Yemen has returned to the forefront of events after a period of relative absence, overshadowed by the genocidal war in Gaza, as well as a relative calm that the region experienced following the Saudis’ announcement in 2023 of an end to a conflict that had lasted for years. This came through the launch of official bilateral talks between the government in Riyadh and the Houthis, culminating in an unprecedented visit in April 2023 by the Kingdom’s ambassador to Sanaa, Mohammed Al Jaber, who had been recalled from the Yemeni capital years earlier, where he met with Houthis leaders.
With the Saudi leadership focusing on domestic economic transformation under Vision 2030, the political cost of the war had exceeded its potential strategic gains. This pushed Riyadh to search for an exit rather than pursue a military victory. Saudi Arabia instead concentrated on preserving its vital geopolitical relationships rather than reassessing its regional ambitions. The war in Gaza also compelled Saudi Arabia to reevaluate its calculations in Yemen, prompting Riyadh to avoid any action that might provoke retaliatory responses from the Houthis.
Despite the United Nations’ assessment at the time that the agreement offered a glimmer of hope to end a devastating war that had claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and pushed millions to the brink of famine in Yemen, long considered the poorest country in the Arab world, conditions soon erupted again. This followed unilateral military escalation carried out by the Southern Transitional Council in the eastern Yemeni governorates of Hadramout and Al Mahra, which pushed Saudi Arabia to adopt what it described as a firm course to impose political and security stability in Yemen after weeks of attempts that Riyadh said were aimed at defusing the crisis. On Tuesday, the coalition carried out a preemptive air strike targeting a military shipment at the port of Mukalla, alongside demands for Abu Dhabi’s forces to withdraw from Yemen within 24 hours and to cease arming any party, in response to a request from the legitimate Yemeni leadership.
While Saudi Arabia renewed its commitment to Yemen’s security, stability, and sovereignty, and its full support for the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council and the government, it expressed in a statement from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs its regret over actions taken by the United Arab Emirates. The statement accused the UAE of pressuring Southern Transitional Council forces to carry out military operations along the Kingdom’s southern border in Hadramout and Al Mahra, describing these actions as a threat to Saudi national security and to security and stability in the Republic of Yemen and the wider region.
When Was It Established and What Are Its Objectives?
The Southern Transitional Council was established in Aden in May 2017 by political, military, and tribal figures, under the leadership of Aidarous Al Zubaidi, with direct support from the United Arab Emirates. The council calls for the secession of southern Yemen and a return to the pre-1990 status before the reunification of North and South Yemen, according to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
On its path toward secession, the council declared self-rule in the southern governorates in April 2020, but later accepted the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement under its latest mechanism on 26 December 2020. The agreement’s key provisions included relinquishing self-administration, forming a 24 minister government equally divided between north and south, and the participation of the Transitional Council in the government delegation for Yemeni political settlement consultations. Nevertheless, the council continues to maneuver in ways that contradict its commitments under the Riyadh Agreement, repeatedly threatening secession.
Control of Strategic Resources Paves the Way for Secession
The Southern Transitional Council exercises control over nearly 90% of southern cities. With its tightening grip on strategic resources, particularly oil fields and refineries in and around Hadramout, the secession project is being managed openly and in an unprecedented manner.
Geographically, Hadramout shares a border strip with Saudi Arabia extending over 700 kilometres and contains the Al Wadi’ah land crossing linking the Kingdom with Yemen. This explains Saudi concerns over the establishment of a southern Yemeni state on its border, as eastern Yemen is considered a direct extension of Saudi national security. In addition, Riyadh does not support the Southern Transitional Council, which is aligned with the UAE, and instead backs the internationally recognised Yemeni government. Hadramout also maintains close cultural and historical ties with Saudi Arabia, as the origins of several prominent Saudi figures trace back to this region, according to a report by the BBC.
Although the Southern Transitional Council was initially part of the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015 against the Iranian-aligned Houthis movement, it later chose to pursue self-rule in the south.
A Coup to Impose a New Reality
In recent days, as part of the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council’s efforts to impose a new security, military, political, and geographic reality, some ministers, deputy ministers, undersecretaries, and governors affiliated with the council openly declared mutiny and a clear coup against the government that emerged from the Riyadh Agreement in 2022.
