The United Arab Emirates is not a party that is merely affected by the crises of the Arab world or interacts with them. It is a structural component in their continuation. Its presence does not appear where states are built, but where they fracture. It does not emerge in moments of national consensus, but in spaces of vacuum and division. Every major crisis in the Middle East has been linked to the UAE, whose interventions have come to be governed by a clear logic: preventing the formation of a strong Arab state. It does not invest in sovereignty, but in its fragility. It does not wager on consensus, but on manageable internal contradictions. From Yemen to Libya, from Sudan to Egypt, and from Gaza to Somalia to Syria, the same model is repeated: supporting forces parallel to the state, arming them outside official channels, creating a political economy detached from national decision making, followed by a discourse of stability that conceals a slow process of dismantling. In this sense, the UAE does not practise sabotage as an error or deviation, but as a systematic policy. It is a policy that views genuine stability as a danger, an independent state as a threat, and people who possess their own decision-making as a burden that must be subdued. This is because such people pose a risk to the occupying entity that commands and is obeyed, rebukes and is met with submission. Thus, the question is no longer why Arab stability fails, but who has an interest in ensuring that it never materialises in the first place.
The role played by the UAE in the Arab region is no longer acceptable or defensible. Its repeated interventions in crisis zones have not produced stability, but rather the dismantling of states, the deepening of divisions, and the obstruction of any independent sovereign path. Under the banners of investment and security, institutions have been undermined, parallel forces to the state have been supported, and national decision-making has been tied to external agendas.
In 2026, the UAE will not cease its attempts to undermine states that seek recovery and approach stability. However, it has become relatively weaker after its manoeuvres were openly exposed, foreign and Arab media revealed its practices, and it faced widespread condemnation, insult, and accusations of treason across social media platforms. This has coincided with changing regional dynamics, particularly following the stance of Saudi Arabia, which confronted the UAE to dismantle its malign project in Yemen.
Third: Yemen. The Malign Emirati Project
The Emirati presence in Yemen was never truly part of the Arab coalition. Rather, it was an independent project aimed at controlling ports, building loyal local forces, dominating maritime passages, and entrenching a secessionist reality in the south.
What has changed recently is that this project has collided with three walls:
First, Saudi Arabia is no longer a silent partner. Riyadh has come to see that a separate southern entity threatens any comprehensive settlement with the Houthis and turns Yemen into a permanent burden. This divergence in positions is no longer confined to secrecy and patient waiting, but has shifted into direct military confrontation that humiliated the UAE and exposed its manoeuvres at the hands of its supposed ally.
Second, local forces have slipped out of control. The Southern Transitional Council has transformed from a tool once in the hands of the coalition and later in the hands of the UAE into an actor that negotiates and extorts. This means Abu Dhabi no longer fully controls the outcomes of its chaotic project.
Third, international pressure on Red Sea routes. Any Emirati security role along the coasts is now under scrutiny, particularly given the overlap of Arab, Western, and Israeli interests in Bab al Mandab.
In 2026, the UAE will not lose Yemen entirely, but it will not be able to deepen its influence further. An open war between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, resulting in the forcible expulsion of Emirati forces from all Yemeni territory, remains unlikely. Nevertheless, the UAE has retreated from its arrogance and has been restrained. This alone constitutes a major material and moral strategic loss, a blow to the core that has broken ribs that do not easily heal, for the ribs of the chest are resistant to recovery.
Fourth: Sudan. Unrestrained Influence Becomes a Burden and a Punishment
In Sudan, the UAE bet on forces of fait accompli rather than the state. The result has been a prolonged war and profound, shifting geopolitical changes. Based on an understanding of the role the UAE plays in the region, it can be seen as sowing the seeds of chaos, division, and instability, precisely what it seeks.
The continuation of fighting in Sudan has begun to threaten everyone’s interests, a reality that was not adequately anticipated. The following points clarify this further:
1. The Red Sea. From Trade Route to Soft Underbelly
The Red Sea is no longer merely a conduit for global trade. It has gradually transformed into an undeclared arena of conflict where international and regional interests intersect. The persistence of fighting in Sudan effectively means the fragmentation of control over a long strategic coastline adjacent to one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors. This opens the door to arms smuggling, increased activity by armed groups, and intelligence and military interventions under the banners of protection and stability, which may harden at any moment.
Within the context of 2026, as maritime vulnerability in the Red Sea escalates due to Gaza, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa, an exhausted Sudan becomes an additional weak link that may push major powers toward direct or indirect intervention, altering the rules of engagement across the entire region.
2. Food Security. When Fields Become a Weapon
Sudan is not a marginal country in the Arab food equation. Historically, it was viewed as a potential breadbasket for the region. Continued war, however, means agricultural disruption, farmer displacement, and the destruction of food supply chains. This results in the loss of export capacity and even self-sufficiency. The danger is not limited to Sudan alone, but extends regionally. States that partially depend on imports from Sudan now face costlier and more difficult alternatives. In an era of global inflation and disrupted supply chains, food shifts from a commodity into an instrument of political pressure.
3. Egyptian Saudi Stability. When Chaos Imposes Itself on Allies
The Egyptian-Saudi relationship is one of the pillars of Arab balance, yet this stability is not insulated from events in Sudan. Continued war these places is increasing pressure on Egypt through its open southern borders, refugee flows, and indirect threats to the Nile file and national security.
For Saudi Arabia, this translates into additional instability in the Red Sea environment and political and security exhaustion in a region it seeks to calm rather than further destabilise.
The real danger does not lie in any tension between Cairo and Riyadh, but in the erosion of their margin of manoeuvre. Both are compelled to manage successive crises instead of formulating long term strategic projects, even as Egypt remains unprepared for the formulation of either short term or long term projects.
In 2026, pressure to end the war will intensify, along with a direct question: who sought to prolong it. At this point, the role of Emirati influence becomes clear and subject to scrutiny, a scrutiny that the government of Mohammed bin Zayed does not heed, much like the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. Abu Dhabi’s government is shielded by the Zionist lobby in the United States and Europe. Some observers of Sudanese affairs anticipate that Turkey may intervene to resolve matters in favour of Abdel Fattah al Burhan, as it previously did during Khalifa Haftar’s assault on Tripoli. Whether Turkey will intervene directly remains an open question.
