One hundred days after the outbreak of the war with Iran on 28 February 2026, Israel’s assessment of the conflict is no longer shaped by the opening strike or the joint American-Israeli military display that accompanied the launch of the operation.
Those first moments created an impression of strength, military reach, and the ability to take the war deep into Iranian territory. However, they were never enough to determine the final outcome.
According to Israeli sources and assessments published in the period following the ceasefire, the war neither closed the nuclear file nor eliminated Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. Nor did it provide the Israeli public with a clear sense of victory. Instead, it generated significant economic and social burdens and expanded the scope of the confrontation to include Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned fronts across the region.
The overall Israeli assessment, as reflected by the country’s media, research institutions, and state bodies, rests on a central paradox: Israel achieved a significant operational success but has yet to convert that achievement into a decisive strategic outcome.
As a result, the balance sheet increasingly resembles a formula of “deferred achievement” versus “open-ended costs”, rather than a clear victory or outright failure.
Incomplete Deterrence
An assessment published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), one of the country’s most influential think tanks closely connected to security establishment debates, provides a useful starting point for understanding the war after the passage of time.
The report states: “Operation Roar of the Lion, the war against Iran and its proxies, is not over.”
Written by Major General (Res.) Tamir Hayman, the institute’s director and former head of Israeli military intelligence, and published on 17 May 2026, the paper shifts the discussion away from the question of what Israel destroyed inside Iran and towards a more fundamental issue: did the war create long-term deterrence, or has it merely opened a prolonged phase of prevention and attrition?
According to Hayman, Israel restored tactical deterrence but has not yet reached a strategic turning point regarding the Iranian nuclear challenge.
This distinction places Israel’s gains into perspective. The country demonstrated an ability to strike deep into Iran, displayed intelligence and air superiority, and operated in unprecedented military coordination with the United States. Yet none of this has conclusively removed the threat.
From Israel’s perspective, the ability to impose direct costs on Tehran and strike targets deep inside Iran represents a significant achievement. It helps restore an image of military capability that was badly shaken following the events of 7 October 2023.
However, the same point also marks the beginning of the limitations. The ability to strike is not the same as the ability to end the threat.
Israeli public opinion surveys reveal this gap clearly.
A poll published by the Israeli Democracy Institute on 14 April 2026, following the ceasefire, found that approximately half of respondents believed Israel’s strategic security position had improved after the military operation. Around one quarter believed the situation had not changed, while others felt it had deteriorated.
The most revealing figure, however, was the gap between perceptions of the military and the government.
While 92% of respondents gave the military high marks for managing the operation, only 38% offered a similar assessment of the government’s performance.
This suggests that the Israeli public drew a distinction between military execution and political achievement, expressing strong confidence in the former while remaining sceptical of the latter.
Unfulfilled Objectives
On 8 April 2026, Jonathan Lis wrote in Haaretz that “Netanyahu set three goals for the war, and none have been achieved so far.”
According to Lis, Netanyahu outlined three central objectives on 12 March: preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, preventing the development of ballistic missiles capable of threatening Israel, the United States, and the wider world, and eliminating the Iranian threat.
The significance of this assessment lies in the fact that it evaluates the war according to its own declared objectives.
After 100 days, those objectives remain unresolved.
Israel inflicted damage on Iranian capabilities, but it did not secure the dismantlement of the nuclear programme, eliminate missile capabilities, or remove Iran from the strategic equation.
In this sense, the deterrence generated by the war remains partial. It is strong enough to demonstrate capability, yet incomplete when measured against the standard of decisive victory.
On the same day, a military analyst writing in Haaretz argued that it remained difficult to translate the overwhelming American and Israeli air superiority, combined with the powerful strikes delivered against Iran, into a clear victory.
He suggested that a turning point might emerge later but was not visible at that stage, comparing promises of decisive success to similar narratives repeatedly postponed during the Gaza war.
Further evidence of this perception appeared in a Kan 11 poll published by Yoav Krakovsky on 27 April 2026.
The survey found that 57% of respondents believed Israel had not achieved victory on any front of the broader conflict since 7 October. Only 16% believed Israel had won in Iran, while just 14% believed it had won in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, 73% said the continued existence of armed groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas posed a risk of another attack similar to 7 October.
For many Israelis, victory is measured not by the number of strikes delivered but by whether an adversary’s capabilities have been removed. As long as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran retain the capacity to threaten Israel, the image of victory remains incomplete.
Growing Public Caution
Additional polling conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies adds another layer to the picture.
A survey conducted on 29 and 30 March 2026, roughly one month after the start of the campaign, found that the public had become increasingly cautious in assessing the extent of damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear programme, missile arsenal, and political system.
Only 48% believed the nuclear programme would suffer severe damage during the campaign. Of that group, 39% expected substantial damage, while only 9% anticipated complete dismantlement.
