On the morning of 8 April, a squadron of fighter jets targeted oil refineries on Iran’s Lavan Island. The strikes came shortly before the ceasefire that halted the American-Israeli air campaign against Iran. Yet according to a report published by The Wall Street Journal, no American or Israeli aircraft took part in the operation. Instead, it was carried out by the United Arab Emirates, the wealthy oil state located across the Arabian Gulf from Iran.
Although Emirati leaders did not confirm responsibility for the attack, the motives behind this strike and the operations that preceded it were clear. For weeks, the UAE had suffered Iranian drone and missile attacks and sought to deter Iranian aggression by demonstrating its own ability to respond. According to American officials, Saudi Arabia also carried out operations against Iran in response to attacks on its territory. However, the UAE’s hardline rhetoric during the war, along with the scale of its operations, set it apart from its neighbours.
Since the beginning of the war, Emirati officials have praised their country’s resilience, readiness to respond, and independence on the global stage. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, stressed the need to confront Iran, which he described as the “main threat” to regional security.
He also praised the “success of the UAE and its model” in withstanding Iranian attacks, affirming that the country “will continue to face challenges with full confidence”.
During the ceasefire, rather than committing to the truce and waiting for the outcome of American-Iranian talks, the UAE sharply criticised other countries in the region for failing to take decisive political or military action against Iran at the beginning of the war. On 1 May, Abu Dhabi withdrew from OPEC in order to separate Emirati oil policy from the organisation’s decisions.
The UAE has long been an important regional player, but today it wants to be recognised as a leading power on par with France or Japan. It does not want the war with Iran to obstruct this transformation. In reality, Iranian attacks in the Gulf have only strengthened the determination of Emirati leaders to push ahead with their pre-war strategy.
At least while the war continues without a decisive outcome, the UAE is betting that stronger ties with Israel, greater distance from other Gulf states, and a close alliance with the United States will help it secure influence and protection. It is also betting that economic expansion across parts of Africa will help deliver prosperity.
In the long run, however, this strategy may isolate the UAE from the rest of the Gulf and make it more dependent on stronger allies, restricting its options rather than strengthening its position.
The Emirati Approach
For decades, the UAE has sought to use its status as a state with efficient institutions in a turbulent region to elevate its global standing. In security affairs, this has been visible through the deployment of its small but highly capable armed forces, along with the use of its vast financial resources to support allies such as General Khalifa Haftar in Libya against Islamic movements whose ideas were seen as a threat to the Emirati regime.
Economically, this approach has involved using sovereign wealth funds and leading national companies, such as the logistics firm DP World and the artificial intelligence giant G42, to attract trade, capital, and advanced technology to Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
Diplomatically, the UAE has presented itself as the closest and most capable American partner in the Gulf, while quietly pursuing a hedging policy. This has included strengthening economic and technological links with China and serving as a financial channel for sanctioned Iranian and Russian capital.
Emirati experts often argue that major strategic bets, even when they carry short-term risks, are necessary to protect the UAE in a region filled with collapsed states and outdated structures.
For example, political science professor Ebtesam Al-Ketbi described Emirati interventions in Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere as “managing fragmentation in order to prevent total collapse”.
The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020 was based on a similar long-term logic. The move provoked angry regional reactions, yet it earned the UAE political credit in Washington and formalised its relationship with the strongest military force in the Middle East and the only regional state possessing nuclear weapons.
Normalisation with Israel is not the only unpopular Emirati policy. The UAE has also supported the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary force fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces since 2023.
The UAE justifies its support for the Rapid Support Forces as a way to limit the influence of Islamic groups within the Sudanese army. Ultimately, however, it seeks the rise of a friendly Sudanese government that would facilitate Emirati economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa.
Meanwhile, Dubai’s gold markets benefit from access to mines controlled by the Rapid Support Forces. This policy has attracted external criticism. During Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearing in January 2025, the US secretary of state described this position as “open support for an entity committing genocide”.
Other countries have also pushed back against Emirati interventions. Last December, when a UAE-backed militia sought to impose full control over southern Yemen, Saudi Arabia saw the move as a challenge to its own spheres of influence. Riyadh publicly accused the UAE of encouraging the militia and intervened militarily to support Yemen’s UN-recognised government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia.
