When “Israel” quietly became the first entity in the world to formally recognise Somaliland, a self-declared breakaway region of Somalia, the announcement landed like a diplomatic thunderclap across Africa and the Middle East.
For Somaliland’s leaders, it was the breakthrough they had pursued for more than three decades: international legitimacy after years of operating as a de facto state without recognition. For Somalia’s federal government, it was a violation of sovereignty, for the African Union, it set a dangerous precedent, and for a growing number of regional analysts, it marked something even more consequential—a potential turning point in how power is exercised across the Red Sea corridor.
“This is not about Somaliland alone,” Mouin Rabbani, senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. “It’s about Israel’s belief that it can now order regional arrangements, not just influence them.”
The recognition comes at a moment of extraordinary flux. The Middle East is still reeling from the aftermath of “Israel’s” war on Gaza and its expansion into Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, as well as escalating confrontations in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Gulf rivalries have sharpened, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as both compete for influence across Africa’s eastern flank.
Against this backdrop, Somaliland—long viewed as diplomatically marginal—has suddenly become strategically central.
A state that exists—and doesn’t
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime and years of brutal repression in the north. Since then, it has maintained its own government, parliament, security forces, and currency.
Yet international recognition has never followed. The African Union has consistently upheld Somalia’s territorial integrity, fearing that recognising Somaliland would encourage secessionist movements across the continent. Western governments, while quietly engaging with Hargeisa, have stopped short of formal recognition.
“Israel’s” move, therefore, breaks a long-standing diplomatic taboo.
But the image of Somaliland as a clearly defined, stable state is misleading, Rabbani warned. “It’s not analogous to the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq,” he said. “It’s a territory in flux, with contested areas that shift in and out of control.”
Recognition, he added, risks hardening those disputes, turning local political tensions into internationalised conflicts.
Fragmentation as policy
To understand why “Israel” would take such a step, analysts say it is necessary to look beyond the Horn of Africa and toward “Israel’s” broader regional trajectory since October 2023.
Following Oct 7 and “Israel’s” devastating genocidal war on Gaza, Tel Aviv steadily expanded its military footprint across the region. Israeli strikes intensified in Lebanon and Syria. Covert and overt confrontations with Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement escalated.
Meanwhile, settlement expansion and de facto “annexation” accelerated in the occupied West Bank.
“In 2024, Israel regained confidence and went on the offensive,” Rabbani said. “It began behaving not simply as the strongest state in the region, but as one that believes it can shape the regional order.”
Fragmentation, he argued, has long been central to Israeli strategic thinking. From cultivating ties with southern Sudanese rebels before South Sudan’s independence to deep engagement with Iraqi Kurds, “Israel” has historically supported or exploited secessionist dynamics on the periphery of Arab states.
“Removing Somaliland from Somalia would be entirely consistent with that approach,” he said.
Being the first, and potentially only, state to recognise Somaliland also gives “Israel” leverage. It positions Tel Aviv as a gatekeeper to further international legitimacy, deepening Somaliland’s dependence on Israeli political and security backing.
Red Sea anxieties and the Bab al-Mandab
Nowhere are “Israel’s” strategic calculations clearer than in the Red Sea.
Since late 2023, the Bab al-Mandab Strait—one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints—has emerged as a critical vulnerability for “Israel”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, acting in solidarity with Gaza, began targeting shipping linked to “Israel”, disrupting trade routes between Asia and Europe.
Despite months of intense US-UK airstrikes on Yemen, the campaign failed to stop the attacks. Eventually, Western forces were forced into a ceasefire that did not even address the continued Yemeni pressure on Israeli-linked vessels.
“For Israel, this was a wake-up call,” Rabbani said. “The Bab al-Mandab became a symbol of strategic exposure.”
Somaliland’s port city of Berbera lies just across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. Control—or influence—over territory near the strait offers obvious advantages: surveillance, intelligence gathering, rapid deployment, and deterrence.
Reports that “Israel” and Somaliland discussed a potential Israeli military presence have been officially denied by both sides. But Rabbani believes Israel already operates covertly in the region, as it has in South Sudan and elsewhere.
“A formal base would simply make overt what is already informal,” he said. “And it would send a message that Israel is the power that defines security arrangements in the Red Sea.”
