On the night of 25 to 26 June 2026, an oil tanker attempted to transit the Strait of Hormuz without obtaining Iranian authorisation and was subsequently targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the account presented, the American tanker, sailing under the flag of a third country, was testing Tehran’s resolve to enforce what it considers its sovereign authority over the Strait of Hormuz. The incident also served as an attempt to undermine the ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, in which Iranian sovereignty over the strategic waterway reportedly formed a central pillar.
Using the attack on the tanker as justification, US forces launched strikes against Iranian islands near the Strait of Hormuz, prompting Tehran to retaliate by targeting American military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and elsewhere.
At the same time, another challenge to the agreement unfolded in Lebanon. Washington reportedly sought to separate the various regional fronts by pressuring the Lebanese president to approve a ceasefire agreement with the Israeli occupation that extended well beyond military arrangements, effectively requiring Lebanon to recognise and normalise relations with the occupying entity.
A New Version of the May 17 Agreement
A close reading of the proposed framework reveals that its opening clause affirms “Israel and Lebanon’s right to exist in peace” and expresses their shared desire to live securely as two neighbouring sovereign states. It further states that both parties intend to permanently end the conflict, address its root causes, formally terminate any state of war between them, and resolve outstanding issues through direct bilateral negotiations under American mediation and support.
The framework also reportedly legitimises the continued presence of Israeli occupation forces in occupied Lebanese territory by linking their withdrawal to the dismantling and disarmament of Hezbollah. It specifically calls for verification of the disarmament of non state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure, allowing the Israeli military to gradually redeploy outside Lebanese territory. This process would be governed by a security annex reportedly drafted in the United States.
Under the proposal, Israeli withdrawal would remain conditional upon the Lebanese state’s phased implementation of the agreement, particularly the elimination of all weapons outside official state institutions. Responsibility for security would gradually be transferred to the Lebanese Army in areas adjacent to those controlled by Israeli occupation forces, effectively positioning the army as a buffer between the resistance and the occupation.
According to the analysis, such an arrangement would inevitably create direct confrontation between the resistance and the Lebanese Army should resistance operations against the occupation continue, raising the prospect of internal conflict or even civil war, a possibility reportedly discussed by Israeli political commentators.
The framework also stipulates that the Lebanese government should seek support from the United States and Arab states to achieve the disarmament of non state armed groups. This has drawn comparisons with the multinational forces deployed in Lebanon in 1982, which participated in military operations against forces resisting the Israeli occupation.
Further provisions commit the Lebanese government to establishing military coordination mechanisms under American sponsorship while launching a conditional programme to support the Lebanese Army, rebuild the country and revive its economy. Critics argue that this effectively conditions reconstruction assistance upon the marginalisation of the resistance, acceptance of the Israeli occupation and normalisation with the Zionist entity.
The agreement also explicitly states that reconstruction funds must not reach armed groups, a provision interpreted as targeting communities that support the resistance. It additionally calls for the establishment of working groups and direct negotiating tracks aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace and security agreement through confidence building measures, ultimately leading to lasting peace and regional stability under American sponsorship and mediation.
Supporters of this analysis argue that the framework closely resembles the content and structure of the 17 May Agreement, suggesting that the United States, Israel and sections of Lebanon’s political establishment are attempting to implement what they failed to achieve more than four decades ago.
The Response of the Axis of Resistance
The reaction in Lebanon was swift. Hezbollah supporters, alongside opponents of the agreement from other political parties and movements, took to the streets to reject the proposed framework.
Within this context, Lebanon is viewed as a key indicator of progress or setbacks in negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Given that Iran reportedly placed Lebanon at the top of its conditions for accepting a ceasefire with the United States, the renewed push for this framework is seen as evidence that negotiations between the two sides are facing significant difficulties.
Developments in Lebanon also coincide with renewed tensions in the Gulf, where exchanges of fire between American and Iranian forces have resumed. These developments suggest that Iranian leaders increasingly believe another direct confrontation with the United States may be approaching.
This perspective is reflected in a statement issued by Iran’s Assembly of Experts, reportedly approved by 62 of its 86 members, endorsing the decisions of Supreme Leader Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei and stressing that Iranian negotiators must adhere to his directives. The statement argues that Washington is using negotiations to rebuild its military capabilities before launching another attack against the Islamic Republic.
The statement insists that none of Iran’s negotiating positions should be compromised, including its right to uranium enrichment, which the Supreme Leader has declared non negotiable. It also reiterates that any ceasefire must apply across all regional fronts while requiring the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Lebanon, together with reconstruction efforts.
The second section of the statement calls for retaliation against US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the assassination of senior Iranian leaders, including Imam Ali Khamenei, General Qassem Soleimani and others.
It further reaffirms Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, insisting that maritime traffic through the strait should be administered jointly by Iran and the only other littoral state, the Sultanate of Oman, without interference from non littoral powers, particularly the United States.
The statement also demands the lifting of all sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets and financial compensation from Washington for damage caused during its military aggression against Iran. Above all, it calls for the withdrawal of American forces from West Asia, referring to the broader Arab Mashriq. This is presented as another indication that renewed confrontation between Tehran and Washington remains increasingly likely amid escalating rhetoric from both sides.
According to this assessment, Iran’s leadership is preparing for a prolonged conflict while simultaneously preparing the domestic front. This helps explain the statement’s emphasis on rejecting any narrative of weakness, preventing Iranian negotiators from conceding any of the principles established by the Supreme Leader.
The statement also reinforces the Supreme Leader’s constitutional authority by affirming that final decisions on strategic matters rest solely with him, requiring the president, the government and all subordinate institutions to seek his approval before making major decisions.
In preparation for a potentially extended conflict, the statement further stresses the continuation of popular mobilisation while reaffirming the Assembly of Experts’ commitment to supporting the leadership and intervening against any deviation from the strategic direction established by Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei.
Where the Negotiations May Be Heading
Taken together, these developments suggest that US Iranian negotiations may not be moving towards a favourable conclusion. Instead, the current ceasefire may represent little more than a temporary pause while the US administration waits for the upcoming midterm elections later this year.
During this period, Washington appears to be seeking additional leverage before any future confrontation resumes. This helps explain its reported pressure on Lebanon to approve the proposed framework agreement with Israel, thereby breaking the principle of unified regional fronts that Iran continues to insist upon.
At the same time, the United States is reportedly working to establish an “Islamic NATO” comprising several Sunni majority regional powers, including Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, with the stated objective of containing Iran.
However, this proposed alliance faces significant internal contradictions. Pakistan continues to view Iran as a natural partner in balancing the growing India Israel partnership.
Egypt, while not necessarily considering Iran a comfortable ally, is portrayed as placing greater priority on what it views as threats to its national security posed by Israel on one side and Türkiye’s ambiguous regional role on the other. This concern is reinforced by Israeli and Turkish influence across Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Syria, all of which directly affect Egypt’s strategic environment.
Conclusion
Taken as a whole, these developments do not point towards a durable peace in the region. Rather, they suggest that the current period may represent only a temporary interruption before the conflict re-emerges in new and potentially more complex forms.
