In the middle of the sixth century AH, Egypt entered a decisive phase in its political and military history. This period coincided with the weakening of the Fatimid state, the escalation of Crusader attacks on Egypt’s coasts, and a bitter power struggle between the two viziers Dirgham and Shawar for absolute control of the country.
Shawar was defeated in this struggle and was forced to seek refuge with Sultan Nur al Din Mahmud Zangi, the ruler of Greater Syria, asking for military support to restore him to the vizierate in exchange for substantial economic and financial concessions that would benefit the Zangid state.
Nur al Din, however, was looking beyond immediate financial gain. He understood that political and economic control over Egypt would strengthen Greater Syria in its broader confrontation with the Crusaders by supplying the funds and manpower needed for sustained wars of attrition. For this reason, he dispatched Asad al Din Shirkuh and his nephew Salah al Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub to resolve the conflict.
Salah al Din succeeded in securing Shawar’s return to power, but Shawar soon reneged on his agreement with Nur al Din. He ignored his prior commitments and moved to betray his allies and eliminate them. When Asad al Din and Salah al Din uncovered this plot, they decided to remove him, and Shawar was killed. Asad al Din then assumed the post of vizier in Egypt with the consent of the last Fatimid caliph, al Adid. When Asad al Din died in 564 AH or 1169 CE, Salah al Din succeeded him as vizier, as recorded by Abu Shama in his historical work al Rawdatayn.
Before the Fall of the Fatimids
In that same year, Egypt faced its most acute challenges when the Crusaders and Byzantines agreed to invade the country and expel the forces of Salah al Din and Nur al Din. This culminated in the campaign against Damietta, where the coastal city became the scene of Salah al Din’s first major confrontation after assuming the vizierate in Cairo. This battle would later prove to be a turning point on the road to ending Fatimid rule.
Following the campaign, Nur al Din sent reinforcements to support Salah al Din’s resistance against the Crusader threat. He recognised that Egypt’s survival was a strategic necessity to prevent Crusader expansion into the country and believed that defending Egypt was inseparable from defending Syria and Jerusalem, as noted by the historian Shakir Mustafa in his book Salah al Din al Faris al Mujahid.
Salah al Din’s victory at Damietta, achieved under extremely harsh conditions, had a profound impact. It cemented his image as a commander capable of managing decisive battles and consolidated his political and military presence in Egypt. From that point onward, he began to view the remnants of Fatimid authority as an obstacle to the broader security of the Islamic world rather than as a genuine partner in governance.
This shift was reflected in policies based on gradually dismantling Fatimid influence without provoking a direct confrontation that might trigger internal unrest or portray him as acting independently of Nur al Din. He strengthened his grip over the levers of power, relying on the Turkish troops previously sent by Nur al Din and on his growing popularity among the Egyptian population, who saw in his presence protection from the Crusader threat after the Fatimid caliphate had failed to defend the country.
As Shakir Mustafa notes, while Nur al Din closely monitored developments, Salah al Din was thinking in two parallel directions. The first was opening the route between Syria and Egypt to facilitate the movement of armies and trade and ensure the unity of the Islamic front against the Crusaders. The second was securing internal stability in Egypt and preventing any rallying around the Fatimid caliph or the resurgence of rebellious forces within the palace.
Salah al Din pursued his project with calculated restraint. He did not rush to announce the end of the Fatimid state, yet he also did not allow it to regain strength or cohesion. As his military and political successes accumulated after defeating the Crusaders at Damietta, historical conditions matured for drawing the curtain on Fatimid rule, paving the way for the unified Ayyubid state that would later assume the task of liberating Jerusalem.
Salah al Din understood that consolidating his authority in Egypt and advancing the project of liberation required securing the military and political link between Cairo and Damascus. From 566 AH or 1170 CE, he began launching campaigns along the Palestinian coast, attacking Ascalon and destroying some of its surrounding fortifications before reaching Ramla. These operations sent a clear field message that Islamic power was moving into areas that formed a natural extension of Egypt’s defensive front and that the Crusaders would not be able to threaten Egypt without facing consequences.
Through this early penetration into Palestine, Salah al Din sought to demonstrate to the Crusaders that the force which had broken their campaign at Damietta remained ready to resume jihad. At the same time, these operations warned merchants and caravans moving between Syria and Egypt against cooperating with the Crusaders under pressure or threat. They also succeeded in deterring Bedouin groups that had long engaged in highway robbery and attacks on travellers. In this way, the first foundations were laid for securing the vital overland route between Egypt and Greater Syria, as confirmed by Shakir Mustafa.
In 570 AH, Salah al Din led his army towards the port and city of Aqaba, whose strategic geographic position controlled routes to the Hijaz and Yemen. This move aimed to tighten the noose around the Crusaders by disrupting their supply and communication lines.
