The prohibition on the production and use of nuclear weapons was issued by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the second Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in 2003 in response to claims that Iran intended to develop nuclear arms. The ruling was later formally presented at the International Conference on Disarmament and Non Proliferation in Iran in 2010.
Since then, this fatwa has functioned as a central pillar in Iran’s political discourse. It has been used as a negotiating tool, a defensive argument in international forums, and a shield against accusations regarding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
However, a critical question has remained largely unaddressed: what happens to this fatwa after Khamenei’s death? Does it expire with him, or is it binding on his successor? Specifically, would a third Supreme Leader, such as Mojtaba Khamenei, be obligated to uphold it?
Juristic Foundations of the Prohibition
The fatwa is grounded in Islamic jurisprudence, drawing from the Quran, the Prophetic tradition, and established legal principles. Islamic law aims to preserve five essential values: life, intellect, lineage, wealth, and religion. Nuclear weapons, by their nature, pose a threat to all five.
Prohibition of Corruption on Earth
Khamenei’s ruling is rooted in the prohibition of فساد in the land, based on Quranic guidance. The use of weapons of mass destruction is viewed as a form of widespread corruption, causing destruction to agriculture, human life, and the environment across generations.
The Quran states: “When he turns away, he strives throughout the land to cause corruption therein and destroy crops and progeny, and Allah does not like corruption” Surah Al Baqarah, 2:205.
Nuclear weapons represent one of the most comprehensive forms of destruction in human history, affecting land, air, water, and future generations.
Principle of Individual Responsibility
Another key basis is the Quranic principle: “No bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another.” This rule prohibits collective punishment. Nuclear weapons, by design, do not distinguish between combatants and civilians, leading to mass destruction that includes innocent lives and future generations.
Prohibition of Killing Non Combatants
Islamic jurisprudence consistently prohibits the targeting of non combatants, including women, children, the elderly, and even animals. Nuclear weapons inherently violate this principle, as their impact cannot be limited or controlled.
Prohibition of Environmental Harm
Classical Islamic rulings also prohibit poisoning enemy water sources. Scholars have extended this analogy to nuclear weapons, which contaminate air, water, and land with radiation for extended periods.
Objectives of Shariah
The broader objectives of Islamic law reinforce the prohibition of unjust killing, environmental destruction, and societal disruption. Nuclear weapons conflict with these objectives on every level.
Fatwa or Political Position?
A key point of debate is whether Khamenei’s statement constitutes a formal juristic fatwa or a political position framed in religious language.
Traditionally, a fatwa is a legal ruling derived through rigorous scholarly methodology and issued in response to specific inquiries. However, Khamenei’s prohibition was expressed through official speeches, state communications, and international statements.
This dual nature suggests that the ruling functions both as a genuine juristic position and a political instrument aligned with state interests. This duality lies at the core of ongoing debates about its future.
The Question of a Deceased Jurist
In Jaafari jurisprudence, the death of a jurist raises a well established question: should followers continue to adhere to his rulings or shift to a living authority?
Two forms of emulation exist. Initial emulation involves following a jurist after his death without prior adherence, which is generally not permitted. Continued emulation applies when a follower maintains allegiance to a jurist after his passing, particularly if the deceased jurist is considered more knowledgeable than living scholars.
However, this framework applies to individual believers, not to the Supreme Leader.
Mojtaba Khamenei and Independent Authority
Mojtaba Khamenei, reportedly a qualified jurist who studied under prominent scholars including his father and Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Bahjat, would not inherit authority from his predecessor. Under the doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih, leadership is based on independent qualifications, not lineage.
The Supreme Leader derives authority from his own juristic competence and constitutional legitimacy, not from the rulings of a previous leader. Therefore, there is no binding obligation for a successor to adopt the fatwas of his predecessor.
Primary vs Secondary Rulings
Jaafari jurisprudence distinguishes between primary rulings, which are fixed and unchanging, and secondary rulings, which depend on circumstances and can evolve.
The central question is whether the nuclear fatwa is a fixed ruling or a contextual one.
Some Iranian officials, including members of parliament, have indicated that the prohibition could be treated as a secondary ruling, subject to revision based on changing conditions. This interpretation suggests that strategic necessity could justify reconsideration.
However, many scholars reject this classification, arguing that the ruling is based on firm legal principles and should be regarded as a permanent prohibition.
Conditional Flexibility and Strategic Context
Khamenei himself did not entirely close the door to reconsideration. Reports indicate that he approved the preparation of a framework for modifying the ruling in the event of an existential threat, while maintaining that nuclear weapons should not be developed unless Iran faces a prolonged and comprehensive war.
This debate has intensified following increased military threats, particularly after Israeli actions against Iran in April 2024, alongside discussions about shifting Iran’s military doctrine from defensive to offensive.
Historical Precedent: The Rushdie Fatwa
A relevant precedent can be found in the case of Salman Rushdie. In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for his death. Before becoming Supreme Leader, Khamenei suggested the ruling could be lifted if Rushdie repented. However, Khomeini’s office rejected this possibility.
After assuming leadership, Khamenei chose to reaffirm the fatwa, demonstrating that continuity is not a legal necessity but a political and religious choice.
Later, under President Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian government distanced itself from the ruling, declaring it effectively closed.
Continuity as a Political Choice
This precedent illustrates that the continuation of fatwas between successive leaders is not a binding legal requirement. It is a discretionary decision made by the successor.
Conclusion
In recent years, voices within Iran, including figures associated with the Revolutionary Guard, have called for revisiting the nuclear fatwa in light of what they describe as existential threats from the West.
These arguments are not purely political but draw on established jurisprudential principles, particularly the concept that necessity permits otherwise prohibited actions.
A new Supreme Leader would exercise independent authority, issuing binding directives based on his own jurisdiction, not that of his predecessor.
This distinction highlights the fundamental difference between a traditional religious authority and a ruling Supreme Leader. While a jurist’s fatwas remain with those who follow him, the authority of the Supreme Leader is not inherited but renewed with each new appointment.