In countries such as Egypt and Tanzania, researchers and activists have accused DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports Group of crowding out local economic activity in favour of Emirati interests. Similar concerns led Djibouti’s government to cancel a 30-year concession granted to DP World in 2018, resulting in the company’s expulsion from the country and the full nationalisation of the port it had operated.
Emirati decision-makers largely dismiss foreign criticism. Ali Al-Nuaimi, a member of the Federal National Council, a semi-parliamentary advisory body, defended his country as the only state willing to act “when others hesitate”, insisting that its policies offer the last and best opportunity to “reshape the region”.
Although criticism over Sudan caused significant frustration and pushed the UAE to lobby intensively to avoid condemnation in Washington and European capitals, the country managed to escape more serious consequences for its involvement in the conflict by making a symbolic appearance in a US-led peace process.
Its massive financial reserves have also allowed it to move past criticism while continuing to build economic relationships with a wide range of partners. Whatever concerns Washington may have about the UAE’s ties with Chinese state-owned companies, Russian oligarchs, or African warlords, the Trump administration granted the UAE access to the most advanced artificial intelligence chips based on promises of future Emirati investment in the United States. This took place alongside Emirati payments to companies linked to the American president.
War Comes Home
The current war with Iran, however, has begun to test the assumption underpinning the Emirati strategy: that the UAE can keep the region’s conflicts outside its borders. Although relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran have fluctuated, Emirati leaders believed that American deterrence, along with Dubai’s role as a “safety valve” for the Iranian economy, would keep the country out of danger.
That did not happen. Of more than 6,000 Iranian drone and missile attacks launched against Gulf states, the overwhelming majority targeted the UAE. They struck civilian infrastructure such as hotels, airports, and data centres, alongside American military sites.
Emirati forces used American air defence technology and Israeli equipment with great effectiveness, limiting the loss of life. Even so, the UAE’s reputation as a safe haven was damaged in the eyes of investors and visitors.
Although the country can still export enough oil to maintain its financial stability, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz caused ships to pile up at Emirati ports and led to the evacuation of luxury hotels.
Emirati officials describe the Iranian bombardment as a defining moment. Yet instead of radically changing policy by cutting ties with Israel or openly attacking Iran, the UAE responded by doubling down on the strategy it had pursued before the war.
For example, the UAE has become more dismissive of the value of Arab states as security partners. In April, Gargash criticised members of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for failing to condemn Iranian attacks on Gulf states.
Later, Gargash criticised the Gulf Cooperation Council for taking a “weak” position, specifically for failing to present a united front against Iran. Emirati leaders and experts have made no secret of their frustration with Saudi Arabia’s peaceful approach towards Iran during the war.
The timing of the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, on the same day as a Saudi-hosted summit on regional integration, sent a clear message and signalled the widening gap between the two countries.
Egypt, for its part, avoided publicly criticising Abu Dhabi and deployed a squadron of fighter jets to the UAE in early May. Yet Emirati leaders feel disappointed that, despite the financial support the UAE provides to Egypt, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi distanced himself from Israel and prioritised diplomatic solutions rather than joining a regional effort to confront Iran.
At the same time, Emirati leaders have emphasised the importance of the United States to their strategy, despite the war raising questions about Washington’s reliability. Before the war, the UAE issued a statement denying that American bases on its territory could be used to attack Iran, but it did little to prevent the Trump administration from launching the attacks.
Once the fighting began, Emirati rhetoric aligned with the most hardline American discourse towards Iran. Less than a month after the outbreak of war, the UAE ambassador to the United States wrote an opinion article in The Wall Street Journal stating that “a mere ceasefire is not enough” to address “all Iranian threats”. He pledged that the UAE would join an international coalition to open the Strait of Hormuz by force.
