Recent developments in the region, particularly in southern Yemen and Somalia, have raised major questions about the convergence of Emirati objectives with those of the Israeli occupation.
Last week, the Israeli occupation’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, announced recognition of what is known as Somaliland, a separatist region openly supported by Abu Dhabi. This was followed by discussion of the possibility that Tel Aviv might recognise “South Yemen”, a move that has triggered unprecedented tensions in recent days between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Unverified reports have also pointed to the possibility of the UAE opening a channel of communication with Druze separatists in Suwayda in southern Syria, led by Hikmat al Hijri.
Arabi21 monitored the convergence between the Emirati and Israeli positions across several Arab and international conflict arenas, where the harmony between them appeared increasingly clear, particularly following the signing of the normalisation agreement in the summer of 2020.
Yemen: The Southern Transitional Council
Southern Yemen represents one of the clearest points of “unofficial” convergence between the two sides. The UAE provides military and political support to the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks to divide the country through secession, while Tel Aviv views its control of the coastline as a guarantee of Israeli national security.
The UAE enabled forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council to take control of Aden and the Bab al Mandab Strait, under the pretext of combating the Islah Party, the Houthis, and al Qaeda, and securing maritime shipping lanes.
The Israeli occupation considers the presence of a local authority such as the Southern Transitional Council, which is hostile to the Houthis, to be a positive development, particularly as it does not adopt an Islamic agenda.
Reports also point to cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv in establishing surveillance and intelligence centres on islands such as Socotra and Mayyun to monitor Iranian and Houthi movements in the Red Sea.
The Washington Institute stated in a recent report that the governorates of Hadramawt and al Mahra, which have come under the influence of the Transitional Council, would grant “Israel” a geographical partner controlling the entire southern coastline stretching from Bab al Mandab to the Omani border.
There is also “silent” activity on strategic islands overlooking the Bab al Mandab Strait. Reports supported by satellite imagery confirmed that the UAE completed the construction of an airstrip and military facilities on Abd al Kuri Island, part of the Socotra archipelago, in April of this year.
Reports have also circulated regarding the presence of Israeli surveillance and intelligence platforms on these islands to monitor Houthi missiles and drones.
Libya: Support for Khalifa Haftar
In the Libyan file, the convergence of interests emerged through support for the forces of the so called Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar against the Tripoli based government that had been backed by Turkey.
During previous years of conflict, the UAE provided extensive military and logistical support to Haftar, via al Khadim airbase, in order to weaken the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey in North Africa.
The Israeli position, meanwhile, openly sided with Haftar. Numerous reports revealed meetings between Israeli officials and representatives of Haftar, as Tel Aviv views the retired general as a “strongman” capable of securing the eastern Mediterranean and preventing weapons from reaching Gaza via Libya.
In 2021, it was revealed that Saddam Khalifa Haftar carried out a secret visit to Tel Aviv, carrying a message from his father requesting military and political support in exchange for promises of future normalisation.
This cooperation was not limited to the political sphere. It extended to field operations in which officers from the Mossad trained commanders affiliated with Haftar in Egypt on warfare and control tactics, and supplied them with advanced technologies for intelligence gathering.
Tel Aviv considers Haftar’s control over the eastern ports of Tobruk and Benghazi to transform Libya into a secure “western wing” for Israeli national security in the Mediterranean Sea, ensuring the protection of Eastern Mediterranean gas routes and preventing the country from becoming a base for Turkish influence or Islamic groups that could facilitate weapons smuggling to Gaza.
Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces
Indicators of converging Emirati and Israeli visions have also emerged in Sudan, through support for the Rapid Support Forces in their confrontation with the army led by Abdel Fattah al Burhan, which is backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.
The UAE is accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, to secure its agricultural investments and future ports on the Red Sea, while the latter has shown openness to normalisation with Tel Aviv.
Israeli reports claimed that the UAE supplied the Rapid Support Forces with Israeli weapons and surveillance technologies, though the Rapid Support Forces denied these reports. It is worth noting that the other party to the conflict, the Sudanese army, has also shown openness toward Tel Aviv.
