After four days of negotiations and the conclusion of the fifth round of direct talks, Lebanon and Israel signed a framework agreement in Washington on Friday, 26 June, aimed at opening diplomatic channels to end the war between the two sides through a complex and phased political and security process.
The 14 point agreement has sparked widespread debate across the Arab world. Supporters view it as a realistic attempt to end the prolonged conflict that has placed immense strain on Lebanon, while critics warn it could quietly pave the way for eventual normalisation with Israel. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun described the agreement as “a first step” towards restoring Lebanon’s full sovereignty over its territory without compromise, while thanking the United States for hosting and sponsoring the negotiations.
Despite the optimism surrounding the announcement, the publicly released framework falls well short of a final settlement. With implementation mechanisms still unclear, the agreement appears to mark the beginning of a lengthy process of political and security negotiations rather than its conclusion. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforced this view, describing it as merely the first step rather than the end of the road.
As a result, questions continue to mount over whether this agreement can survive the political and security challenges surrounding it. Can it overcome the obstacles that threaten to derail it, and how will Lebanon, Israel and Hezbollah respond? More importantly, does this represent a pragmatic security arrangement imposed by current military realities, or the first stage of a gradual path towards full normalisation between Lebanon and Israel?
Four Key Foundations of the Agreement
The agreement is built upon four principal pillars that define its overall direction.
The first is Lebanon’s preliminary recognition of Israel’s right to exist peacefully, coupled with a willingness to formally end the state of war through direct negotiations under American sponsorship. For many observers, this represents one of the most politically significant aspects of the agreement.
The second pillar links any Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanese territory to a gradual and conditional process through which the Lebanese state re-establishes effective control over all its territory. Under the proposal, the Lebanese Army would first deploy in two pilot zones, one north of the Litani River and another to its south, before gradually expanding its control.
Should the Lebanese Army fail to secure these areas, Israel would retain its military presence in much of the territory it currently controls.
This means there is no commitment to a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made this clear, stating that Israel would remain within the southern security zone, describing it as a major achievement that would continue for as long as Hezbollah remained armed and capable of threatening Israel.
Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth also reported that the framework contains no clear implementation timetable, only provisions for two trial areas from which Israeli forces would withdraw before being replaced by the Lebanese Army.
The third and arguably most sensitive pillar commits the Lebanese government to dismantling Hezbollah’s military and security infrastructure, disarming the group and placing all decisions relating to war, peace and the use of force exclusively under state authority. Such a commitment raises the prospect of direct confrontation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah, placing Lebanon’s domestic stability under significant pressure.
The fourth pillar concerns international assistance. Military support for the Lebanese Army and economic aid for reconstruction would be released only in stages as implementation milestones are verified. The agreement also emphasises preventing reconstruction funds or financial assistance from reaching armed groups.
Taken together, the agreement is not simply an effort to end hostilities. It represents an attempt to fundamentally reshape relations between Beirut and Tel Aviv around state sovereignty and security, with Lebanon’s ability to fulfil its commitments determining whether Israeli withdrawal and international support ultimately materialise.
Lebanon’s Sovereignty Faces Its Greatest Test
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the agreement is that it places Lebanon’s concept of sovereignty under direct examination.
The Lebanese Army would be expected to establish complete control over southern Lebanon while ensuring that no military or security organisations outside state authority continue operating there. The armed forces would become the sole institution responsible for national security decisions.
In principle, this aligns with Lebanon’s longstanding political position that only the state should possess weapons and authority over war and peace. In practice, however, transforming that principle into reality could prove exceptionally difficult.
Should Hezbollah reject the agreement or refuse to comply, the Lebanese Army could find itself confronting the group either directly or indirectly.
While the agreement offers Beirut an opportunity to strengthen state institutions, restore security authority and unlock foreign military and economic support, it also places an enormous burden on the government by requiring it to achieve what previous administrations could not, namely limiting Hezbollah’s independent military capabilities.
The challenge extends well beyond security matters. Hezbollah’s position is deeply intertwined with Lebanon’s sectarian balance, its role within the country’s political system and Iran’s regional influence. Consequently, the pursuit of state sovereignty could trigger a serious domestic crisis if not managed with extreme caution.
Hezbollah’s Dilemma
Hezbollah rejected the framework agreement even before its final version was announced.
MP Hassan Fadlallah, a member of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, accused the Lebanese government of handing Israel a free political victory and insisted that the agreement would have no practical effect on the ground, signalling that Hezbollah does not consider itself bound by its provisions.
