On 11 November 1982, a white Peugeot 504 drove toward a seven-storey building used by Israeli forces in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre. The vehicle was in fact a large explosive device packed with significant quantities of explosives. The blast caused the building to collapse, killing at least 91 people, including 75 Israeli soldiers and members of the Shin Bet security service, as well as several Lebanese civilians.
For decades, Israeli authorities publicly maintained that the explosion was the result of a gas leak. However, unofficial reports consistently pointed to a deliberate bombing. In 2022, an official investigation committee was formed in Tel Aviv, comprising representatives from the military, Shin Bet, and police. The committee reviewed extensive material, including thousands of documents, forensic evidence, and explosive residue analysis.
By 2024, the committee concluded that the incident was most likely a deliberate attack involving a car bomb containing at least 50 kilograms of explosives, alongside gas cylinders that intensified the blast. These findings align with Hezbollah’s long-standing position that the operation was its first “martyrdom operation” against Israeli occupation forces in Lebanon, carried out by 17-year-old Ahmad Qasir.
The Emergence of High-Impact Operations
This operation marked the beginning of a series of attacks during the 1980s. Hezbollah is believed to have conducted dozens of bombings against Israeli and foreign targets between 1982 and 1989, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Research from the Chicago Project indicates that at least 41 individuals participated in these operations, many of whom came from secular or leftist ideological backgrounds, including socialists, communists, and some Christians.
Recent statements from a Hezbollah military official indicate a potential return to what was described as “1980s tactics”. Speaking to Al Jazeera, the official referred to the reactivation of “martyrdom units” aimed at preventing Israeli forces from consolidating their presence in contested areas. These units, according to the statement, have been deployed into zones witnessing Israeli incursions, with the objective of direct engagement inside Lebanese villages.
Strategic Context: From Invasion to Resistance
These developments come amid continued Hezbollah responses to Israeli ceasefire violations, alongside growing discussion of a shift toward closer-range ground confrontation. The origins of these tactics trace back to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, launched with the declared objective of eliminating the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The invasion included the siege and bombardment of Beirut, as well as massacres such as Sabra and Shatila.
During this period, Hezbollah operations were characterised by the use of improvised explosive devices carried in vehicles and driven toward fortified, high-value targets. These devices, commonly known as IEDs, consist of a power source, triggering mechanism, detonator, main explosive charge, and a container often packed with shrapnel such as nails or metal fragments.
Precision Strikes With Limited Resources
The explosive material itself could be sourced from military ordnance such as artillery shells, mortar rounds, or aerial bombs, or constructed from locally available materials such as fertilisers combined with TNT. This flexibility made such devices relatively easy to produce and adapt.
Hezbollah used these methods to carry out highly calculated operations designed to inflict maximum casualties in a single strike. One example includes the April 1983 bombing of the US embassy in West Beirut, which killed 63 people, including 17 Americans.
A more significant attack occurred on 23 October 1983, when a truck bomb targeted US Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport. The explosion, estimated at around 6,000 kilograms, caused the building to collapse and killed 241 American personnel. Less than ten minutes later, a similar attack struck French paratroopers, killing 58 soldiers.
Another bombing took place on 4 November 1983 in Tyre, targeting an Israeli command site and killing 28 Israelis, including border police, intelligence personnel, and soldiers.
Strategic Gains and Asymmetric Warfare
From a military analysis perspective, these operations demonstrated a high cost-to-impact ratio. Non-state actors did not require heavy weaponry or air power to achieve significant strategic outcomes. A single individual, combined with a relatively low-cost explosive, could generate severe political and security repercussions.
This model reflects broader patterns in asymmetric warfare, where lower-cost weapons challenge high-cost defence systems. Contemporary examples include conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, where expensive interceptor missiles are used to counter low-cost drones or munitions, leading to long-term economic strain.
Another advantage of such operations lies in plausible deniability. During the 1980s, several attacks were claimed by the Islamic Jihad Organisation, a group distinct from the Palestinian movement of the same name. Although formally separate from Hezbollah, reports suggest overlap in personnel and coordination, with some intelligence assessments indicating the group functioned as an operational front.
The targeting of heavily fortified sites, such as embassies and military barracks, carried significant political impact. These attacks contributed to growing pressure within the United States, ultimately influencing the decision of President Ronald Reagan to withdraw American forces from Lebanon in February 1984.
Tactical Evolution After Israeli Withdrawal
Following Israel’s withdrawal from most of Lebanon by mid-1985, retaining only a southern “security zone”, Hezbollah adapted its tactics. The battlefield shifted from urban centres to rural and fortified frontlines, requiring a transition away from vehicle-based bombings.
According to analysis published in the journal International Relations, researcher David Sosa identified a shift toward a three-part tactical model: roadside bombs, anti-tank missiles, and Katyusha rockets.
Roadside bombs became a central tool, deployed in ambushes targeting patrols and supply lines. These devices ranged from simple pressure-triggered explosives to more sophisticated systems activated remotely via radio signals. They were often concealed as debris or natural objects and combined with follow-up attacks using small arms or rocket fire.
Expansion and Replication of Tactics
The effectiveness of these methods led to their adoption in other conflict zones, particularly in Iraq following the US-led invasion. There, improvised explosive devices evolved into a structured system involving specialised planning and execution units.
By 2003, such attacks in Iraq reached over 100 incidents per month, rising to more than 1,000 by 2005 and exceeding 2,500 by 2006. By 2007, IEDs accounted for approximately 63 percent of coalition fatalities in Iraq and over 66 percent in Afghanistan.
The Role of Rockets and Anti-Tank Systems
Katyusha rockets extended Hezbollah’s reach beyond the immediate battlefield into Israeli territory. While not highly precise, they created disruption, displacement, and economic pressure. Their integration into the broader tactical framework contributed to declining morale among Israeli forces and growing domestic pressure.
Anti-tank missiles also became increasingly significant, particularly in later conflicts such as the 2006 Lebanon war, where Hezbollah reportedly used more than 1,000 such weapons, damaging numerous Israeli armoured vehicles.
Systems such as the Russian-made Kornet missile demonstrated the ability to counter advanced armour. Similar approaches were later adopted in Gaza, including locally developed systems like the Yassin 105, used to disable Israeli vehicles and target personnel inside them.
Hybrid Warfare and Long-Term Strategy
Over time, Hezbollah evolved from a non-state actor into a hybrid force, combining guerrilla warfare with elements of conventional military structure. This included small mobile units, ambush tactics, and infrastructure disruption, alongside heavier weaponry and organised command structures.
Unmanned aerial systems were later integrated into this model, including first-person-view drones capable of recording and broadcasting strike footage, contributing to psychological pressure on opponents.
Information warfare has also been a consistent component of Hezbollah’s strategy, with media output targeting both domestic and international audiences.
Strategic Outcome and Ongoing Questions
Hezbollah’s long-term strategy did not aim for a decisive battlefield victory, but rather the gradual accumulation of losses that would make continued Israeli presence politically unsustainable. This approach aligns with broader theories of asymmetric conflict, where the weaker party prevails by endurance and sustained pressure rather than direct defeat of a stronger adversary.
This strategy proved effective with Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, a result rooted in developments that began in the 1980s.
Today, with renewed tensions and references to earlier tactics, the question remains whether these strategies can be replicated under current conditions, or whether Israel has adapted to withstand prolonged attrition. The trajectory of the coming weeks will determine the answer.
