An Israeli analysis has warned that any Syrian military move against Hezbollah could ignite a wider regional confrontation stretching from Lebanon to Iran and Türkiye, arguing that Syrian President Ahmad al Sharaa is currently avoiding such a step out of concern that it could trigger an uncontrollable Sunni-Shia conflict.
The assessment was presented by researcher Yaron Friedman in an article published by the Hebrew newspaper Maariv. Friedman examined the possibility of the Syrian administration becoming directly involved in a confrontation with Hezbollah, arguing that President Ahmad al Sharaa is facing a complex equation in which both external pressure and domestic considerations are preventing such a move for the time being.
External Pressure and Internal Constraints
According to Friedman, Ahmad al Sharaa, who came to power in Syria in December 2024, now stands at a decisive crossroads. The article claims he is facing pressure from both the United States and Saudi Arabia to deploy Syrian forces into Beirut’s southern suburbs and bring the conflict with Hezbollah to an end.
Despite these pressures, al Sharaa has officially rejected such a move. The writer questioned why he continues to refrain from acting and pointed to what he described as the “catastrophic scenario of a Sunni Shia conflict” that the Syrian president is seeking to avoid.
The article also noted recent remarks by US President Donald Trump, who reportedly said he would prefer Syria to deal with Hezbollah rather than have the Israeli military destroy an entire building to target a handful of the group’s members.
Friedman argued that such a proposal could be highly attractive to al Sharaa. Success against Hezbollah, he suggested, could earn the Syrian government broad support from Iran’s regional rivals, strengthen the legitimacy of the new administration, open the way for Lebanon to begin a new chapter, revive its economy, and end three decades of Iranian influence.
However, Friedman described this view, which he says is held within parts of the White House, as deeply flawed and reflective of Trump’s limited understanding of the complexities of the Middle East.
Why al Sharaa Remains Cautious
According to the analysis, al Sharaa has approached the issue with restraint and patience, making it unlikely that he would embark on an operation with unpredictable consequences.
Friedman argued that pressure on Damascus extends beyond Washington and Riyadh. Former figures within Syria’s Islamist opposition are said to be waiting for an opportunity to seek revenge against Hezbollah for its role alongside the Assad government during the Syrian conflict.
The article also referred to a Salafi current in northern Lebanon, particularly in Tripoli, that is reportedly waiting for an opportunity to join any confrontation against Hezbollah.
The Syrian Military’s Capabilities
Friedman described the newly formed Syrian military as lacking modern military equipment and resembling a collection of militias more than a conventional army.
Nevertheless, he argued that it demonstrated considerable effectiveness by toppling the Assad government and ending Kurdish self rule within a relatively short period. Its fighters, he added, gained extensive battlefield experience during the years of civil war.
Despite this, he stressed that confronting Hezbollah would present a completely different challenge from any opponent Syrian forces have previously faced.
Hezbollah Remains a Formidable Opponent
The article argues that time currently favours Damascus. Hezbollah has lost its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah, while the Israeli military continues to gradually degrade the group’s military capabilities.
Even so, Friedman maintained that victory over Hezbollah by al Sharaa and his Lebanese allies remains far from guaranteed, noting that Hezbollah spent three decades building its military strength with Iranian support.
He also recalled that during the Syrian civil war many opposition fighters expressed admiration for Hezbollah’s battlefield performance.
Citing journalist Murtada Radwan’s book The Revolution That Prolonged Old Age, Friedman quoted one jihadist fighter as saying Hezbollah members continued advancing despite coming under heavy fire, wondering whether they feared death or were using narcotics.
The article further argued that jihadist forces managed to defeat Hezbollah in 2015 and claimed that, had it not been for Syrian intervention at the time, al Sharaa would have seized power years earlier. Instead, he reportedly remained in Idlib for another decade until conditions shifted in his favour.
Fear of Losing Control
According to Friedman, al Sharaa’s greatest concern is that sending Syrian troops into Lebanon could quickly spiral beyond his control.
He compared the scenario to Syria’s military intervention in Beirut in 1975 and Hezbollah’s entry into Syria in 2012.
With Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon weakened by ongoing Israeli operations, the article argues that Syrian forces would instead find themselves fighting in the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Friedman suggested that Syrian troops could enter Lebanon through the Homs to Al Qusayr corridor before advancing into the Bekaa Valley and then towards Beirut’s northern southern suburbs in coordination with allied groups based in Tripoli. Such a scenario, he claimed, would force Hezbollah to fight on three separate fronts.
Risk of Regional Escalation
The article argues that any future fighting would differ significantly from Israeli military operations.
According to Friedman, Syrian forces would enter the conflict driven by revenge for the hundreds of thousands of victims of the Syrian war and could, in his view, commit killings and ethnic cleansing against Shia communities.
He also suggested that Iran could retaliate by launching missile strikes against Damascus and other Syrian cities, recalling previous Iranian threats to respond to attacks targeting Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Given Syria’s limited air defence capabilities, Friedman warned that the country could become vulnerable to severe retaliation.
He further argued that direct Iranian involvement could trigger Turkish military intervention, describing Ankara as al Sharaa’s principal regional backer. He referred to what he described as Turkish threats against Iran in March 2026 following missile launches targeting Hatay Province.
Washington’s Potential Incentives
Friedman concluded that al Sharaa fully understands the dangers of a broad Sunni Shia war and therefore continues to insist publicly that Syria has been exhausted by years of conflict and that its primary battle is now against poverty.
However, he argued that pressure on Damascus will continue as long as the Hezbollah issue remains unresolved.
The article did not rule out future American proposals that could include substantial economic assistance and possible concessions involving Israel, including a withdrawal from the security zone in Quneitra.
It also suggested that the Lebanese government could eventually face a stark choice between continuing under Iranian influence or accepting a military solution led by Damascus, arguing that some in Beirut may ultimately regard the latter as the less costly option.
Friedman concluded that al Sharaa is currently acting with caution and waiting for circumstances to evolve, but changing regional conditions could eventually prompt him to reconsider his position.
