On the morning of 27 February 2026, just hours before the start of the American-Israeli attack on Iran, Chinese military air activity over Taiwan came to a halt in an unusual development. For years, Taiwan’s defence authorities had been accustomed to a near-daily routine: monitoring Chinese warplanes as they penetrated Taiwan’s air defence zone in repeated displays of military power. The sudden pause in Chinese air activity therefore became a puzzle, creating uncertainty over Beijing’s intentions.
The pause lasted nearly two weeks, with only one breach recorded during that period. It was the longest interruption since China began regularly entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone in 2020. According to analysts, the ambiguity surrounding China’s movements at the time resembled the suspicious calm before a storm. Some interpreted it as a deceptive tactic ahead of a large-scale military drill, or perhaps as preparation for a shocking and sudden attack in which Beijing could exploit Washington’s preoccupation with its war in the Middle East.
This took place as news reports continued to emerge about the Pentagon drawing on its stockpile of advanced Patriot interceptor missiles allocated to the Indo-Pacific region amid the escalating war with Iran. That left America’s flank exposed to China’s growing ambitions in East Asia. On 10 March, The Washington Post reported that the United States had begun transferring parts of the THAAD missile defence battery system from its bases in South Korea to the Middle East in anticipation of a rise in Iranian attacks. This weakened America’s ability to confront China as its military capabilities were being drained elsewhere.
What if China adopted a naval blockade strategy against Taiwan, similar to the Strait of Hormuz model, instead of launching a full invasion?
All these factors made that moment an ideal time for China to take an escalatory step against Taiwan. In the end, Beijing did not escalate, perhaps waiting for a more favourable moment. Yet the spectre of Chinese military action never disappeared. While most attention tends to focus on the scenario of a potential Chinese invasion of the island, military analyst Robin Johnson, director of the Asia Research Centre at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, has raised another troubling possibility.
Johnson’s hypothesis can be summarised in one question: what if China followed a naval blockade strategy similar to the Strait of Hormuz model rather than a full invasion? Johnson argues that the current American administration suffers from a critical weakness in maritime control, making a blockade strategy more dangerous and more impactful, not only for the United States but for the entire global economy.
The 2027 Dilemma
In December 2025, Beijing launched a large-scale military exercise under the name “Justice Mission 2025”. It was considered a realistic simulation of a comprehensive blockade scenario, as it sought to rehearse the encirclement of Taiwan and its isolation from the world. The exercise used a full spectrum of military capabilities, including the firing of dozens of missiles and the deployment of large numbers of frigates, destroyers, fighter jets, drones and bombers. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence counted at least 28 Chinese naval vessels and 89 warplanes.
This exercise was not merely a display of Chinese power. It was a symbolic message with multiple layers, ranging from a direct threat to Taiwan to a warning to external powers supporting it, primarily the United States, against intervention. What stood out about the exercise was that it included realistic training on targeting ports and cutting supply lines. This led experts and observers to suggest that Chinese military thinking is leaning towards a naval blockade strategy, rather than the direct invasion many had previously assumed.
The year 2027 stands out as a potential turning point in the China-Taiwan conflict, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.
Amid rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, 2027 stands out as a possible decisive point in the China-Taiwan conflict. It marks the centenary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. According to the US Department of Defence, Beijing has become ready to win its battle for “One China”.
To understand the complexity of the current situation, we must go back six years, specifically to a 2021 statement by Admiral Philip Davidson, who was then responsible for US Indo-Pacific Command. He stated that China would be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, an assumption that became known as the “Davidson Window”.
US intelligence has confirmed that reunifying China with Taiwan is not merely an issue under discussion, but an inevitable destiny from Beijing’s perspective.
This was reinforced by US intelligence assessments in 2025, which indicated that reunifying China with Taiwan is not merely a matter open for debate but an inevitable destiny from Beijing’s perspective. It is also an indispensable pillar of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which seeks to transform China into a fully fledged global superpower by 2049. The only remaining question is the timing and method by which this dream will be achieved.
