More than three months have now passed since the United States and Israel launched their military offensive against Iran, including the ceasefire that came into effect on 8 April. This may be an appropriate moment to assess what each side has gained and what each has lost.
To do so, it is necessary to revisit the objectives publicly declared by both Washington and Tel Aviv when the campaign began. At the time, it was argued that Iran had reached the threshold of acquiring a nuclear weapon capable of threatening not only Israel but potentially the United States itself. Addressing this threat, it was claimed, required not only the destruction of Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also the elimination of its senior political, military and technical leadership, foremost among them the Supreme Leader.
According to the stated rationale, such a strategy would pave the way for the collapse of the political system established after the Islamic Revolution and facilitate its replacement with a government aligned with American and Israeli interests.
It was also argued that Iran’s broader military capabilities needed to be neutralised. This included its air force, navy, ballistic missile programme, drone fleet, launch platforms and military infrastructure in general.
As the conflict unfolded, another factor emerged, one that appears not to have been fully anticipated despite being both foreseeable and logical: Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass through this waterway, along with numerous commodities essential to global economic activity, particularly agricultural fertilisers. Reopening the strait to international shipping subsequently became one of Washington’s key objectives.
With these goals in mind, it is worth examining the current situation.
Regime Change Failed to Materialise
Regarding the objective of regime change in Iran and the installation of a government friendly to the United States and Israel, the initial stages of the offensive appeared significant. During the opening hours of the campaign, a substantial number of senior figures were reportedly eliminated, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This was followed by the deaths of numerous other first-tier military, security and technical officials.
Yet these developments failed to produce any meaningful destabilisation of the state’s governing structure. It became increasingly evident that replacement cadres, largely drawn from the more hardline elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), quickly assumed leadership positions.
Equally notable was the failure of another expectation reportedly conveyed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the American administration when advocating for the operation. According to those claims, mass protests would erupt across Iran, aided by Mossad-linked networks, demanding the overthrow of the government. No such scenario materialised.
Assessing the Military Dimension
American officials have maintained that the campaign resulted in the comprehensive destruction of Iran’s air force and navy, as well as most of its ballistic missile inventory, launch platforms, drone capabilities and significant portions of its military infrastructure.
However, any assessment must acknowledge the limited strategic value Iran’s conventional air and naval forces were expected to have in a conflict against an adversary possessing vastly superior technological and operational capabilities.
Iran’s air force, constrained by decades of sanctions since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, consisted largely of ageing American-made aircraft acquired during the Shah’s era. These platforms were already considered obsolete compared to the systems fielded by both Israel and the United States.
The same applied to Iran’s navy. The vessels reportedly destroyed included ageing American frigates dating back to the pre-revolutionary period, supplemented by domestically produced smaller craft. Like the air force, these assets were never expected to pose a serious challenge to overwhelming American naval power, including one of the US Navy’s largest aircraft carriers deployed during the conflict.
Recognising the limitations of its conventional military forces, Iran had long pursued an alternative doctrine under the leadership of the IRGC. This strategy focused on domestically produced ballistic missiles and drones that could be manufactured relatively cheaply while serving as substitutes for technologically advanced air power.
At sea, Iran invested heavily in fast attack boats capable of delivering explosives against larger naval vessels and deploying naval mines. Thousands of these craft were produced as part of what became known as the “Mosquito Fleet”, also operated by the IRGC.
The Effectiveness of Asymmetrical Warfare
Developments during the war demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach.
Iran successfully utilised what military strategists describe as asymmetrical capabilities in both the aerial and maritime domains, inflicting losses that its adversaries had not anticipated when the offensive began in late February.
On the Israeli front, a number of Iranian ballistic missiles and Shahed drones, previously used extensively by Russia during the war in Ukraine, managed to penetrate Israel’s layered air defence systems.
These included the Iron Dome, primarily covering the Tel Aviv area, David’s Sling, which protects much of the rest of the country, and the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems designed for broader regional coverage.