Asked whether such a move could destabilise regional security, Rabbani was blunt. “Destabilisation is not a side effect—it’s the point.”
The UAE’s shadow
“Israel’s” recognition of Somaliland cannot be separated from the growing role of the United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa.
For years, Abu Dhabi has invested heavily in Somaliland, particularly in Berbera port, which it sees as a commercial hub linking Gulf capital to African markets. Emirati companies have also been active in security cooperation, infrastructure, and logistics across the region.
“The Israeli and Emirati strategies are deeply intertwined,” Rabbani said. “They should be seen as part of a unified campaign.”
That alignment, however, has sharpened tensions within the Gulf, especially with Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh considers the Red Sea and Horn of Africa zones of vital national security. From its perspective, Emirati activism, particularly when linked to Israel, looks increasingly like encirclement.
“Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Tel Aviv appears more valuable to it than its relationship with Riyadh,” Rabbani said. “And Emirati policies increasingly reflect Israeli priorities rather than Saudi ones.”
The Somaliland recognition comes amid other Emirati moves that have alarmed Saudi officials, including support for the Southern Transitional Council in southern Yemen and backing for the Rapid Support Forces in the Sudanese conflict.
Taken together, these actions have strained what was once a central alliance between the two neighbouring countries.
African resistance and Somali anger
The backlash from Africa was swift. The African Union called on “Israel” to revoke its recognition, warning that it undermines foundational principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For Adam Matan, a Somali-British civil society activist and former director of the Anti-Tribalism Movement, the decision risks destabilising an already fragile region.
“This sets a dangerous precedent,” Matan told Al Mayadeen English. “It tells secessionist movements that external powers can be used to bypass African consensus.”
Matan rejected the idea that recognition would bring peace or prosperity to Somalilanders. “What it brings is militarisation, elite deals and geopolitical competition,” he said. “Ordinary people are excluded.”
He also warned that recognition could inflame internal Somali tensions, particularly in contested regions where clan loyalties and political authority overlap. “These are precisely the conditions in which proxy conflicts thrive,” he said.
Gaza, relocation, and violence
One of the more inflammatory narratives circulating since the recognition is the claim that Somaliland could be used as a destination for Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza.
Rabbani dismissed the idea outright. “It’s a pipe dream,” he said. “I don’t see shiploads of Palestinians sailing from Gaza to Berbera.”
Still, he acknowledged that such rhetoric serves political purposes—both domestically within “Israel” and diplomatically with Somaliland’s leadership. “Talking it up sells the recognition to sceptics,” he said, “even if it’s completely unrealistic.”
For many in Somalia and the wider Muslim world, however, the symbolism is deeply provocative: a Muslim-majority territory gaining recognition from a state widely condemned for its actions in Gaza.
International law in retreat
“Israel’s” recognition of Somaliland also highlights the accelerating erosion of international legal norms.
Under the Biden administration, “Israel” faced few meaningful constraints on its regional actions. With Donald Trump’s return to power and his open contempt for international institutions, analysts say “Israel” feels even less restrained.
“This has reinforced the belief that international law no longer matters,” Rabbani said. “That you can act first and deal with consequences later.”
Yet “Israel’s” capacity to sustain such a strategy is limited. Unlike global powers, it relies heavily on Western political, military, and economic support.
“The question,” Rabbani said, “is whether this is hubris on steroids—biting off more than Israel can chew.”
A gamble that may backfire
Far from triggering a wave of recognition, “Israel’s” move appears—at least for now—to have isolated Somaliland further. Ethiopia and the UAE, once seen as potential followers, now appear constrained by African and Arab opposition.
What the recognition has unquestionably done is expose fractures within the Middle East, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It may also place new strain on Egypt’s relations with “Israel”, given Cairo’s own sensitivity to Red Sea security.
“This was intended to reshape alliances,” Rabbani said. “Instead, it has revealed how brittle those alliances really are.”
For Somaliland, recognition offers symbolic victory but uncertain material gain. For Somalia, it threatens unity. For “Israel”, it is a bold assertion of power in a region already on edge.
And for the Red Sea—already militarised, contested, and volatile—it may mark the beginning of yet another dangerous chapter.