China has worked to simulate the American model of military rise. It has developed its nuclear capabilities across air, sea and land, and restructured its air force by introducing strategic bombers such as the H-20, whose development was announced in 2016. It has also developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, reaching the DF-41 model, which has a maximum range of 15,000 kilometres.
Although the naval capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army had historically been a weakness, that situation is changing rapidly. Beijing intensified its warship-building efforts to the point that, between 2014 and 2018, it surpassed the German, Indian, British and Spanish navies combined. It also succeeded in overtaking the US Navy itself in terms of the number of vessels, even though overall combat superiority remains heavily in favour of the US Navy. In addition, the Chinese navy has made major efforts to develop submarine technology and underwater detection capabilities.
China has deployed sensor networks along the Chinese coast and in the South China Sea, a system described as the Great Underwater Wall of China.
According to The Wall Street Journal, China launched a nuclear-powered attack submarine in 2023 equipped with a pump-jet propulsion system instead of propeller engines, along with noise-reduction technologies similar to those used in American submarines. It also deployed several sensor networks along the Chinese coast and in the South China Sea, a system described as the “Great Underwater Wall of China”. This is how Beijing prepared itself for any coming conflict with Taiwan, and for making the western Pacific unsafe for American submarines.
In seeking control over Taiwan, Beijing has followed a long-term dual approach. On one hand, Chinese fighter jets fly on near-daily missions to penetrate Taiwan’s air defence zone, creating psychological pressure and a constant warning that war could erupt at any moment. On the other hand, soft power is also present through a more moderate method based on economic attraction, offering generous economic incentives and exploiting shared cultural and linguistic background.
Experts and analysts describe this approach as “grey warfare” or “grey zone tactics”. These usually rely on intimidation and breaking resistance through unconventional methods, such as disinformation, cyber espionage and military exercises. This allows Beijing to apply military pressure on Taipei without risking an all-out war that could force it into direct confrontation with the United States.
Beijing understands that invading Taiwan is a risky gamble that could inflict massive economic losses, which is why it places the invasion scenario at the bottom of its options.
Beijing understands how the invasion option could become a dangerous gamble that may cause enormous economic losses. For that reason, China places the invasion scenario at the bottom of its list of available options. This was the conclusion of the 2026 annual threat assessment on major national security threats issued by the US Central Intelligence Agency, which stated that China has not yet made a decision to invade Taiwan and does not have a timetable for achieving unification, contrary to expectations surrounding 2027.
However, the absence of an invasion decision does not mean Beijing has retreated. Rather, contradiction is one feature of deception within Chinese strategy, which seeks to keep all options open. This has led many military experts to regard a naval blockade as the most realistic scenario.
The Taiwan Strait: The Nerve Centre of Technology
Taiwan is officially known as the Republic of China. It is an archipelago of 168 small islands, the largest of which is Formosa, which accounts for 99% of the archipelago’s area. Located in East Asia and overlooking the Pacific Ocean, it is separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait, a distance of around 180 kilometres. Despite its small area of no more than 36,000 square kilometres, it is one of the most dangerous strategic flashpoints in the world.
Military analyst Robin Johnson says the Taiwan Strait can be viewed as a multidimensional weapon capable of reshaping the global economy. Its importance is no less than that of other vital waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz. If Hormuz is the world’s “oil artery”, then the Taiwan Strait is the “nerve centre of technology”. If it were closed or blockaded, it could paralyse almost every aspect of modern life.
The Taiwan Strait is a multidimensional weapon capable of reshaping the global economy.
