India and the United Arab Emirates signed, on Monday, a series of agreements aimed at doubling bilateral trade to USD 200 billion by 2032. The agreements were concluded on the sidelines of the visit of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to India and his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the capital, New Delhi.
The meeting focused on strengthening cooperation in trade, energy, defence, and emerging technologies, according to Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, who confirmed the comprehensive strategic relationship that has witnessed notable growth over the past decade between the two countries.
The two leaders set a target to double trade volume to USD 200 billion. India also signed an agreement to import 500,000 tonnes of liquefied natural gas annually from the UAE for a period of ten years starting in 2028, in addition to a letter of intent to conclude a framework agreement for a strategic defence partnership. Deals were also signed in the space and food sectors, while the UAE pledged an undisclosed investment in the Indian state of Gujarat to develop an integrated investment zone that includes airports, ports, and smart cities.
In a post on his official account, political analyst and writer Abdulkhaleq Abdulla described the deal as a “masterstroke”, noting that “the UAE and India are signing a joint defence agreement and will work on advanced projects in the nuclear field”, reflecting the deep strategic dimensions of the agreement.
Egyptian writer and researcher Gamal Sultan pointed out that “the UAE announced a joint defence and strategic cooperation agreement with India, while Israeli media spoke of the Netanyahu government moving towards a defence and economic partnership with India after losing hope in normalisation with Saudi Arabia and its leadership”. Sultan added that this move “reinforces international reports about the formation of a new axis: Israeli, Indian, and Emirati, in confrontation with another axis: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan”.
These developments come at a time of growing Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani rapprochement, and amid unprecedented tension in Saudi-Emirati relations against the backdrop of ongoing developments in southern Yemen. This increases the sensitivity of strategic moves in the region and raises questions about the reshaping of regional alliances and the long-term political and economic stakes.
Within the analytical readings accompanying the Emirati Indian rapprochement and the debate surrounding its regional implications, the Editor in Chief of the Saudi newspaper Al Watan, Sulaiman Al Aqili, argued that these moves fall within what he described as “Abu Dhabi’s strategy to encircle the Arab region through the theory of the arc of crises”.
Al Aqili explained, in an analytical article, that this approach indirectly draws inspiration from the “arc of crises” theory formulated by former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in the late 1970s, which was based on managing instability on the periphery of rivals rather than direct confrontation. He argued that Abu Dhabi, with the assistance of Israeli experts, adopted a regional version of this philosophy aimed at entrenching influence beyond its natural size.
He indicated that this strategy specifically targets key centres of Arab influence, foremost among them Saudi Arabia and Egypt, through policies of geographic and strategic attrition extending from Yemen and the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, Libya, and Syria. He noted that the Emirati presence in Aden, Mokha, Socotra, and Mayun does not fall within a purely defensive framework, but rather within efforts to control maritime chokepoints in Bab al Mandab and the Gulf of Aden.
Al Aqili added that the war in Yemen represented “the clearest testing ground” for this approach, where the Emirati role, according to his description, shifted from support within the coalition to managing the course of the conflict through backing separatist projects and forming parallel militias. This left Saudi Arabia’s southern borders in a fragile position before this “arc” extended westward to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, and eastward to Libya and Syria.
In contrast, Al Aqili stressed that this approach clashes with the reality of transformations in contemporary Saudi policy. He argued that Riyadh has succeeded in dismantling the logic of “managing chaos” by adopting preventive diplomacy, turning attrition into opportunity, and redefining its national security according to a logic of stability and initiative rather than reaction. This, he concluded, is reshaping the regional balance of power.
