Nearly three weeks after the outbreak of the US Israeli war on Iran, three American assessments converge on a single conclusion: what has been achieved on the battlefield has not yet translated into a clear political outcome.
Military superiority is one thing, but the ability to impose an end to the war is another. Within this gap, these assessments suggest that the American predicament is deepening, and that Tehran may have succeeded in drawing Washington into a war of attrition that cannot be decided by strikes alone.
In an editorial, The New York Times states that US President Donald Trump entered the war without explaining a clear strategy to either the American public or the world. The course of the first weeks, according to the newspaper, suggests that he may not have had a coherent plan in place at all.
The paper adds that the administration raised the ceiling of its war objectives from weakening Iran to overthrowing the regime and permanently preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon, without clarifying how these goals could be achieved or how it would deal with the expected consequences of war, particularly disruptions to oil markets and the global economy.
From another perspective, William Galston, writing in The Wall Street Journal, argues that success in war is not measured by the impact of strikes alone, but by their ability to achieve the political objectives for which the war was launched.
Meanwhile, Nate Swanson, in Foreign Affairs, contends that the war has “backfired” on Washington, and that Tehran, following the initial strikes, is now closer to imposing costs and conditions that make ending the war more difficult than the US administration anticipated.
War Objectives and the Means Dilemma
The New York Times notes that Trump, from the outset of the war, adopted rhetoric that went beyond deterrence and containment. He called on Iranians to take control of their government, demanded “unconditional surrender”, and implied that he would have a role in determining Iran’s next leadership.
However, the newspaper argues that he has yet to present a serious explanation of how such objectives could be achieved, especially given that regime change is rarely accomplished through air power alone. It typically requires ground forces capable of seizing and reshaping the instruments of authority.
In the same context, Galston asserts that Tehran will not accept “unconditional surrender”, nor will it voluntarily relinquish its stockpile of enriched uranium. He adds that any attempt to seize this stockpile by force would open the door to a complex and uncertain military operation.
Swanson, for his part, argues that the US administration based part of its calculations on the assumption that the strikes would trigger internal fractures or popular unrest capable of weakening the regime from within.
However, he believes that this assumption was, from the outset, closer to wishful thinking than realistic assessment, particularly given the Iranian leadership’s demonstrated willingness to use “maximum levels of violence” to ensure its survival.
The Limits of Military Strikes
The New York Times acknowledges that the war has achieved significant tactical successes. Iranian air defences have been heavily damaged, missile stockpiles reduced, a number of senior commanders and nuclear scientists killed, and Iran’s regional networks weakened.
Similarly, Galston writes that Iran’s navy has suffered extensive destruction, its ballistic missile capabilities have declined, and the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard has been significantly damaged.
However, the central question in these analyses is not whether Iran has been struck, but whether these strikes are sufficient to achieve a political outcome.
The New York Times states that the strikes have not brought down the regime, have not resolved the nuclear issue, and have not prevented Iran from responding. Galston concludes that the war once again demonstrates that military success, regardless of its scale, does not automatically translate into political gain.
Swanson adds that the strikes have given the Iranian government an opportunity to redirect attention away from its internal crises by mobilising the population around the narrative of “resistance against foreign aggression”.
Hormuz and the Cost of War
Across the three analyses, a picture emerges of what can be described as an Iranian trap. This does not refer to Tehran’s ability to defeat the United States militarily, but rather its ability to draw it into a costly open ended war that cannot be concluded on purely American terms.
The New York Times notes that one of the most significant miscalculations was underestimating Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz.
It points out that Trump had been warned before the war by his top military commander that Iran could respond by disrupting navigation in the strait. However, he assumed that Tehran would collapse before taking such a step, or that the US Navy would be able to keep it open.
The newspaper states that this assessment proved incorrect, as evidenced by oil prices rising by more than 40 percent.
Swanson argues that the war initiated by Trump is heading toward an unfavourable outcome.
Galston also notes that Iran’s decision to close the strait has upended the administration’s calculations, as reopening it is neither simple nor low cost.
He explains that the US Navy would require significant time and resources to secure safe passage for tankers, while the strait itself remains vulnerable to becoming a dangerous arena of attrition under the threat of Iranian drones and missiles.
Swanson adds that Tehran does not need a daily military victory to impose its logic. It is sufficient to inflict periodic damage that keeps markets, US allies, and American public opinion in a constant state of anxiety.
From this perspective, disrupting navigation in a corridor through which one fifth of global oil supplies passes becomes both a political pressure tool and a military measure.
The Nuclear File Beyond Airstrikes
One of the issues that most clearly reveals the limits of military action in these analyses is the matter of highly enriched uranium.
The New York Times states that this stockpile, believed to remain in a tunnel complex near Isfahan, provides Iran with a potential path to a nuclear weapon if the war ends without its removal.
The newspaper suggests that the military strikes and humiliations endured by Tehran may ultimately push it toward fully pursuing the nuclear option.
Galston emphasises that removing this stockpile, if it is indeed a genuine objective, cannot be achieved through air power alone, but may require a large scale and complex ground operation with unpredictable costs and risks.
Swanson argues that continued airstrikes yield diminishing returns, as most clear targets have already been hit. The alternatives would be either a ground intervention, which Trump has repeatedly pledged to avoid, or limited operations tied to maritime or nuclear security, neither of which appears sufficient to compel Iran to submit.
Hesitant Allies and Narrowing Options
The New York Times criticises the US administration for not seeking congressional authorisation, failing to seriously coordinate with European and Asian allies, and offering only superficial justifications for the war to the American public.
Galston adds that Trump’s request for allies to deploy naval forces to help protect navigation in the Strait of Hormuz was met with clear reluctance, citing cautious positions from Germany, Japan, and Britain. He notes that this hesitation is unsurprising, given that the war was launched without meaningful consultation with these allies.
Swanson concludes that the remaining options before the White House are all unfavourable: either continue an unpopular war, or seek a ceasefire that would involve concessions Tehran could frame as a political victory.
The military blows and humiliation inflicted on Tehran may ultimately push it toward fully embracing the nuclear option.
In Swanson’s assessment, Iran seeks to impose a difficult equation on Trump: either continue a war whose costs are rising for the United States, the Gulf, and global markets, or pursue an end that restricts Israel’s ability to resume strikes in the future.
He adds that Trump cannot unilaterally prevent Tehran from continuing to target US interests or Gulf states, at a time when Iran appears more prepared to engage in a prolonged war of attrition with the United States than to accept recurring conflicts with Israel in the coming years.
Accordingly, Tehran aims to force the US president to choose between Israel’s security interests and the stability of global markets.
The conclusion, according to Swanson, is that the war initiated by Trump is heading toward an unfavourable outcome, and that each additional day not only makes peace more difficult, but also delays any better prospects for the Iranian people.