Meanwhile, 45% expected only limited damage or no meaningful damage at all.
These figures are particularly significant because they undermine the core narrative of success. Even after a month of war, no clear majority of Israelis believed the nuclear programme would be dismantled.
The same survey also revealed declining confidence regarding damage to Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure and decreasing support for continuing the campaign until regime change was achieved.
Support for pursuing the campaign to that objective fell from 63% during the early stages of the war to 54% two weeks later, and then to 45.5% in the subsequent survey.
The trend suggests a gradual erosion of enthusiasm for maximalist objectives as the war dragged on and the limits of air power became more apparent.
A Delayed Nuclear Problem
The nuclear file remains one of the most complex aspects of Israel’s post-war assessment.
While the strikes may have delayed certain capabilities, they did not produce a final dismantlement of Iran’s programme, nor did they resolve questions surrounding enriched uranium stockpiles.
Reflecting this concern, Haaretz military correspondent Yaniv Kubovich reported on 1 May 2026 that senior military and security officials believed the campaign would be considered a failure if the nuclear programme remained intact and the issue of enriched uranium was left unresolved.
This assessment sets a demanding benchmark for success, one that extends far beyond images of airstrikes and explosions and focuses instead on the final strategic outcome.
A separate INSS paper authored by Tamir Hayman and Dr Raz Zimmt, head of the institute’s Iran programme, warned that if the Iranian system survives the war, it may increasingly view nuclear capability as its only credible existential deterrent.
This may represent the most significant risk within Israel’s profit and loss calculation.
The war may have delayed the nuclear project technically, but it may also have strengthened Tehran’s conviction that a nuclear capability is the only guarantee against future attacks.
The same report noted that Iran demonstrated an ability to recover faster than expected following previous confrontations.
According to the assessment, Tehran restored elements of its nuclear infrastructure, accelerated construction projects, expanded missile production to nearly 125 missiles per month, and worked to rebuild and finance Hezbollah while reopening supply routes through Syria.
These figures reinforce the argument that even extensive strikes are insufficient if reconstruction capabilities remain intact.
This transforms military success into a strategic dilemma.
Every successful strike demonstrates Iranian vulnerability to American and Israeli power, yet it may simultaneously reinforce Tehran’s determination to pursue stronger deterrence.
The key question is therefore not whether Israel struck the nuclear programme, but whether it reduced or intensified Iran’s motivation to continue pursuing it.
Economic Costs Become Visible
Economically, the losses are easier to measure.
In its decision issued on 30 March 2026, the Bank of Israel warned that Operation Roar of the Lion had generated significant consequences for real economic activity and increased geopolitical uncertainty, particularly regarding the duration, intensity, and outcome of the conflict.
This was not a journalistic interpretation but the official assessment of Israel’s central monetary authority.
On 4 May 2026, the Bank of Israel announced an extension of banking assistance programmes for customers affected by the war.
Governor Professor Amir Yaron stated that the continuation of hostilities highlighted the importance of supporting households and businesses through the crisis.
Banking Supervisor Daniel Hahiashvili similarly noted that “the battle is not yet over,” justifying the decision to extend support measures.
The programme included mortgage payment deferrals for displaced families and homeowners whose properties were damaged, consumer loan deferrals of up to 100,000 shekels, and business loan deferrals of up to 2 million shekels for small enterprises.
These measures reveal how deeply the conflict penetrated everyday economic life.
According to reporting in Calcalist citing OECD projections, Israel’s economy is expected to grow by only 3.3% in 2026 due to the war and broader regional instability, before recovering to 5.6% in 2027.
The significance of this forecast is that it reflects a post-war assessment rather than the optimism that often accompanies the launch of military operations.
Prior to the war, Israel’s economy had been showing signs of acceleration, driven by private sector growth, rising industrial production, stronger consumer spending, and falling unemployment.
In this sense, the war interrupted a recovery that had begun to take shape following the shocks of 7 October.
Large-Scale Compensation Measures
The economic picture becomes even clearer when examining legislation designed to support businesses affected by the conflict.
A compensation package approved by the Knesset included state participation in fixed expenses and wage costs, alongside compensation mechanisms for medium-sized businesses with annual revenues ranging from 300,000 to 400 million shekels.
The programme acknowledged a reality in which businesses could remain technically open while suffering major revenue losses due to declining consumer activity.
To address this, the state agreed to subsidise wage costs based on reductions in business activity.
The significance of the policy lies in its attempt to preserve employment relationships and prevent economic dislocation from spreading further.
Northern Israel received particularly generous support measures, reflecting the impact of both the Iran conflict and the continuing tensions along the Lebanese front.
A Society Under Strain
Research conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute in 2026 revealed deeper social consequences.
The study, examining the financial condition of workers two and a half years after the outbreak of the Iron Swords War, was conducted between mid-April and early May, after the ceasefire with Iran had taken effect.