Yet the Trump administration agreed to a fragile ceasefire, excluded the UAE from subsequent negotiations, and mostly ignored Iranian attacks on the UAE during the truce. Despite the American position overlooking Emirati security concerns, Abu Dhabi continued seeking closer bilateral ties. In mid-April, Badr Jafar, the UAE special envoy for business and philanthropy to the foreign minister, wrote in The New York Times, appealing to the United States and saying the relationship between the two countries was “too valuable to be left without constant care”.
Finally, the war has pushed the UAE closer to Israel. Although the UAE condemned some Israeli actions, such as the bombing of Lebanon, it did not criticise Israel’s role in the outbreak of the war with Iran.
At a media forum held in May, Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al Hashimy said: “I see us continuing in that relationship [with Israel], and I see us continuing to work closely [with Israel] to face some of the major challenges our region is experiencing.”
Israel’s decision to lend air defence systems to the UAE further convinced Abu Dhabi that it must prioritise partners who provide security. Previously, the UAE’s relationship with Israel was a way to build political capital in Washington. It has now become a cornerstone of its security strategy.
Emirati experts continue to stress the central importance of the relationship with the United States, but they also fear that Washington may eventually withdraw from the Middle East, while Israel will not. For the UAE, a close relationship with Israel can compensate for American unreliability and strained relations with other countries in the region.
Where Is Abu Dhabi Heading?
The current war is drawing a dividing line between the UAE and the rest of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh no longer agree on the nature of the Iranian threat. Although both call for stronger Gulf unity, their strategies differ sharply: Abu Dhabi favours collective security and the forceful containment of Iran, while Riyadh favours diplomacy in pursuit of a negotiated settlement with Tehran.
This division limits the diplomatic weight of the Gulf states and keeps them on the margins of American-Iranian negotiations. For the UAE, strengthening ties with Israel may provide some short-term security support, but Tel Aviv cannot strengthen the UAE’s negotiating position in the way a unified Gulf position could.
Furthermore, the Emirati model is unlikely to strengthen the country’s global economic standing under the conditions of the current war. Wealthy individuals from countries with weak institutions may continue to deposit their money in Dubai, and the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC suggests that it plans to increase income by raising oil production. Yet achieving international influence will become much harder if renewed Iranian attacks, or a direct confrontation between the two countries, push talent and advanced industries away from settling in the “capital of finance”.
As the country becomes less attractive to investors and foreign workers, Emirati officials and chief executives may seek economic arrangements that exploit the UAE’s influence in regions such as Africa. By offering financial incentives or security assistance abroad, Abu Dhabi may try to secure greater control over land, supply chains, rare minerals, and data flows.
But this approach has limits. The UAE’s activities in Sudan continue to provoke global anger, and the United States has imposed sanctions on several UAE-linked companies because of their ties to the Rapid Support Forces. Unfair terms also led to DP World’s expulsion from Djibouti. Earlier this year, Emirati involvement in mediating formal relations between Israel and the separatist region of Somaliland led to DP World’s expulsion from Somalia as well.
Despite these setbacks, and the additional disruption caused by the war to shipping through Dubai’s port, the company remains optimistic about its expansion plans in Africa. But if the UAE continues pursuing political control through economic projects on the continent, its activities may undermine conflict-resolution efforts and attract further international criticism.
The future of the war in the Middle East remains deeply uncertain, meaning the UAE could change course again. If negotiations with Iran collapse and the war resumes, it is easy to imagine Emirati fighter jets openly carrying out joint raids with Israeli aircraft, with the UAE placing its full weight behind the use of force to address regional files.
But if the Trump administration blocks renewed war and signs an agreement with Tehran allowing unrestricted foreign investment in Iran, Abu Dhabi may rebuild friendly relations with the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, while Emirati companies rush to invest in Iran.
As the United States and Iran swing between war and peace, the UAE is likely to continue seeking closer security ties with Israel while doubling down on efforts to win favour in Washington.
Yet in its pursuit of security, the UAE is exposing itself to unnecessary risks. It is antagonising its neighbours, and they may eventually decide to do without it. Regional cooperation alone can elevate Abu Dhabi’s global standing in the long term. Without that cooperation, the UAE will not achieve the strategic independence it desires. Instead, it will become a state fully dependent on Washington and Tel Aviv.