Taiwan should be understood as the artery powering the electronic devices we rely on today, from medical devices to cars and mobile phones. Taiwan controls up to 60% of the global electronic chip manufacturing market and alone produces around 20% of the world’s semiconductors. This makes most civilian and military industries heavily dependent on it. These microscopic chips power the algorithms of Apple smartphones, fifth-generation communication systems, data processing centres and the satellites used by the GPS. If this Taiwanese supply were cut off from major companies and economies, the manufacturing of most of these products would stop.
This status is what led Johnson to adopt the hypothesis that China may blockade Taiwan like the Strait of Hormuz. Beijing closely observed the economic consequences that followed the closure of the Strait of Hormuz from the beginning of the American-Israeli war on Iran. It saw how the economic impact went beyond global energy markets and reached the “loaf of bread”, because Hormuz is a major passageway for nitrogen fertilisers used in the cultivation of strategic crops such as wheat, rice and corn. This came alongside the sharp rise in oil and natural gas prices.
The closure of the Taiwan Strait could lead to losses of $10 trillion in one year, equivalent to 9.6% of global economic activity.
The devastating impact of closing Hormuz makes a blockade of the Taiwan Strait an attractive option. It would allow Beijing to place military pressure on the island while also threatening the economies of many countries that support Taipei if they attempted military intervention, led by the United States. Estimates from 2022 indicate that one-fifth of global maritime trade passes through the Taiwan Strait, valued at more than $2.45 trillion. Therefore, according to Johnson, closing it could lead to losses of $10 trillion in one year, representing 9.6% of global economic activity.
At the same time, the US military relies heavily in its defence systems on products made by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, TSMC. This includes systems used in the latest F-35 stealth fighter, as well as artificial intelligence technologies used in weapons manufacturing, which help guarantee American military superiority. This scenario therefore pressures a key American weakness, making Washington one of the parties most damaged by any disruption to semiconductor supplies.
Three Scenarios for a Blockade of Taiwan
On 16 January 2026, The New York Times published details of an unprecedented scene. On 25 December, more than 2,000 small fishing boats lined up near Taiwan in parallel rows, forming geometric lines that stretched for nearly 290 nautical miles. They obstructed the movement of commercial cargo ships, forcing them to sail through winding routes.
The event was repeated on a slightly smaller scale on 11 January 2026, when around 1,400 small fishing boats left China’s main ports and lined up in a rectangular formation extending about 200 miles in the East China Sea. They appeared like tiny units forming a wall whose size and coordination international observers had not seen before.
Fishing boats are usually viewed as small civilian vessels sailing in circular and winding routes in the hope of catching fish. In these scenes, however, they turned into a form of irregular “maritime militia”. They positioned themselves in relatively fixed locations and obstructed the movement of passing ships, according to Andrew Erickson, a professor at the US Naval War College, who noted that this approach could be used in any possible military confrontation between China and Taiwan.
Beijing uses small fishing boats as a maritime militia capable of disrupting the movement of large cargo ships through their high capacity for mobilisation and manoeuvre.
In recent years, China has used these boats to strengthen its irregular naval forces by building and training a system resembling armed maritime militias. These forces are trained to gather, manoeuvre and potentially collide with other boats if disputes break out. This gives Beijing innovative methods to impose control in disputed seas alongside its regular naval forces.
What was striking here was the exceptional military coordination that enabled control over thousands of small civilian boats. This reflected a massive capacity for mobilisation and deployment that could be used to obstruct military operations and confuse the radars and sensors of ships, warplanes and drones. These movements were regarded as a simulation of a future naval manoeuvre that could impose a blockade, isolate Taiwan and cut off its external supply lines.
In 2024, ChinaPower, affiliated with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, published a series of research reports examining several possible pathways for a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan. These ranged in severity from limited economic restriction to the imposition of a partial or full blockade. The report shows how China could exploit Taiwan’s vulnerabilities as a small island with limited natural resources, heavy dependence on trade, imports of around 70% of its food and nearly 97% of its oil needs. These vulnerabilities could amplify the destructive consequences of a blockade and force Taiwan to surrender.
