On 10 June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered a speech outlining what appeared to be a new security doctrine for Turkey.
“Turkey’s security does not begin only in Hatay,” he declared. “It begins in Aleppo and Damascus, and it begins in Beirut as well.”
He added: “We are fully aware of the ultimate objective behind the obsession with the Promised Land. God willing, we will never allow it.”
Erdogan also warned that if Turkey’s rights, or those of Turkish Cypriots, are challenged in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara’s response would be “clear and extremely decisive”.
The remarks reflect Turkey’s growing ambition to expand its security outlook beyond its geographical borders and immediate neighbouring regions.
By the beginning of 2026, Turkey had largely completed its shift from acting as a functional bridge between East and West to embracing what can be described as offensive realism.
This approach has enabled Ankara to establish a broad sphere of influence stretching from the Caucasus to the Horn of Africa. It has also allowed Turkey to fill the geopolitical vacuum in post-Assad Syria, bringing it closer than ever to achieving the strategic aspirations associated with the National Pact, not necessarily as formal borders, but as a sphere of political and economic influence.
Growing Fears of an Israeli Project for Regional Dominance
Since the beginning of this year, and particularly following the American-Israeli war against Iran, a growing number of Turkish officials have begun to question whether their country’s previously functional relationship with Israel can shield it from what they see as an Israeli project aimed at dominating the region.
Although relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have often been accompanied by populist rhetoric from both sides, many voices in Turkish media and strategic think tanks have increasingly argued that Israel may eventually confront Turkey directly.
From the Israeli perspective, recent developments in its security doctrine point in another direction altogether.
Over the past several years, war has increasingly come to be viewed not as an exceptional circumstance, but as a permanent condition that must be continuously reproduced.
This means constantly creating new enemies and recycling existential threats.
The list of adversaries has expanded from Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and Iranians to potentially include Turks, Egyptians and Gulf states in the future.
In this framework, the continuation of wars becomes a logical consequence of a political structure that depends on the existence of a permanent enemy in order to justify endless conflict.
Two Competing Visions for the Region
The Middle East is increasingly being shaped by two competing visions.
Once the fighting with Iran subsides, and if the conditions that sustained confrontation with Tehran can no longer be reproduced, Israel’s continued reliance on conflict may push the region towards a new phase of geopolitical rivalry.
This emerging landscape could pit two projects of regional dominance against each other.
On one side stands Israel, seeking to preserve and expand its strategic supremacy.
On the other is Turkey, whose influence has grown significantly following regional transformations and the weakening of the Axis of Resistance.
Israeli analysts have increasingly described Turkey as “the new Iran”, reflecting the perception that Ankara may become Israel’s next major strategic challenger.
Based on the prevailing strategic mindset in Israel, its approach after the Iran war may shift towards limiting the influence of a rising competitor.
Israel’s current regional ambitions increasingly clash with Turkey’s expanding role.
Syria as the Primary Arena of Competition
Israeli efforts are likely to focus on reshaping the regional environment in ways that constrain Turkish influence.
This would not stop at excluding Ankara from its traditional sphere of influence in the Levant.
It could extend to challenging Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, with the aim of depriving Turkey of the geopolitical leverage it has gained over major shipping routes and curbing its broader regional ambitions before they fully mature.
Within this context, Syria is emerging as the most likely arena for competition.
Since 2024, Syria has effectively become a buffer state separating Turkish and Israeli spheres of influence.
Turkey maintains extensive influence across parts of the country, while Israel continues to occupy territories inside Syria and seeks to exploit political contradictions and any emerging security vacuum.
Given these realities, Syria could evolve into a proxy battleground between the two sides.
A New Era of Regional Competition
The Middle East is entering a new phase in the aftermath of the Iran war.
Several scenarios remain possible.
The region could witness a proxy conflict in Syria.
Tensions may escalate in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Alternatively, temporary understandings imposed by major powers could postpone a broader confrontation.
What appears increasingly certain, however, is that the region is moving towards a complex struggle that extends beyond military power.
The competition will encompass economics, maritime corridors and political legitimacy.
Understanding the coming Turkish-Israeli rivalry therefore requires more than simply following political speeches or populist rhetoric.
It demands a deeper understanding of the strategic structures shaping the region, structures that increasingly turn the Middle East into an open arena for competing projects of regional dominance and an environment in which perpetual conflict remains, for Israel, an existential necessity.
