In recent days, discussion has intensified around the completion of US preparations for a potential attack on Iran. On the Iranian side, officials are speaking of finalising preparations to confront any possible aggression and respond to American targets. Once these preparations are in place, the central question emerges: when will President Trump decide to launch an attack?
Here the core problem becomes clear. The strategic objective of the US administration remains undefined, and the ambiguity deepens due to President Trump’s highly personal dominance over decision making. Amid this unprecedented military build-up, what exactly is the administration’s primary goal? Is it to use this concentration of force to alter the behaviour of the Iranian regime and steer it in the direction Trump desires, or is the objective the overthrow of the regime itself? Several scenarios arise from the uncertainty created by the president’s repeated and often contradictory public statements.
The first scenario involves maintaining the military build-up for an extended period in order to strangle the Iranian regime and force it to submit to American demands. These demands begin with denying Iran its right to enrich uranium, limiting its ballistic missile capabilities, and abandoning its regional allies. This path would ultimately culminate in the signing of an economic agreement with Washington that secures American gains.
The dilemma here lies in how long such a military build-up can be sustained, given the financial bleeding involved in funding deployments that cost billions of dollars. Can these demands, or even part of them, realistically be achieved, allowing Trump to brand the outcome, as he often does, as a great deal? This comes up against Iranian determination to resist relinquishing its enrichment rights, missile programme, and regional leverage.
The second scenario centres on striking regime targets. The question here is what benefit would come from a strike that neither topples the regime nor delivers the desired outcome. Two options present themselves. The first is a limited, symbolic strike that Iran absorbs while avoiding retaliation in order to prevent escalation. The second is a harsh and painful blow to the regime, one that would compel an Iranian response to preserve national dignity. In that case, the most likely option for Iran would be to respond in the direction of Israel.
Such an attack would force Israel to intervene and act against Iran, as it would result in significant damage inside Israel. Recent experience reinforces this assessment. During what Israel termed the Rising Lion war, which lasted twelve days in June, Iran demonstrated capabilities that cannot be ignored. These included the use of hypersonic missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads, posing serious challenges to Israeli and American missile defence systems such as Arrow, Patriot, and THAAD.
The greatest challenge Iran would face in delivering a truly painful strike lies in its ability to deploy large quantities from its missile stockpile. This is to avoid a repeat of the twelve-day confrontation, when Israel succeeded in neutralising missile launch capabilities by striking tunnel openings from which missiles were fired. That outcome placed Iran in an embarrassing position due to its inability at the time to effectively utilise its missile reserves.
Against this backdrop of complex options aimed at achieving political objectives, it is difficult to favour one scenario over another. None of the scenarios being discussed offer real solutions or provide the kind of achievement Trump would seek to boast about.
This leaves the scenario of Trump’s personal decision making. He must take into account that he seeks only short and profitable confrontations that do not clash with a significant segment of his electoral base, particularly the MAGA movement, out of fear of being drawn into a prolonged war. This is compounded by Democratic Party opposition to military entanglement.
If the Iranian challenge continues, and this requires a level of resilience that has characterised the Iranian leadership despite its pragmatism, Trump may be forced to search for an exit that allows him to claim victory. Otherwise, the alternative would be the most difficult option of all, entering a war without clear objectives aimed at subduing Iran as a state and leadership.
Conclusion
In light of these complexities, Trump is more likely to favour an agreement that allows him to project an image of victory and achievement following a limited strike, rather than igniting a war whose consequences remain unknown.