The findings showed that 45% of residents in northern Israel and 32% of residents in Haifa reported declines in work activity or business operations.
Among communities evacuated after 7 October, 42% reported damage to their employment situation, compared with 26% in January 2026.
Meanwhile, 31% of respondents said their wages or work-related income remained lower than before 7 October.
Among self-employed workers, 70% reported lower income than before the war, while 26% of salaried employees reported war-related income losses.
The findings underline that the war was not only fought with aircraft and missiles but also through reduced working hours, declining income, financial pressure, and weakening economic confidence.
The Home Front
Israel’s domestic front increasingly emerged as one of the conflict’s most vulnerable arenas.
Investigations published in Calcalist documented extensive damage to residential, commercial, medical, and educational infrastructure.
In Tel Aviv, four direct strikes rendered 1,747 properties unusable, including 1,576 apartments and 171 commercial units.
Among the most prominent cases was a luxury residential tower near Israel’s defence headquarters.
In Haifa, the 29-storey Sail Tower was abandoned following severe damage and became known locally as the “Missile Tower”.
The healthcare sector also suffered significant disruption.
Soroka Medical Centre in Beersheba sustained extensive damage, resulting in the loss of seven of its twenty-four operating theatres and forcing the relocation of patients to underground facilities.
In education, approximately 2,700 children in Bnei Brak were displaced after five educational institutions were completely destroyed.
Public frustration increasingly focused on government performance, with residents expressing anger over what they viewed as an inadequate state response.
This deterioration was accompanied by a sharp decline in public morale.
An initial INSS survey conducted two weeks into the war found that 42% of respondents felt significant fear and personal threat, while 61% supported strikes against Tehran regardless of the cost.
A month later, however, anxiety levels had surged to 67%, confidence in home front leadership had fallen to 34%, and 71% expressed doubts about the long-term resilience of infrastructure and the economy.
The shift reflected a transition from wartime mobilisation to growing frustration and uncertainty.
A separate survey published in Israel Hayom on 13 April 2026 found that 88.2% of Israelis did not believe Iran was weak or close to collapse, while 62.2% described themselves as pessimistic about the broader situation.
These figures undermine the psychological dimension of victory.
Many Israelis supported the decision to go to war, but fewer believed the outcome had produced a decisive strategic success.
Hezbollah and the Northern Front
In Lebanon, the balance sheet becomes even more complex.
Israeli military leaders believe Hezbollah suffered the most severe blow in its history and was significantly weakened.
According to a report by Amit Segal published in Israel Hayom on 4 June 2026, Hezbollah had approximately 30,000 fighters on 6 October 2023, with around 8,000 killed and a similar number wounded since then.
From an Israeli perspective, these figures represent a major achievement.
However, the same report also highlights the limits of that success.
Israeli military officials acknowledged that Hezbollah had been close to escalating even before entering the conflict and that significant movements by Radwan forces had been detected south of the Litani River during the first week of March.
In other words, Hezbollah may be weaker, but it remains part of the strategic equation.
Polling data further suggests that the ceasefire with Iran did not reduce Israeli support for military action in Lebanon.
Following the ceasefire, 80% of Israeli respondents said military operations against Hezbollah should continue regardless of developments involving Iran.
Tamir Hayman’s assessment also argues that Hezbollah’s entry into the war damaged its image among sections of Lebanese society by making it appear as though it had dragged Lebanon into conflict on Iran’s behalf.
At the same time, he warns that maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon could expose Israeli forces to prolonged risks while simultaneously restoring Hezbollah’s legitimacy as a resistance movement.
This captures the broader pattern of the war’s gains and losses.
Israel may have reduced an immediate threat, but it may also have opened the door to a longer period of attrition.
A Heavy Conclusion
After 100 days, Israel can point to five notable achievements.
It restored part of its image as a military initiator, demonstrated its ability to strike inside Iran, inflicted damage on Iranian capabilities, exposed vulnerabilities among Tehran’s regional allies, and preserved a degree of stability within its military institutions and financial markets.
Yet it also failed to achieve five equally important objectives.
It did not close the nuclear file, did not convince much of its own public that victory had been achieved, did not eliminate the Lebanese front, did not avoid significant economic costs, and did not transform the ceasefire into a stable strategic arrangement.
The true measure of the first 100 days therefore lies not in the opening strike but in what remains afterwards: an intact nuclear question, missile capabilities that can be rebuilt, an economy requiring extensive compensation measures, a pessimistic public, a damaged north, and a weakened but still active Hezbollah.
Viewed through the lens of contemporary Israeli assessments, the war appears to be less than a victory and more than a single military round.
It marks the beginning of a prolonged phase of containment and prevention, where Israel’s success will depend not on what it destroyed in the early days of the conflict, but on whether it can prevent Iran and its allies from rebuilding what was lost.
