US military deployments in the Middle East are accelerating, amid preparations for a military operation or a war against Iran that American and Israeli sources say is becoming increasingly imminent.
During a visit to Israel on 26 January, Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, spoke of a “short, fast and clean operation” against Iran, stressing the readiness and preparedness of American forces.
In the same context, Eyal Zamir, Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, indicated that defensive coordination between Israel and the United States had been discussed in the event of an attack on Iran, which could trigger the launch of ballistic missiles towards Israel.
Israel may believe it has found its long sought opportunity to achieve its major objectives against Iran, either by forcing Tehran to comply with its conditions or through military force, as part of a project to redraw the Middle East according to the standards of the extremist theological Zionist right.
Limited Operation or Major War
On the surface, American and Israeli statements suggest that Washington is moving towards a limited but painful strike that could target Iranian officials, under the pretext of victory and retaliation for demonstrators who took to the streets on 28 December 2025, protests that continued for weeks before subsiding.
Cooper indicated that any potential attack on Iran would target officials accused of harming protesters.
In this context, it is not inconceivable that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could be a target, based on previous hints by US President Donald Trump, who said he knew Khamenei’s exact location and described him as an “easy target”, while adding that he would not be targeted for now. These remarks provoked angry reactions in Iran.
Within the dynamics of relations between Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran, references to protesters are widely viewed as a pretext to resume war on Iran in order to achieve strategic objectives that were not accomplished during the twelve day assault last year. Chief among these objectives were regime change in Iran or stripping the state of its deterrent power.
This assessment is reinforced by Israel’s request that Washington delay any US strike until it is thoroughly prepared, while taking defensive measures against possible Iranian retaliation, which could be significant and far reaching this time.
At the same time, American conditions were reportedly conveyed to Iran via Turkey. These included dismantling the nuclear programme and handing over enriched uranium, abandoning ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel, and halting support for its regional allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen.
These demands amount to a radical overhaul of Iran’s strategic foreign and defence policies, forcing it into inward retreat as a neutral regional state at best. Iran has neither accepted this path nor adopted it following the twelve day war in June 2025.
This indicates that Iran continues to adhere to the same strategic approach, while remaining open to negotiations with Washington on the basis of mutual respect and international law. This framework, however, has been undermined by Trump’s conduct and reliance on a policy of imposing facts on the ground through the logic of power, as seen in Venezuela and potentially elsewhere.
Israel appears to believe it has found its moment to impose its vision on Iran, either through compliance or force, as part of reshaping the region in line with extremist Zionist ideology.
The American military operation described by Cooper as “short, fast and clean” may fail if it does not succeed in achieving shock and surprise. This possibility grows if Iran maintains internal cohesion and takes the initiative in launching a heavy response. In such a case, the region could slide into an escalating confrontation that drags the Middle East into a harsh war with severe security and economic consequences regionally and globally.
A Major Explosion in a Fragile Region
Based on official positions and declared measures, the Iranian system is preparing for a wide and decisive war, treating any coming attack as an existential battle. This comes amid shrinking diplomatic space, deep mistrust between Washington and Tehran, and the erosion of international law governing global relations.
Given the scale of potential strategic repercussions, it is likely that any war this time would not be confined to Iran’s borders. Iran has threatened to strike Israel and US bases in the region that would be used to launch attacks against it.
From another front, Naim Qassem, Secretary General of Hezbollah in Lebanon, stated on Monday 26 January that the American threat against Iran constitutes a direct threat to Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance. He said it cannot be treated as an internal Iranian matter but rather as a direct assault on the axis of resistance.
He stressed that the party has full authority to act as it deems appropriate, in line with its commitment to the principle of the wilayat al faqih, which it regards as a guiding authority in existential challenges and major confrontations.
Beyond the possibility of the Lebanese front igniting, Iraq is witnessing intense political manoeuvring. The Coordination Framework, which brings together Shia parties and forms the largest parliamentary bloc, has chosen Nouri al Maliki as its candidate for the next premiership.
This points to an approaching political showdown in Iraq between Iran, which supports Maliki, and the United States, which opposes his return. Washington has warned Baghdad, through Secretary of State Marco Rubio, against forming a government aligned with Iran, as Maliki’s potential comeback has raised American concerns.
The United States seeks a prime minister who would move to marginalise and dissolve factions of the Popular Mobilisation Forces that maintain close ties with Iran, despite being officially part of the Iraqi army.
Washington fears that if it strikes Iran, PMF factions could target US presence in Iraq and the region or attack Israel through Jordanian territory. This scenario also alarms Israel in the event of a future war with Iran.
An Israeli report published by the Ynet website recently said the Israeli army has begun a broad operation to restore and reinforce military fortifications along the Jordanian border, amid fears that the border could turn into an active front involving fighters aligned with Iran.
At the same time, the Wall Street Journal quoted a US defence official and cited official statements saying the United States has deployed F 15 Strike Eagle aircraft to Jordan and is transferring Patriot and THAAD air defence systems to the region to protect American facilities and allies from potential Iranian counterattacks.
Washington and Israel may be miscalculating if they assume that transforming Iran from an adversary into a friendly state can be achieved through a swift aerial operation. Iran is a large country with a complex internal system, and Israel seeks an existential war of eradication. This, in itself, raises the cost of war and complicates the achievement of objectives.
From the Israeli perspective, war against Iran is aimed at uprooting the Iranian system and altering the regional balance of power. This also entails dismantling Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen. Such ambitions point towards a fierce war that could trigger a major, fragmented explosion across multiple theatres in an already fragile Middle East marked by deep security volatility.
While several Arab and Islamic states, including Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have expressed opposition to a war on Iran due to the dangers of destabilising geopolitical realities, Russia and China would view such a conflict as an American war in their strategic backyard.
Russian and Chinese interests in Iran are extensive, economically and militarily. Coupled with Iran’s sensitive geopolitical location, bordering China to the east and Russia to the north via the Caspian Sea, any American military campaign would become far more complex, costly, and unlikely to achieve the strategic objectives of the Zionist American alliance.