Joint blockade operations are based on six key components of the People’s Liberation Army working in integration.
Most of these scenarios relied on the strategy of a “joint blockade campaign”. This is an offensive operation involving air and naval forces working together to encircle the opponent and isolate it economically and militarily from the outside world, as described in the 2006 book The Science of Military Campaigns, issued by China’s National Defence University. Joint blockade operations are based on six key components of the People’s Liberation Army, including naval fleets, submarines and various branches of the air force, along with conventional missile capabilities, coastal defence forces and support forces. They also involve information coordination and the incorporation of elements of China’s maritime militias.
Across all these pathways, the central role of maritime law enforcement forces, represented by the China Coast Guard, stands out. Their role would be to present the blockade as a matter of law enforcement, while Beijing moves to impose control and subject international trade movement to its authority, forcing states and companies to deal with it as the de facto authority over Taiwan.
Scenario One: The Iron Ring
In the iron ring scenario, Beijing is likely to launch offensive operations targeting Taipei’s defence systems and impose a comprehensive blockade on major ports that could last for months.
The first and most likely scenario would involve Beijing launching offensive operations in which China targets Taipei’s defence systems and imposes a comprehensive blockade on all major ports. This blockade could last for several months, during which the island may witness brief truces to allow negotiations. China would then resume its strikes if Taiwan refused to surrender. This is known as the “iron ring”.
Scenario Two: Quarantine
The second scenario is described by sources as “quarantine”. It is a military tactic resembling the security measures used to combat pandemics and epidemics, as it seeks to restrict maritime and air navigation in limited areas without launching direct military strikes. In this case, Beijing would use unconventional hybrid tools to impose control.
The most important of these tools would be laying naval mines at port entrances, to be detonated when required, along with launching cyberattacks to sever military communication lines between Taipei and its allies. In this case, quarantine would not aim to isolate Taiwan from the world as much as to consolidate China’s control over it. Here, the role of law enforcement forces, namely the China Coast Guard, would become central. They would inspect passing ships and review transit permissions and permits in order to subject international trade movement to Beijing’s will.
Under this scenario, Chinese forces would not begin attacking unless they were attacked by Taiwanese warships or defence systems. Although this strategy may help Beijing avoid the possibility of US military intervention, it is also a military gamble that would leave Chinese naval and air forces vulnerable to counterattack. This could worsen the situation to the point where Beijing would eventually be forced to apply a full blockade strategy, returning it to the first scenario.
Scenario Three: The Grey Ban
The third scenario remains the most peaceful and least likely option according to the sources. It closely resembles the second scenario in applying quarantine measures, but excludes the laying of naval mines. It is called the “grey ban” because it depends primarily on grey zone strategies, including psychological warfare and hybrid conflict methods.
The United States continues to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding China and Taiwan.
Despite its appeal, this strategy may not fully subdue Taiwan. China would therefore eventually find itself forced to move towards direct confrontation and then towards the option of a comprehensive blockade. Blockade strategies may also be paired with other military operations, such as seizing some of Taiwan’s small islands. This could provide Beijing with a limited victory if the blockade does not result in Taipei’s surrender.
On the other side, the United States continues to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding China and Taiwan. Washington avoids stating whether it would intervene militarily to protect Taiwan if war or a blockade broke out. This policy has prevailed since the 1970s. It was criticised in a research paper published by the Brookings Institution on 20 March 2026, which called on Washington to draw clear red lines before Beijing’s ambitions and express its readiness to defend Taiwan against any attack.
According to researcher Matthew Turpin, a security analyst and former US Army officer, the economic, geopolitical and technological conditions that prevailed over the past four decades are no longer similar to the current strategic environment. Washington and Beijing have become bitter rivals, and Beijing has moved closer to using military force to pursue its ambitions. This requires the United States to define its red lines precisely in order to avoid miscalculation that could lead to a bloody conflict whose consequences would be unbearable.
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