The group’s opposition quickly moved beyond political statements. Supporters organised motorcycle convoys through several areas of Beirut, including Bashara al Khoury, Riad al Solh and the Airport Road, sending a clear message that Hezbollah remains prepared to use public mobilisation if negotiations threaten its strategic position.
For Hezbollah, the agreement directly targets the foundations of its influence. The organisation has built its political legitimacy around resistance against Israel, the defence of southern Lebanon and maintaining military, security and economic capabilities independent of the Lebanese state.
Any effort to disarm the group, remove it from southern Lebanon or place all security decisions under government control would undermine the very foundations upon which its influence has rested for decades.
Rather than accepting such changes, Hezbollah is more likely to transform the agreement into a domestic political battle, portraying it as a step towards normalisation with Israel and the abandonment of resistance in order to reinforce support within its own constituency.
Israel Emerges as the Primary Beneficiary
Based on the publicly available provisions, Israel appears to gain the greatest strategic advantage.
The agreement allows Israel to convert recent military gains in southern Lebanon into long term security arrangements while maintaining influence under a political and legal framework.
Israel’s objective extends well beyond securing another temporary ceasefire. It seeks guarantees preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding its military infrastructure or re-establishing its presence near the border, thereby addressing what Israeli leaders have long regarded as a major strategic threat.
Accordingly, Israel insists upon three conditions: no withdrawal before Hezbollah is fully neutralised as a military threat, no lasting calm without removing Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, and no recognition of Lebanon’s effective sovereignty until Beirut proves it can enforce state authority and monopolise weapons.
The difficulty lies in the fact that these conditions are unlikely to be met in the near future. This creates the possibility that the agreement may instead legitimise a prolonged Israeli military presence in parts of southern Lebanon.
At the same time, Hezbollah can continue citing that presence as justification for retaining its weapons, arguing that resistance remains necessary while Israeli forces continue occupying Lebanese territory.
Lebanon therefore finds itself trapped between two opposing conditions. Israel refuses to withdraw before Hezbollah is disarmed, while Hezbollah refuses to disarm before Israel withdraws. Rather than resolving the crisis, the agreement risks perpetuating it.
Six Major Challenges That Could Derail the Agreement
Despite President Aoun’s optimism, the broad language of the agreement and the absence of detailed implementation mechanisms leave it vulnerable to several serious obstacles.
The first challenge concerns sequencing. Which side acts first? Will Israel withdraw from the designated pilot areas before Hezbollah dismantles its military infrastructure, or must Hezbollah move first? With neither side trusting the other, this issue alone could stall implementation indefinitely.
The second challenge involves vague terminology. What exactly constitutes dismantling Hezbollah’s military structure? Does it require withdrawing fighters, surrendering weapons, dismantling missile sites, ending military operations or severing Iranian support? Without precise definitions, competing interpretations are almost inevitable.
The third, and potentially most dangerous, challenge lies within Lebanon itself. Hezbollah’s weapons are deeply connected to sectarian politics and the country’s fragile political balance. Any attempt to address this issue through force risks creating severe internal instability and widening divisions across Lebanese society.
The fourth challenge concerns Israel’s own conduct. Continued airstrikes or military operations justified as preventive security measures could undermine confidence in the agreement, strengthen Hezbollah’s argument for remaining armed and place the Lebanese government under intense domestic pressure.
The fifth challenge is the United States itself. Washington is currently the agreement’s principal sponsor and guarantor, but its commitment ultimately depends upon changing political priorities. Under an unpredictable administration, shifting strategic interests could quickly weaken American engagement, leaving the agreement without meaningful backing.
The sixth and perhaps most significant challenge concerns Iran. It is difficult to imagine Tehran accepting the weakening of Hezbollah, its most influential regional ally and one of the central pillars of what it describes as the “Axis of Resistance”, without responding.
Any effort to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities is unlikely to be viewed in Tehran as merely an internal Lebanese matter. Instead, it would almost certainly be interpreted as a direct challenge to Iran’s regional influence, potentially prompting political support, increased pressure within Lebanon or actions elsewhere in the region aimed at disrupting the agreement.
Conclusion
Based on the agreement’s current framework, it remains far too early to speak of full normalisation between Lebanon and Israel.
The document contains significant political, security and regional challenges that make its implementation uncertain. Rather than representing a comprehensive peace settlement, it appears to be a pragmatic security arrangement shaped by military realities and sustained American pressure.
Whether it eventually evolves into broader political normalisation will depend on developments inside Lebanon, Israel and the wider region. At present, those conditions remain far from being realised.
