Two questions now dominate the minds of those shaping the decisions behind this war, as well as those paying its price. They also weigh heavily on the hearts of ordinary people who fear for their future and existence, particularly given the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that may emerge from this conflict.
The difficulty in answering these questions lies in the fact that they are deeply interconnected. The question of when the war will end depends directly on how it ends. In fact, the relationship between the two is so strong that the ultimate outcomes of the war will depend on the circumstances under which its end is declared.
While this dynamic may apply to other wars as well, it does not diminish the particular nature of this relationship or its exceptional significance in the present conflict.
From this interdependence, it becomes possible to attempt an answer. It has now become clear, even openly acknowledged, that the objective of this war was and remains the overthrow of the Iranian regime. Whether the decision to go to war was rushed or reactive, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested, or whether it was primarily driven by American strategic considerations, the central objective has clearly become regime change in Iran.
The first logical conclusion is that the continuation or cessation of the war now depends on whether that objective is achieved.
If the United States and the Israeli occupation succeed in achieving this goal at any stage, the war will likely end.
So far, however, the Iranian regime has not collapsed. There are no clear signs that it will fall due to ongoing attacks, internal revolt, or an inability to continue striking what it perceives as threats, vulnerabilities, or potential dangers.
Iran’s Resilience in the First Phase
More than that, the system has demonstrated remarkable cohesion even after the assassination of its leading figures and symbols, and despite the disappearance of the entire first tier of leadership from the operational and political scene.
At the same time, Iran has damaged the logistical and technical infrastructure supporting the active American military presence in the Gulf. It has also engaged in a measured and gradually escalating missile campaign against the Israeli occupation.
From both military and political perspectives, the first phase of the war has ended without the collapse of the Iranian system, or even its destabilisation. Despite the scale of the attacks, there are no visible signs of retreat, weakening, or even a reduction in the pace of its responses.
Based on this reality, several conclusions can be drawn.
Iran has suffered widespread destruction. Thousands of targets have reportedly been struck, dozens of senior leaders assassinated, hundreds of personnel lost, and numerous military bases and facilities destroyed.
Yet at the same time, Iranian missiles and drones have continued to strike targets with relative efficiency and consistency. These attacks have taken place without the presence of an effective air defence shield after many American naval assets were redeployed toward the Indian Ocean.
The United States has also been unable to prevent Iranian strikes against its bases and installations. Whether this reflects an inability to do so, a lack of willingness, or a broader attempt to draw Gulf states directly into the war remains an open question.
A Balance That Favors Tehran
Within Israel, the Iranian strategy appears gradual and calibrated for a relatively prolonged conflict. It focuses on targeting vital and sensitive military facilities while also maintaining constant psychological pressure on Israeli society.
At this stage, the conflict remains within what can be described as a single phase, even if it continues at the current pace for several more weeks. Unless major developments or surprises occur, the dominant characteristic of this phase is balance and parity.
Some observers may still argue that the United States and Israel retain a relative advantage, while others suggest that Iran holds such an advantage. However, the broader conclusion is that ending the war at this stage of equilibrium would favour Iran.
Such an outcome would offer little strategic meaning for the United States or Israel and could be interpreted as a sign of failure.
A new element in this first phase is that endurance has become necessary not only for Iran but also for all actors on the opposing side of the equation.
This reality suggests that inevitable changes in both the battlefield and the pace of the war are approaching. Prolonging the current phase appears to benefit Iran, or at least gives it a growing relative advantage over time, while American and Israeli advantages diminish with each passing hour, day, and week.
The Second Phase of the War
The first major shift toward a second phase may involve preparations for a ground intervention by special forces equipped with highly advanced capabilities. This could be accompanied by preparations for more intense and destructive strikes, the direct involvement of Gulf states in the conflict, and the creation of an international coalition to participate in the war.
Such steps would also reflect the failure of the original American and Israeli calculations to bring about the collapse of the Iranian regime.
Another critical development would be the entry of the Lebanese movement Hezbollah into the conflict. Such a step carries high political and social costs for the group, yet it has nevertheless entered the confrontation in a coordinated and direct manner.
One of the defining features of this new phase could be the emergence of severe crises in global oil and gas markets. Iran may also begin testing maritime closures in the Strait of Hormuz.
Meanwhile, the relative quiet of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement appears likely to represent a strategic pause, potentially preceding a complete closure of the Bab al Mandab Strait at a later stage of escalation.
Expanding Regional Fronts
It is widely believed that Hezbollah’s involvement is intended to alter Israel’s perceived freedom of military action inside Lebanon. It also seeks to challenge internal political dynamics within Lebanon, where some actors have called for the disarmament of the group while failing to oppose repeated Israeli violations across Lebanese territory.
According to this perspective, preventing internal confrontation in Lebanon may be considered more urgent than confrontation with the Israeli army itself. From this viewpoint, a potential Israeli ground invasion may represent what Hezbollah considers a strategic trap, one that could fundamentally reshape Lebanon’s internal balance of power.
Whether such calculations are justified or not, the defining characteristic of this new phase is the direct involvement of Iran’s regional allies in the confrontation.
European participation in the war is unlikely to alter its direction significantly. Similarly, the entry of Gulf states may not fundamentally change the pace, trajectory, or ultimate decision regarding the continuation or termination of the war.
What appears more likely is that the United States is currently seeking both international and regional political cover. Such cover may serve to justify continuing the conflict if President Donald Trump feels compelled to do so, or to maintain pressure if a ceasefire becomes necessary.
At this point, however, a divergence between the American and Israeli positions could emerge. In such a scenario, an expanded war in Lebanon or renewed escalation in Gaza may become the method through which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces accusations related to crimes committed in Gaza, attempts to manage such divergence.
A Conflict With Global Consequences
The region is likely to face waves of extremely intense attacks, dramatic developments on the battlefield, and serious economic and political repercussions.
The wider Middle East and the global system may also face significant instability.
For the first time in this war, the possibility of major international confrontations emerging from the conflict appears closer than before.
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