The American magazine Foreign Affairs has published an analytical report examining rapid shifts in China’s nuclear policy, warning that Beijing is moving decisively to reshape the global nuclear order. The report suggests this trajectory could effectively end the bipolar structure dominated by United States and Russia since the end of the Cold War.
According to the report, China has nearly tripled its nuclear warhead stockpile since 2019, based on US government estimates. It has also expanded its nuclear capabilities across land, air, and sea domains, signalling a comprehensive and coordinated escalation in strategic capacity.
Structural Expansion and Long Term Deterrence Strategy
The developments go beyond numerical growth. China has significantly advanced its research, development, and assembly infrastructure, reflecting a long term strategy that positions nuclear deterrence as a central pillar of its defence doctrine.
In March, Beijing formally declared its intention to “enhance and expand” its strategic deterrence capabilities, reinforcing its commitment to both quantitative and qualitative modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. The report highlights that China has shown no willingness to engage in restrictive arms control negotiations.
Rising US Concern Over a Tripolar Nuclear Order
Washington is increasingly alarmed by this shift, fearing a transition from a US Russia dominated framework to a tripolar nuclear system in which China emerges as a principal actor. In this context, the United States has declined to renew the New START Treaty with Russia, citing concerns over being bound by limitations that exclude China.
Despite sustained US pressure, China continues to reject formal nuclear arms limitation talks. The report interprets this stance not as a dismissal of risk, but as a calculated strategic position. Chinese leadership views strengthened nuclear deterrence as a mechanism to compel the United States to recognise it as an equal power and to deter interference in what Beijing defines as its “core interests”, particularly the issue of Taiwan.
Strategic Perception and Escalation Risks
The report notes that Beijing’s perception has been reinforced by recent US behaviour, particularly following the return of Donald Trump to the presidency. Chinese officials have observed a more cautious US approach to sensitive geopolitical issues, alongside increased focus on stabilising bilateral relations through economic and trade channels.
However, the magazine warns that China’s lack of transparency and its rejection of nuclear confidence building measures are producing counterproductive outcomes. These policies are prompting the United States to expand its nuclear arsenal and missile defence systems, while also heightening concern among European allies.
This dynamic is further intensified by growing military cooperation between China and Russia, including in nuclear related domains. In response, both France and United Kingdom have initiated efforts to modernise their own nuclear capabilities, undermining the prospects for effective multilateral arms control.
The Problem of Mutual Perception
A central issue identified in the report is the challenge of mutual perception. Each side fears the possibility that the other may resort to first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a large scale conflict, despite neither formally adopting such a doctrine.
The report argues that the risk does not lie solely in official policies, but in ambiguity and the potential for miscalculation during crises. While China has proposed a mutual no first use policy, the report suggests this alone is insufficient to bridge the trust gap without tangible steps to increase transparency, particularly regarding short range nuclear capabilities linked to regional conflicts.
Internal Drivers and Strategic Constraints
Part of China’s posture is attributed to concerns over the conventional balance of power. Beijing fears that Washington could exploit military gaps or internal instability to exert pressure. Domestically, the consolidation of authority by Xi Jinping over the military establishment has narrowed the space for internal debate on sensitive initiatives such as arms control negotiations.
On the US side, there is concern that China may abandon its no first use commitment in the event of a major conflict, especially over Taiwan. This concern is amplified by the ambiguity surrounding certain Chinese missile systems capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear payloads, complicating deterrence calculations and increasing the likelihood of worst case scenario assessments.
Constraints on Escalation and Strategic Trade Offs
Despite rising tensions, the report notes that the United States retains strong incentives to avoid first use of nuclear weapons. There is no direct existential threat to US territory, and any large scale nuclear escalation would face significant political constraints.
The report also cautions that further expansion of the US nuclear arsenal could divert resources away from strengthening conventional military capabilities, which are more relevant in regional conflict scenarios.
Breaking the Cycle of Nuclear Escalation
Foreign Affairs concludes that breaking the cycle of nuclear escalation requires a strategic shift towards preventing nuclear conflict altogether, rather than focusing solely on managing escalation after it begins.
The report emphasises that any future high level meetings between the two countries present a critical opportunity to initiate deeper security dialogue, centred on practical confidence building measures and clearly defined boundaries for nuclear competition.
A Fragile and Dangerous Trajectory
The magazine ultimately warns that the current trajectory risks triggering a more complex and less controllable tripolar nuclear arms race. Responsibility, it argues, does not rest solely with Beijing, but requires a balanced and coordinated approach from both sides to prevent the international system from sliding into a more fragile and dangerous phase.