Several projectiles reportedly reached central Israeli territory, including the vicinity of Dimona, home to Israel’s nuclear facilities, causing both material damage and casualties.
Damage Inflicted on American Forces
On the American front, Iranian missiles and drones succeeded in striking military bases across the region, damaging facilities and equipment.
According to assessments from independent organisations, including American sources, one of the losses involved damage to a THAAD missile defence battery. The United States possesses only eight such systems worldwide, each valued at approximately US$1 billion.
The attacks reportedly also destroyed 42 aircraft on the ground, including F-15 and F-35 fighter jets, along with a reconnaissance aircraft whose replacement cost is estimated at US$700 million.
These losses came in addition to the enormous expenditure on munitions. Offensive weapons included Tomahawk cruise missiles, each costing approximately US$1.3 million, while defensive Patriot interceptors carry a price tag of around US$4 million per missile.
Such costs help explain why total war expenditure may exceed official estimates. While the Pentagon informed Congress that the conflict had cost approximately US$29 billion, independent assessments place the figure between US$40 billion and US$50 billion.
Economic Consequences
Economically, all parties have paid a price.
Within the United States, organisations including Moody’s estimate that the conflict has cost the American public around US$100 billion when accounting for military expenditure borne by taxpayers and rising energy prices.
Israel’s economic burden has been somewhat mitigated by its energy structure. Natural gas, in which Israel is largely self-sufficient, now accounts for approximately 45 per cent of domestic energy consumption. Meanwhile, oil imports from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have continued to flow despite higher global prices.
Iran, however, faces immense reconstruction costs. Repairing widespread destruction across military installations and civilian infrastructure resulting from American and Israeli air strikes, which according to several estimates targeted more than 17,000 locations, is expected to require hundreds of billions of dollars over many years.
These costs are compounded by losses arising from American efforts to restrict vessels transporting Iranian exports abroad.
Political Fallout
Beyond military and economic considerations, the political consequences of the war have been substantial.
In the United States, the conflict has contributed to a sharp decline in President Donald Trump’s approval ratings. This is widely expected to negatively affect Republican prospects in the upcoming midterm elections.
For Israel, despite achieving what can reasonably be described as a historic accomplishment through direct American participation in a large-scale military campaign against Iran, a goal Netanyahu reportedly pursued for three decades, significant political costs have emerged.
International criticism of Israel has intensified across both governmental and public spheres in much of the world.
Particularly significant is the shift occurring within the United States itself, Israel’s most important ally. Changing attitudes are becoming visible not only among the general public but also within influential institutions and circles that shape both public and official opinion.
A growing debate has emerged regarding the extent to which American and Israeli interests genuinely align. Questions are increasingly being raised about whether Israel is leveraging American power to advance its own objectives, even when those objectives may conflict with US national interests.
Such discussions would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago.
The long-term implications could be considerable, especially given that much of the growing criticism originates among younger Americans under the age of forty, the very demographic likely to hold positions of leadership in the years ahead.
Iran, too, faces political consequences. Its military operations extended beyond American bases and reportedly caused civilian losses in neighbouring countries. This is expected to undermine some of the diplomatic progress Tehran had achieved in recent years with regional states.
No Clear Winners
What conclusions can be drawn from the current state of affairs?
It is evident that neither side achieved its principal objectives.
The anticipated regime change in Iran never occurred. Iran retains military capabilities, and perhaps most importantly, it succeeded in keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed to international shipping, establishing the waterway as a major strategic variable in both the current conflict and any future confrontation.
At the same time, despite its achievements, Iran continues to face severe economic challenges that will inevitably have domestic repercussions in the months and years ahead.
Ultimately, any judgement at this stage must recognise the fluid nature of the situation. The conflict remains shaped by actors whose next moves are difficult to predict.
For now, there is no substitute for waiting to see what comes next.