Joint Support for “Somaliland”
The UAE is making substantial investments, through DP World, in the port of Berbera and a military base there, and treats the region as a de facto independent state in order to strengthen its influence in the Horn of Africa.
The Israeli occupation has become the first to recognise the sovereignty of “Somaliland”, with Tel Aviv aiming to secure a strategic foothold to monitor the Houthis and protect ships heading to the port of Eilat.
Intelligence and field reports indicate that Berbera airport and military base were used as a primary launch platform for transporting equipment and ammunition destined for the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, via air and land supply lines passing through Ethiopian and Chadian territory.
Reports also stated that Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv seek, through “Somaliland”, to encircle Turkish influence in Somalia, where Ankara maintains its largest overseas military base and operates the port and airport of the capital, Mogadishu.
Chad: The Back Door of Conflicts
Chad has become a vital anchor point for the UAE in 2025 and a theatre where Emirati influence intersects with long standing Israeli security interests in the Sahel region.
The UAE signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Chad in November 2025 and uses the Chadian airport of Umm Jaras as a main logistical hub for delivering aid, which is described militarily as support for the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
Tel Aviv maintains strong security relations with the regime of Mohamed Déby in Chad, especially after relations were resumed in 2019, and views Chad as a barrier against the spread of radical groups and Iranian influence in West Africa.
Ethiopia: The Struggle for Influence in the Nile Basin
Ethiopia is the arena where Emirati ambitions for economic dominance intersect with Israeli efforts to secure “non Arab allies” in the surroundings of Nile Basin states.
The UAE is the most prominent financial and military backer of the regime of Abiy Ahmed, particularly during internal conflicts, to ensure continued influence over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and agricultural projects.
Israel, for its part, does not deny the existence of longstanding security and technical cooperation with Addis Ababa, viewing it as a strategic partner to balance power in East Africa and prevent Ethiopia from becoming a hostile sphere of influence.
Eastern Mediterranean: Cyprus and Greece
Although not a battlefield in the traditional sense, this arena represents a struggle over energy influence and maritime borders. The UAE entered as a strategic partner in military exercises and energy investments with Greece and Cyprus to counter what are described as previous Turkish ambitions.
The Israeli occupation is a core member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and maintains formal alliances with Greece and Cyprus.
The “Crystal Ball” Platform
In discussing the convergence of visions and the Emirati Israeli alignment, the digital platform “Crystal Ball” stands out. It was launched in 2023 and began to show tangible results in 2025.
The idea of “Crystal Ball” is based on a cooperative initiative between the Emirati Ministry of Cybersecurity and Israeli defence companies, such as Rafael, aimed at exchanging intelligence data on aerial and maritime threats in the region. This helps explain the high level of coordination in arenas such as Yemen and Somaliland.
“Crystal Ball” is not limited to radar data exchange. It uses artificial intelligence algorithms to predict the trajectories of drones and missiles before launch and to track the digital signatures of vessels in the Red Sea.
Djibouti and Eritrea: The Struggle of “Maritime Alternatives”
This region is the “backyard” of Bab al Mandab and is witnessing a silent struggle to encircle the influence of central states there. After its disputes with Djibouti, Abu Dhabi worked to marginalise the port of Djibouti in favour of alternative ports such as Berbera in Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea.
The Israeli occupation has long maintained a military intelligence presence in Eritrea, at Mount Amba Soira. This alignment aims to create a new regional order in the Horn of Africa that isolates traditional powers.
Knocking on the Doors of the West
Emirati Israeli cooperation is not confined to field arenas in the Middle East and Africa. It extends to the “engineering of decision making” in Western capitals.
Since 2020, what resembles a “unified axis” has taken shape within decision making circles in Washington and Brussels, where Emirati funds have converged with pro Israel lobbying groups to achieve shared objectives.
Investigative reports and leaks revealed Emirati funding of research centres and right wing figures in Europe and the United States to promote a discourse of Islamophobia that conflates Islamic political movements with “terrorism”.
Emirati lobbies in Washington, through public relations firms such as Akin Gump, worked in alignment with the Israeli lobby to push for harsher sanctions on Iran, place Turkish allies on terrorism lists, and justify military operations in Yemen and Libya as a “war on extremism”.
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