They expressed full alignment with and support for the measures taken by the Transitional Council in the southern and eastern Yemeni governorates to restore what they called the State of South Arabia. This step reveals the council’s continuation of its project along a new and dangerous escalation path. Statements issued by the council and its affiliates called on the Arab Coalition, the international community, and the United Nations to respect what they described as the aspirations of the southern people and their will to restore their sovereign state.
The UAE Supports Secession and Pushes Toward the Partition of Yemen
The UAE’s position in southern Yemen supports the Southern Transitional Council, enabling Abu Dhabi to enhance its geopolitical influence linked to maritime security and strategic interests. Abu Dhabi has not confronted Saudi Arabia directly in a hostile sense, but instead used indirect local Yemeni tools to counter Saudi influence, reinforcing its position amid diverging visions between former partners in the Arab Coalition.
Emirati support for the council has not been limited to political cover. It has included the establishment of parallel military formations outside the state, such as the Security Belt forces and the Hadrami Elite Forces, providing them with weapons, training, and funding. In this way, the UAE built a network of militias loyal to it. This policy is most clearly evident in Hadramout, a governorate that holds around 80% of Yemen’s oil reserves and has become a central target for the Transitional Council and its Emirati ally.
Following tensions with local tribal forces and undeclared support to rearrange the security landscape, the Emirati-backed Hadrami Elite Forces advanced and seized control of Seiyun and vital facilities, raising the old flag of South Yemen. The scene reflected a political project more than a security operation. The UAE justifies this intervention with ready-made slogans such as combating terrorism and confronting the Muslim Brotherhood.
From Mokha to Socotra, and from Mayun Island in Bab al Mandab to scattered coastal bases, Abu Dhabi has built a network of military and commercial influence that turns southern Yemen into a strategic extension of its economic and security interests. The most dangerous aspect of the Emirati role lies in managing the conflict rather than resolving it. Despite attempts to portray the Southern Transitional Council as a force for stability, the reality in southern Yemen points in the opposite direction. Living crises are deepening, electricity outages persist, basic services are collapsing, and resources are squandered in internal power struggles.
Aidarous: No Objection to Normalisation With Israel
The Southern Transitional Council’s ambition for a secessionist state justified a sudden step. The council’s president, Aidarous Al Zubaidi, previously revealed in a private interview with the Russian channel RT in 2021 that normalising relations with the occupying state was possible. Al Zubaidi said that normalisation with the occupying state was conceivable once they had a state and a capital belonging to the Arab south.
He clarified that there were no contacts with Israel and stated that they had welcomed the normalisation of relations by some countries with Tel Aviv. He noted that there were currently no efforts in this direction, but emphasised that if they were to establish a sovereign state with Aden as its capital, it would be their right to propose normalisation with Israel, stressing that this would be a sovereign right.
The Illegitimate Offspring of the United Arab Emirates
According to the circumstances of the Southern Transitional Council’s emergence and the fingerprints of its establishment, a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states that the council is considered the illegitimate offspring of the United Arab Emirates. It is therefore unsurprising that its compass moves in line with Abu Dhabi’s policies and orientations, even on the issue of normalisation. In addition, Israelis played an indirect role in forming and organising the Security Belt forces affiliated with the council at their establishment in 2016, through the UAE’s hiring of retired Israeli officers from foreign security companies to train leaders of the Security Belt in Abu Dhabi.
Moreover, dozens of assassinations targeting opponents of the UAE and the Southern Transitional Council in Aden were carried out through Emirati contracts with Israelis working in foreign companies, such as the American security company Spear Operations. Among them was the former commander of the assassination program within the mercenary unit, Abraham Golan. Nevertheless, Al Zubaidi’s statement at the time was met with near collective rejection from most influential southern forces, including components that agreed with him on the issue of secession. These included the Southern Revolutionary Movement Council and non secessionist components such as the Southern Yemeni National Salvation Council, in addition to protests that erupted across most southern governorates condemning and rejecting these statements.
Some regional and international actors deal with the Southern Transitional Council as operating under the Emirati umbrella and controlling, with direct Emirati support, several vital areas in southern Yemen, most notably the temporary capital Aden and the island of Socotra. However, this engagement amounts to little more than exploiting Yemen’s fragile situation and benefiting from it, rather than seeking to establish diplomatic relations or build strategic interests. This is due to several factors, including the council’s failure to represent all southern components, even those that share its secessionist idea, as well as its limited presence on the ground. Such complexities prevent it from presenting itself as a legitimate or sole representative of southern Yemen, making recognition of it and its hoped-for state in southern Yemen impossible, or at the very least extremely difficult.