Salah al Din and the End of the Fatimid Caliphate
Alongside his military efforts, Salah al Din launched a long term political project aimed at transforming Egypt’s social structure from loyalty to the fading Fatimid system to allegiance to the rising state he was leading.
This vision was implemented through systematic economic and social reforms that focused on easing the tax burdens that had exhausted the population for decades, establishing justice within state institutions, and directing public resources toward meeting the needs of vulnerable groups. These measures directly enhanced popular acceptance of his authority and strengthened public trust in the emerging Ayyubid project.
Salah al Din also moved to neutralise networks of corruption and Fatimid loyalty that continued to operate in the shadows. He confronted internal forces, including remnants of the Fatimid guard and elements linked to internal conspiracies, most notably the conspiracy of the Sudanese slaves and the plot of Imara al Yamani, among other attempts to revive Fatimid rule through subversion or incitement.
He dismantled these organisations through strict security measures and reorganised the army by excluding old guard units and building a new military force composed of Kurdish and Turkoman troops from Syria. This ensured firm control over armed power and permanently closed the door to any attempt to restore Fatimid rule from within or without.
Salah al Din’s strategy combined firmness abroad with the construction of legitimacy through justice and anti corruption measures at home. As his actions against the Crusaders earned him public respect in Egypt, his influence continued to grow.
Once his position in Egypt was consolidated after a series of victories over the Crusaders and the stabilisation of his rule in Cairo, Nur al Din found an opportunity to urge him to carry out the long awaited political transformation of ending Fatimid rule and formally severing ties with Ismaili doctrine.
At that time, the Fatimid caliph al Adid li Din Allah was suffering from a severe illness that removed him from active governance. Few paid attention when he died shortly thereafter, as Egypt had already effectively entered a new political phase.
The calm that prevailed in Cairo reflected the fact that the Fatimid caliphate, which could be described at that stage as the sick man on the Islamic front, had lost its capacity to influence events. People had turned their attention away from it and were absorbed in confronting the Crusader invasion, which had become the greatest threat to their land and faith. Thus, the final chapter of the Fatimid state closed without popular revolt or civil unrest, but through a quiet transition resulting from the erosion of its foundations and the loss of public trust.
Notably, two of the most prominent contemporary historians of Salah al Din’s era, Ibn al Athir, who was close to the Zangid state, and Ibn Abi Tayyi, a Shiite historian, presented accounts marked by varying degrees of bias. Ibn al Athir, one of the great historians of Islam, criticised Salah al Din for assuming control over Egypt and Syria, which he regarded as Zangid inheritance. At the same time, he revealed many positive aspects of Salah al Din’s policies in Egypt and confirmed that Sultan al Nasir did not sever his allegiance to Nur al Din, while also highlighting his declaration of loyalty to the Abbasid caliphate.
Ibn Abi Tayyi, who drew much of his material from his father, who had been exiled to Aleppo by order of Nur al Din, displayed more pronounced bias in his narrative. On this basis, some later writers relied on Ibn al Athir’s claim that Salah al Din hesitated to abolish the Fatimid caliphate out of fear of Nur al Din to argue that he was not fully convinced of dismantling it and feared Zangid intervention that could threaten his authority in Egypt.
Salah al Din’s Strategy in Egypt
A large number of modern historians, including Shakir Mustafa in his book Salah al Din, Yaacov Lev in Salah al Din in Egypt, and Michael Fulton in The Contest for Egypt, The Fall of the Fatimid Caliphate, reject the claim that Salah al Din lacked decisiveness regarding the Fatimid caliphate. They argue that this view collapses when the political and military context of the period is examined carefully. Salah al Din’s actions from the moment he assumed the Fatimid vizierate clearly reflect a comprehensive strategic vision aimed at ending the Fatimid caliphate through a gradual and calculated process.
He worked to dismantle centres of power linked to the old regime within state institutions and to exclude influential figures from decision making. In doing so, he effectively emptied the Fatimid caliphate of its substance before formally announcing its end. This reflects a sustained project to abolish Fatimid rule, not to preserve it, as some historians, led by Ibn al Athir, have suggested.
His military movements in southern Greater Syria and along the Palestinian coast formed part of a broader vision to secure the route between Egypt and Syria, enabling the integration of both fronts against the Crusaders. This was not a break from Nur al Din’s authority, as a superficial reading might suggest, but rather a preparatory step to strengthen the Zangid project of unifying the Islamic world, while granting Egypt a leading role within this new framework.
Politically, Salah al Din maintained clear loyalty to Nur al Din and displayed no behaviour indicating a desire to monopolise power or rebel against the legitimate framework within which he operated. He avoided confrontation with Nur al Din, fully aware that any internal conflict would serve the Crusaders at a time when the existential battle facing the Islamic world was paramount. When Nur al Din ordered that the Abbasid caliph al Mustadi bi Amr Allah be mentioned in the Friday sermon on Cairo’s pulpits, Salah al Din complied.
