A leaked official document has exposed Emirati funding and incitement of Shiites in Saudi Arabia through attempts to court figures to oppose the Saudi government and to prepare the environment for launching protests under the banner of social and economic demands.
The document, attributed to the UAE’s Central Information Unit, dated April 2024 and obtained by “Emirates Leaks”, reveals a network of organisational, financial, and media activities run by the UAE inside Saudi Arabia. These activities are attributed to an entity known as the “Arabian Peninsula Council”.
According to its contents, the document presents a detailed operational picture of funding mechanisms, methods of incitement, approaches to cell building, and forms of social penetration, with references to external roles in support and direction. These are read within the context of regional competition and its repercussions inside Saudi Arabia.
The document shows Emirati incitement of Shiites in Saudi Arabia through issues of unemployment, rising poverty rates, youth anger, complaints of geographic discrimination, continued exposure to discrimination, and a growing sense of frustration and marginalisation.
Organisational Structure and Funding Channels
According to the document, the organisation relies on a geographically distributed network structure, with a primary focus on the Eastern Province, followed by the central region, then the northern and southern regions.
The report notes that this distribution was determined based on demographic and social considerations, in addition to the security sensitivity of certain areas.
The document states that funding constitutes the backbone of the activity and has taken multiple forms, including regular cash assistance, logistical support, coverage of transportation and communication expenses, and financing of social activities used as fronts for recruitment and influence building.
The document points out that part of the food and cash assistance that was monitored did not reach its intended beneficiaries inside Saudi Arabia, but was instead diverted or leaked through external channels. This indicates, according to the assessment provided, the presence of actors controlling financial flows and redirecting them to serve specific political priorities. It adds that the multiplicity of funding channels and the difficulty of tracking them contributed to sustaining the activity and reducing exposure risks.
Incitement as a Mobilisation Tool
The activity, according to the document, is not limited to funding but extends to an organised inciting discourse used as a mobilisation tool.
Field reports indicate the exploitation of local grievances, whether real or perceived, and their re-framing within an identity-based discourse aimed at creating polarisation.
The document records targeted religious and media activities directed at specific youth groups and families, implemented through religious and social occasions exploited as platforms for influence.
Monitoring shows that the inciting discourse often begins in a rights-based or demands-focused form, then gradually escalates to more severe expressions, with a clear effort to avoid security detection by using local intermediaries, changing communication channels, and avoiding reliance on a single pattern of communication or organisation.
Social and Economic Penetration
The document explains that the organisation relies on the local economy as a primary entry point for social penetration. The methods mentioned include temporary job offers, small loans, and medical and educational assistance, initially presented as humanitarian support, after which beneficiaries are later linked to the organisation’s networks.
According to the document, this approach creates a state of gradual dependency that allows financial support to be transformed into a tool of political or security pressure.
The document also notes recorded attempts to penetrate service, municipal, and communications sectors by courting or recruiting individuals working within these sectors. This facilitates information gathering, securing logistical cover, and providing communication channels less vulnerable to monitoring.
The document records precise details regarding concealment methods, including constantly changing meeting locations, using code names, relying on cash transfers or intermediaries, and dividing cells into small units to limit losses in the event of exposure. It also monitors attempts to test security surveillance capabilities through limited movements described as “reconnaissance”, preceding any broader activity.
The document concludes that the level of threat is not linked to the number of members as much as it is to the nature of network-based operations and their ability to persist due to diverse sources of funding and incitement. Despite noting internal failures and organisational violations, the document considers that continued external support keeps the network active and capable of re-adaptation.
The assessment also indicates that dealing with this phenomenon cannot be limited to a security approach alone, but requires dismantling funding channels, enhancing transparency in charitable work, and addressing the social and economic factors that are being repurposed within the inciting discourse.
The leaked document presents a comprehensive picture of the intersection between external funding and Emirati sectarian incitement to build political influence inside Saudi Arabia through a gradual process, social and economic penetration, and precise covert management.
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