Despite more than a year having passed since the “Third Lebanon War” between Israel and Hezbollah, the security situation in the eastern Mediterranean remains unstable.
Following the “temporary cessation of fighting” in southern Lebanon, Israeli officials, with full backing from Tom Barrack and Morgan Ortagus, openly declared that the conditions for the next phase include, alongside the withdrawal of the Lebanese Islamic Resistance to the upper bank of the Litani River and the destruction of Hezbollah’s military and civilian infrastructure near the shared border, the disarmament of Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance factions present in Lebanon’s refugee camps. These demands are based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701.
The Netanyahu government has explicitly stated that the fundamental condition for the “continuation of the ceasefire” on the “northern front” is the disarmament of Iran aligned resistance forces.
In response, senior Hezbollah officials, foremost among them Sheikh Naim Qassem, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, stated that the model proposed by Israel and the United States is unacceptable, and that the party will only accept Lebanese negotiations built on the interests of the Lebanese “state nation”.
As for Tehran, following the experience of the “12 Day War”, it has come to recognise more than ever the importance and position of Hezbollah in forming an effective deterrent capability against the Israeli enemy. This approach was clearly reflected during Ali Larijani’s first visit to Beirut in his capacity as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
More than a year after the ceasefire on the Lebanese front, the implementation of the project to disarm Hezbollah remains “suspended”. In this context, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated: “Israel may launch attacks on Gaza and Lebanon before the next elections in October 2026”.
This likely explains the notable statements made by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam regarding the end of the “first phase” of Hezbollah’s disarmament. It also explains why Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji criticised, in unprecedented terms, Tehran’s regional policies.
With the changing landscape of key actors in the “Lebanese conflict”, some elites and media figures raise a central question: if Israel launches a new attack against Hezbollah, how will the Islamic Republic of Iran respond?
“An Existential Battle”. Direct Intervention on the Battlefield
The first scenario proposed regarding “Iran’s response” to any new Israeli attack against Hezbollah involves Iran entering the battlefield directly.
Under this scenario, Tehran would move beyond the stage of “advisory”, “armament”, and “logistical and financial” support to protect the most important assets of the “Axis of Resistance” on the forward line of confrontation against “Israeli containment”. It would begin directly targeting Israeli military and non-military forces and assets, with the aim of “raising the cost of continuing the war”.
Had Netanyahu and Trump not launched direct attacks on Iranian nuclear military sites in June 2025, this scenario might have seemed unlikely. However, the exposure of new dimensions of Netanyahu’s regional programme has granted the option of “high risk play” a special standing within the “Supreme National Security Council” and the “Supreme Defence Council”.
Nevertheless, accepting the risks of direct intervention in the Lebanon battle may be understood by some experts within the framework of what is known as the “Thucydides Trap”, a theory suggesting that wars erupt when a rising power feels threatened by a dominant one. Implementing this option may be seen as an indication of Tehran’s full readiness to enter a new round of conflict with Israel.
Strategic Patience. No Direct Intervention
Before June 2025, the confrontation between Iran and its regional allies on one side and Israel on the other took place within what is known as the “grey zone”.
Between 2018 and 2023, the Israeli army viewed the Iranian advisory presence in Syria as a “national security threat” and carried out a series of focused airstrikes against Iranian interests there, within the framework of the “campaign between wars” strategy.
During this period, Iran adopted a policy of “strategic patience”, focusing on protecting Syrian territorial unity and preserving the positions of the Axis of Resistance in southern Syria, without being drawn into a comprehensive military confrontation with Israel.
This approach continued after the “Al Aqsa Flood” operation on 7 October 2023, through a “campaign of assassinating leadership figures”, and reached its peak when an Israeli airstrike targeted the Iranian embassy building in Damascus on 1 April 2024.
As the limited confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel escalated in 2024 and transformed into the “Third Lebanon War”, voices rose within official and popular circles supportive of Hezbollah calling for direct Iranian intervention. These calls intensified especially after the pager terrorist attacks, the assassination of the Secretary General, and the killing of commanders from the “Radwan Unit”.
However, Tehran’s lack of full readiness at that time to enter a “direct war” with Israel led it to confine itself to supporting Hezbollah through various means. Nevertheless, the experience of the past two years has resulted in a decline in supporters of the “strategic patience” theory, and this tactic now enjoys less support within the ruling elite circles in Tehran.
Reviving the “Ring of Fire”. Containing Israel’s Behaviour in Lebanon
As the anniversary of the “Third Lebanon War” approaches, the Alma research and education centre claimed that Iran, in addition to transferring one billion dollars in financial assistance to accelerate the reconstruction of what was damaged in Hezbollah’s capabilities, also opened new routes through the Horn of Africa and other regions to secure logistical and military support for the party.
Due to restrictions imposed over the past year, Hezbollah has moved toward establishing and expanding workshops for manufacturing strategic weapons such as missiles and drones, within a policy of “self-reliance” in confronting the “Israeli enemy”.
The resistance in Yemen and Iraq, despite American pressure, has also become more prepared to participate in the next round of war against Israel. In this context came the phone call between US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Iraqi Defence Minister Thabet Al Abbasi, which included a clear warning against Iraqi resistance entering an imminent war in one of the region’s countries.
In this third scenario, Tehran may initially seek, in coordination with its regional allies, to “contain” Israel and push it toward retreat. However, if this plan “fails”, Iran may find itself facing two options: “strategic patience” or “confronting the existential threat abroad”. Recent confrontations between Tehran and Tel Aviv have increased the likelihood of Iran’s direct intervention on the battlefield more than ever before.
The Regional Balance of Power Has Not Yet Changed
Current indicators point to rising “geopolitical risks” in the Middle East during the first three months of 2026.
Among the most prominent indicators are:
Escalating American Israeli pressure on the governments of Baghdad and Beirut to accelerate the disarmament of resistance factions.
Rapid progress in restoring Iranian military capabilities.
The halt of nuclear file negotiations and the uncertain fate of 408 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%.
In addition to the severing of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s information chain regarding Tehran’s activities over the past six months, and Netanyahu’s weakened position and that of the Israeli right in opinion polls ahead of the upcoming Knesset elections.
In light of these circumstances, Tehran appears more prepared than ever to engage in a “direct war” with Israel and defend its vital assets. As for the timing, it will choose to return to the arena of confrontation; developments in the coming phase will reveal it.
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