Abu Shama records Nur al Din’s advice to Turanshah, Salah al Din’s elder brother, before his journey to Egypt as part of a force sent to support Salah al Din. Nur al Din told him that if he went to Egypt viewing his brother as merely Yusuf who once served him while he sat idle, then he should not go, as this would corrupt the land and bring punishment upon him. But if he regarded him as the ruler of Egypt acting on Nur al Din’s behalf and served him as he served Nur al Din himself, then he should go, strengthen his position, and assist him in his mission. Turanshah agreed, and matters unfolded as described.
Ibn al Athir himself later acknowledged in his al Kamil fi al Tarikh, after his earlier claim that Salah al Din did not wish to dismantle the Fatimid caliphate, that Nur al Din pressed him insistently to end the Fatimid khutba and left him no room to disobey. In reality, Salah al Din was acting as Nur al Din’s deputy. It coincided with al Adid’s severe illness, and when Salah al Din resolved to end the khutba, he consulted his commanders. Some supported the move without regard for Egyptian sensitivities, while others feared popular reaction. Ultimately, obedience to Nur al Din’s order was unavoidable.
An account follows of an Ajam man known as al Amir al Alim who took the initiative to deliver the khutba in the name of the Abbasid caliph al Mustadi. No one objected. On the following Friday, Salah al Din ordered all preachers in Egypt and Cairo to cease mentioning al Adid and to deliver the khutba for al Mustadi. This occurred without resistance or unrest.
If there was disagreement, it was over timing rather than the objective itself. Salah al Din feared the remnants of the old regime embedded in key positions and among the general population. His cautious handling of the matter aimed to avoid internal unrest that could undermine his later military project against the Crusaders.
Subsequent events confirmed the consistent objective that had guided Salah al Din since his arrival in Cairo. He immediately laid the foundations of the Ayyubid state, extended Abbasid legitimacy over Egypt, and reoriented the country politically and doctrinally to serve as the base for the anticipated confrontation to liberate Jerusalem. This confirms that what preceded the dismantling of the Fatimid state was careful preparation, and what followed was a decisive advance toward the ultimate goal.
After the abolition of Fatimid rule and the declaration of Egypt’s allegiance to the Abbasid caliphate, a phase of political and administrative reorganisation began to consolidate the legitimacy of the historic transformation led by Salah al Din. This phase commenced with the dispatch of an official delegation to Baghdad to announce the end of the Fatimid daawa and to activate the khutba in the name of the Abbasid caliph across Cairo and other Egyptian cities. White banners associated with Fatimid rule were lowered and replaced with black banners, the symbol of the Abbasid state.
Abd al Rahman Azzam documents in his book Salah al Din and the Revival of Sunni Islam the comprehensive reform process undertaken by Salah al Din. At the official level, state leaders and senior officials were required to attend Friday prayers under the Abbasid banner, publicly demonstrating Egypt’s political realignment. Coinage was reissued in the name of the Abbasid caliph al Mustadi, while highlighting Nur al Din as the supreme authority in Egypt during this transitional phase.
The reform plan also included purging the judicial and administrative apparatus of influential Fatimid elements and replacing them with new Shafii judges loyal to Salah al Din’s doctrinal orientation, among them Sadr al Din Ibn Darbas, who was appointed chief judge. Salah al Din also restructured educational and religious institutions by closing Dar al Mauna, a notorious prison in Cairo, and converting it into a school for the promotion of the Shafii school, alongside establishing other institutions for the Maliki school.
He ended the presence of Fatimid rituals and practices in society that clashed with the beliefs of the general population and banned the teaching of works serving Ismaili doctrine, replacing them with unifying Sunni practices. He also sought to cleanse social identity of remnants of Fatimid discourse that linked the caliphs’ political lineage to the Prophet’s family, dismantling these claims within the framework of renewed Abbasid legitimacy.
On the financial front, Salah al Din took decisive action by abolishing unjust taxes and levies that had burdened Egyptians for decades. He issued formal orders cancelling debts and grievances imposed on the public and returning unlawfully seized wealth to its rightful owners. He went further by allocating substantial funds to improve social conditions, support the poor, and facilitate the affairs of Egyptian pilgrims travelling to the Hijaz, after Fatimid policies had long obstructed their routes and commercial activity.
For the first time in many years, Egyptians experienced tangible political and economic outcomes that restored a sense of justice and dignity. This was observed by the Andalusian traveller and jurist Ibn Jubayr during his visit to Egypt in Salah al Din’s era. It earned Salah al Din widespread trust across social strata at home and abroad and allowed his project of unifying the Islamic front to take root internally before turning toward the liberation of Jerusalem.
