Within Washington’s corridors and the media centres monitoring the Middle East conflict, sharply divergent expectations have emerged regarding a potential American strike on Iran. The differences are not merely a matter of degree but of kind, revealing a deep divide among seasoned analysts reading the same signals. This split places the world before two irreconcilable forecasts at a moment when one of the most consequential decisions facing the Trump administration is under assessment.
One of these analysts, Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, argues that if American military action does occur, it would amount to a calculated display of restraint and would ultimately serve as a face saving measure. Such an action, in his view, would be limited in scope, conducted unilaterally, and aimed primarily at resolving the political dilemma currently confronting Donald Trump. By contrast, a starkly opposing analysis from former Central Intelligence Agency officers Larry Johnson and Ray McGovern suggests that American military action could take place within days, triggering a comprehensive conflagration that would engulf US bases, Israel, and the global economy.
This sharp divergence lies at the heart of the analysis. Where Mearsheimer sees calculated restraint born of military incapacity, Johnson and McGovern see an unstoppable march towards war.
The Case for Calculated Restraint
Professor Mearsheimer builds his analytical framework on a bleak assessment. Regime change in Iran, he argues, remains militarily unachievable and would carry enormous negative regional consequences. His analysis points to briefings delivered to Trump on 14 January, in which American military leaders reportedly acknowledged they could not guarantee regime change, particularly after the failure of protests allegedly orchestrated by the CIA in Iranian streets. This reality, he suggests, leaves Trump with a series of painful choices.
Mearsheimer states that simply deploying additional military forces to the region does not make regime change more attainable, describing this as the very problem Trump created through his confrontational rhetoric. He adds that the only option remaining is to launch a limited strike that would allow Washington to declare victory and withdraw. Yet this path also carries grave risks. Iran, he notes, has made clear that any military strike, however limited, would provoke full scale retaliation.
The consequences of such a scenario are, in Mearsheimer’s words, easy to predict. Iranian missiles would rain down on American targets across the Middle East, Israel would be attacked despite efforts to remain outside the conflict, and there could even be an assault on the Strait of Hormuz, an act that would have devastating implications for the global economy.
Central to Mearsheimer’s argument is his assertion that US policy towards Iran is driven not by legitimate security concerns but by the Israeli lobby. He cites the Clinton administration’s attempted rapprochement with Iran as an example of how American presidents, in his view, have been prevented by Zionist lobbying from pursuing policies aligned with US interests. This dynamic, he argues, creates a persistent risk of war between the two countries even when such a conflict would run counter to American strategic priorities.
Warning of an Imminent Catastrophe
Johnson and McGovern express no such doubts. Drawing on what they describe as access to intelligence sources and back channel communications, they report that an American strike could occur by the end of this week or the next, with Iran declaring war immediately.
The operational challenges they outline are formidable. They claim that Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have refused to allow the United States to use their airspace, leaving aircraft carriers exposed off their coasts. Johnson calculates that the fleet’s air defence missiles would be depleted within ten days of combat if Bahrain were attacked and no safe port were available for resupply.
Johnson states plainly that Iran is likely to declare war, outlining a three pronged response by Tehran. This would involve attacks on American bases in the region, strikes against Israel, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He adds that Iran has been communicating these intentions to oil dependent states in the Gulf and Asia, hoping they will pressure Washington to pull back.
McGovern paints the potential consequences in even darker tones. He warns that Trump could commit the fatal error described as the law of unintended consequences, pushing Iran towards what he terms the destruction of Israel. McGovern argues that the pretext for war is thin, noting that US intelligence assessments have concluded only that Iran might consider resuming aspects of its nuclear programme, a judgement he says falls far short of justifying a catastrophic conflict.
Once again, McGovern points to Israel as the driving force behind Washington’s posture, stating that the overwhelming majority of the push towards war with Iran stems from priorities set in Jerusalem and treated as sacrosanct in Washington. Unlike Mearsheimer’s scenario, however, McGovern sees no evidence of Iranian retreat. Johnson adds that the June operation failed even to neutralise Iran’s capacity to respond, with retaliation reportedly occurring within ten hours.
The Intelligence Puzzle
What explains these radically different conclusions? Both analyses agree on the core variables shaping the crisis. These include Trump’s hard line stance, Iran’s deterrent capability, Israel’s interests, and the impossibility of regime change. Yet they diverge sharply on questions of timing and likelihood.
Mearsheimer’s conclusions rest on rational actor theory, which assumes that the impossibility of military success and the scale of catastrophic consequences will ultimately dictate behaviour. Johnson and McGovern, by contrast, ground their conclusions in insider information, arguing that momentum has already overtaken the capacity for rational and strategic decision making.
The stakes of this analytical divide are immense. A war with Iran would be catastrophic not only for the Middle East but for the world at large. Such a conflict could trigger a global economic crisis and potentially draw in Russia and China, given their significant interests in Iranian energy resources.
The question confronting any serious observer is which interpretation of the same intelligence should be believed. Should one trust the academic who argues that strategic paralysis will ultimately restrain action, or the intelligence veterans who warn of an uncontrollable momentum towards war once events are set in motion?
The answer will determine whether the coming weeks bring tense diplomatic manoeuvring or the outbreak of the most dangerous conflict the Middle East has seen in decades. What is certain is that the consequences of either a limited face saving strike or a full scale war would be felt far beyond the shores of the Arabian Gulf.
