The magazine Foreign Policy published an article by former US ambassador to Egypt and Israel Daniel Kurtzer and Aaron David Miller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stating that a sense of optimism prevailed through much of 2025 regarding Washington’s view of the Middle East. A ceasefire was implemented in Gaza, which, despite the continuation of violence, contributed to ending two years of brutal war.
In an unprecedented shift, the new Syrian leadership established closer relations with Washington, increasing the likelihood of reaching an Israeli-Syrian security agreement mediated by the United States.
The End of Optimism and the Return of Regional Reality
According to the Foreign Policy article, as 2025 nears its end, these promising developments described by the Trump administration as transformative have collided with the harsh reality of regional politics and the intransigence of many actors in the Middle East.
The occupying state continues to use military force to preempt and prevent any attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, while maintaining control over territories in all three areas. Tensions are escalating in the West Bank as the occupation government persists with its de facto expansionist policies.
The authors noted that US President Donald Trump, whose focus on Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran helped create opportunities, may easily lose interest. He appears content to add the Middle East to the list of conflicts he claims to have resolved, shifting his attention to other issues such as Russia and Ukraine.
The most recent meeting between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort, their sixth meeting this year, suggested that the president, who holds a unique position to pressure the Israeli prime minister, chose to manage their differences rather than use his leverage. Trump praised Netanyahu for implementing the Gaza plan and aligned with him on the Iran file.
The Trump administration has expressed concern over Israeli policies in the West Bank and has pressured Israel to avoid provocative actions, but it remains unclear whether this will translate into tangible pressure.
Limited Chances of Preventing a Return to Conflict in 2026
The article questioned whether anything in 2026 could salvage these nascent achievements and prevent a return to conflict in this volatile region, concluding that the most likely answer is no. At best, the issue is not about sweeping transformations, but about management, mitigation, and incremental gains if possible.
The authors explained that Trump seeks peace and normalisation between the occupying state and the Arab world, yet even maintaining the status quo requires a degree of attention and skill that this administration has rarely demonstrated.
Stalled Second Phase of the Gaza Plan
The article noted that it remains unclear whether Trump’s meetings with Netanyahu in Florida helped advance the transition of the Gaza plan from its first phase to the second.
Trump stated that disarming Hamas remains a priority, but he did not explain how this would be achieved. He praised Netanyahu’s commitment to the Gaza plan while threatening Hamas if it failed to comply. Among the issues to watch is Turkey’s potential role in Gaza’s security, a notion Trump appeared enthusiastic about, while Netanyahu strongly opposes it.
Absence of an International Force and the Persistence of Hamas
The authors added that there were no indications that the administration was closer to forming, or even announcing, an international stabilisation force to train Palestinian police, maintain order, and disarm Hamas.
Hamas may have been weakened, but it remains the strongest Palestinian force in Gaza, far stronger than the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian technocrats, occupation backed Palestinian militias, clans, and criminal gangs. Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, and Trump is unlikely to find any international parties willing to attempt to disarm it by force.
According to the article, a Hamas official indicated the possibility that the movement could agree to store its weapons if the occupation fully withdraws from the Gaza Strip, while another official ruled out complete disarmament. He considered that deploying an international stabilisation force in roughly 53 per cent of Gaza under occupation control would be little more than a symbolic display, providing cover for Israel’s efforts to entrench its hold over the areas it controls.
Netanyahu and His Internal Political Crises
The article explained that Hamas’s continued presence in Gaza as a potentially influential force allows the Israeli government to delay any discussion of establishing a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu is preoccupied with internal political crises after the government decided to form a committee to examine the 7 October 2023 attacks and the Oslo Accords, while the opposition demands a governmental inquiry committee with legal authority.
Tensions remain high over the exemption of Haredim from military service, and members of the far-right coalition continue to push for the formal annexation of parts of the West Bank. Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal cases have become more complicated following revelations of Qatari influence on Israeli policy regarding the return of captives.
As a result, Netanyahu is keen to avoid the difficult decisions required to move to the second phase of Trump’s peace plan, a stance that runs counter to Trump’s objectives.
The West Bank and the Risk of Explosion
The article noted that conditions are deteriorating in the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority is taking slow steps toward reform. None of this will matter in 2026 if the same rigid leadership remains in power.
Israeli policies of expanding settlements and outposts, along with general leniency toward settler violence, further erode what remains of the Palestinian Authority’s already diminishing credibility. Hamas enjoys popularity in the West Bank, largely due to public frustration with the absence of hope for a political solution.
The article stressed that a third intifada remains a constant possibility. Even if it does not erupt, 2026 will see more settlements, more violence, and further steps toward Israeli annexation.
It concluded with a reality described as four entities: an area of increasing Israeli control in part of the West Bank, an area of limited Palestinian control in another part, the yellow zone under Israeli control in Gaza, and Hamasistan in the remainder of the Strip.
Failure to Restrain Israeli Policies
The authors argued that one of the weaknesses of the Trump administration’s strategy is its unwillingness even to attempt to restrain Israeli policies in the West Bank. Simply voicing opposition to annexation is meaningless given the trajectory of Israeli actions and policies toward that objective.
In Lebanon, the article stated that it is difficult to expect progress on disarming Hezbollah, which has seen a decline in its strength but has not been defeated and is rebuilding its ranks. The Lebanese government, fearful of civil war, and the internally divided Lebanese army lack both the will and the capacity to disarm Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River or prevent their regrouping in the south.
Israeli occupation forces remain stationed at five sites in southern Lebanon and have taken it upon themselves to wage war on Hezbollah, recently targeting one of the group’s senior leaders in Beirut.
Syria Between Challenges and a Historic Opportunity
According to the article, the task list facing Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa is exceedingly difficult. Even if Syria can become a cohesive state with good governance, this would take years, given the challenges of reconstruction, curbing the Islamic State group, ensuring equal rights for all Syrians, opening the political system, and dealing with external interventions involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, the Gulf states, and Israel.
The article added that the occupying state has a historic opportunity in Syria following Washington’s mediation in high-level Israeli-Syrian talks on a security agreement that showed promising signs. However, this remains contingent on the occupation’s withdrawal from areas it seized since the ouster of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.
Iran and a Year of Regional Tension
The article explained that Israeli and American strikes have weakened Iran and its allies without eliminating the Iranian regime, which continues to face significant internal pressure.
According to the authors, Tehran may seek an agreement to ease pressure or attempt to rebuild enrichment facilities, air defences, and its missile arsenal without abandoning its nuclear and regional ambitions. They concluded that 2026 is likely to be a year of heightened tension in the American Israeli Iranian triangle.
The article concluded by stressing that prospects for peace in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon are bleak, and that democratic transformation in Syria remains uncertain. It noted that while Washington may be unable to resolve all crises, diplomacy and prudent leadership could still prevent them from worsening, with hope remaining alive.
