Political and media circles in the United States are currently engaged in an intense debate marked by frustration and self-examination, particularly following the recent agreement with Iran and its implications for American influence in the Middle East.
Major American newspapers and magazines have offered varying interpretations of the current moment through analyses, reports and opinion pieces. Yet despite their differences, they converge on one central conclusion: the war ended far from the objectives Washington originally declared, and its consequences may extend well beyond Iran, potentially reshaping America’s global standing and long term strategy.
A Reverse Marshall Plan
In an extensive political analysis published by The Atlantic, Thomas Wright, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argued that the agreement signed by President Donald Trump on Wednesday evening at the Palace of Versailles represents a fundamental turning point that confirms the decline of American influence.
Wright drew a striking historical comparison between the new agreement and the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the Second World War.
The original Marshall Plan was designed to consolidate an American victory in Europe.
This new arrangement, Wright argued, serves a very different purpose. Rather than cementing victory, it is intended to manage the consequences of what he describes as a defeat that pushes the United States one step further towards withdrawing from the Middle East.
The article revisits the Marshall Plan announced by Secretary of State George Marshall in 1948, under which Washington provided more than 13 billion dollars to rebuild Western Europe after the devastation of war.
Trump’s agreement with Iran, by contrast, commits the United States and its regional partners to guaranteeing that Tehran receives at least 300 billion dollars for reconstruction and economic development.
Wright describes this arrangement as, in effect, “a Marshall Plan for the Iranian regime”.
He criticises what he calls the “extreme ambiguity” surrounding the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran.
According to Wright, the agreement speaks broadly about peace and regional stability and reiterates Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
However, it offers few concrete details regarding the limits of uranium enrichment or the mechanisms for implementation.
Likewise, the promise of at least 300 billion dollars to rehabilitate Iran’s economy remains, in Wright’s view, more of a political framework than a clearly defined programme.
Iran’s Gains and America’s Unmet Objectives
Wright argues that Iran emerged from the war with tangible gains.
These include sanctions relief, renewed oil exports, the release of frozen financial assets and the possibility of receiving substantial economic support should a final agreement be reached.
The United States, meanwhile, failed to achieve its stated objectives.
Washington did not significantly reduce Iran’s regional influence, nor did it impose strict limitations on Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Wright goes further, arguing that the war should never have been fought in the first place.
The manner in which it was conducted, he writes, convinced the Iranian government that it was fighting for its survival, especially after political leaders were targeted.
As a result, Tehran resorted to pressure tactics it had avoided in previous confrontations, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting regional interests.
According to Wright, one of Iran’s greatest achievements may ultimately be weakening America’s determination to continue acting as the dominant security actor in the Middle East.
This shift comes at a time when public support for the American-Israeli alliance is declining inside the United States and scepticism about continued involvement in the region is growing.
Three Lessons From a Failed War
Writing in The Washington Post, columnist Jason Willick examined the conflict from a different perspective and identified three key lessons from what he described as “the failed war in Iran”.
Willick argues that the war’s outcome makes it difficult to claim it served America’s national interests.
According to his analysis, Washington consumed large quantities of strategic munitions needed to deter both Russia and China.
Meanwhile, the consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz drove up prices and eroded many of the economic gains achieved during the early phase of Trump’s current term.
The first lesson, Willick argues, is that regime change remains an extraordinarily dangerous war objective.
He believes the United States repeated mistakes made during the Iraq War by linking military success to internal political transformation in a Middle Eastern state.
After the assassination of Iranian leaders at the beginning of the conflict and the collapse of the regime change scenario, Washington found itself trapped in an open-ended confrontation without clearly achievable goals.
The second lesson is that American power has limits.
Military, political and economic constraints apply even to the world’s strongest power.
Willick argues that the agreement ending the war reflects this reality.
Forcing the Strait of Hormuz open would have required greater escalation and far higher costs, while prolonging the conflict would have increased economic pressures on the administration as congressional midterm elections approach.
The third lesson concerns constitutional governance.
Willick criticises the decision to wage war without explicit authorisation from Congress, arguing that the absence of public and institutional debate meant fundamental questions about the war’s objectives and consequences were never adequately addressed.
In his view, the American political system would function more effectively if it restored some of the constitutional checks and balances intended to govern decisions of war and peace.
The Role of External Pressure
In a very different contribution, Foreign Policy published an article by Alice Baumgartner, Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California.
Her argument offers an alternative understanding of how the United States interacts with the outside world.
While other commentators focused on strategic failure in the Middle East, Baumgartner argues that international pressure and criticism have historically helped the United States live up to its own founding principles of liberty and justice.
She points to several historical examples.
One of them is Mexico’s abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, which transformed the country into a refuge for people fleeing enslavement in the American South.
This, she argues, contributed to undermining the institution of slavery inside the United States itself.
Baumgartner also discusses the role of international investigative commissions during the 1920s and 1930s.
Foreign governments and diaspora communities used these legal forums to challenge discriminatory laws and racial violence inside the United States.
The resulting diplomatic embarrassment pushed Washington to reassess its human rights record and move closer to international standards.
For Baumgartner, American history cannot be understood solely as the product of domestic struggles.
It must also be viewed as the result of external pressures and criticisms that exposed contradictions between the country’s declared principles and its actual practices.
She concludes that foreigners have not always threatened American values.
At times, they have helped the United States adhere to them more faithfully.
The American Empire Debate
In an opinion piece published by The New York Times, editor John Guida Madar discussed the question: “Is America an empire?”
The article centred on a conversation with Herman Mark Schultz, Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.
Schultz argues that American dominance is not based on territorial expansion.
Instead, it rests on military, financial and intellectual power that enables the centre to impose its conditions globally.
Guida, meanwhile, argues that Trump’s current administration is witnessing a struggle between traditional state institutions and the ambitions of Project 2025.
He accuses the project of weakening the foundations of American power in favour of a billionaire class by undermining scientific research, encouraging poorly planned wars and shaping policy to serve a narrow elite while transforming labour worldwide into a system of freelance and precarious work.
Schultz believes the Iran war exposed growing strategic confusion within the United States.
At the same time, he argues that the international system is entering a period of transition marked by China’s rise.
The coming years, he suggests, are likely to produce a more fragmented and competitive global economy, one in which American power remains significant but faces increasingly serious challenges.
