Foreign Policy magazine recently published an analysis by Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, warning that a new war between Israel and Iran is not just likely — it may erupt before December, and possibly as early as late August.
According to Parsi, Iran is anticipating the attack and preparing accordingly. In the previous round of fighting, Tehran adopted a long-term strategy, pacing its missile strikes with the expectation of a protracted conflict. This time, however, Iran is expected to launch a decisive and powerful opening strike, aiming to crush any notion that it can be subdued under Israeli military dominance.
A War Bloodier Than the First
Parsi warns that the next conflict is likely to be far deadlier than the first. Should U.S. President Donald Trump once again bow to Israeli pressure and join the fight, the United States could find itself in an all-out war with Iran — a war that would make the Iraq invasion look easy by comparison.
Israel’s June war against Iran was never just about Tehran’s nuclear program. It was a bid to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East, with nuclear capability as an important but secondary factor. For over two decades, Israel has sought to push Washington into direct military action against Iran — something it cannot achieve on its own.
Israel’s Triple Objectives
Parsi outlines three main goals Israel pursued beyond weakening Iran’s nuclear infrastructure:
- Drag the United States into a direct military confrontation with Iran.
- Weaken and destabilise the Iranian state, ideally pushing it towards collapse.
- Turn Iran into “another Syria or Lebanon” — countries Israel can bomb without consequence or U.S. interference.
Of these, only the first was partially achieved. While Trump’s limited strikes pulled Washington briefly into the fight, he refused to escalate into a full-scale war — a major disappointment for Israeli strategists. His approach aimed to cap the escalation, not expand it, which ultimately led Israel to accept a ceasefire.
Heavy Israeli Losses — and Iranian Resilience
During the fighting, Israel’s air defences suffered badly, while Iran became increasingly adept at penetrating them. Although Israeli intelligence successes early in the war — including the killing of 30 senior commanders and 19 nuclear scientists — caused temporary disruption, Iran replaced most of its leadership within 18 hours and launched a massive retaliatory missile barrage.
Mossad reportedly tried psychological operations, contacting senior Iranian officials on their phones and threatening to kill them and their families unless they defected publicly. More than 20 such calls were made in the war’s opening hours. None succeeded.
Contrary to Israeli hopes, the killing of senior IRGC commanders did not trigger protests or a popular uprising. Instead, Iranians across the political spectrum rallied around the national flag, with a surge in nationalist sentiment uniting the country against external aggression.
Strengthening the Very System Israel Sought to Weaken
After nearly two years of Israeli atrocities in Gaza and a surprise strike on Iran during nuclear talks, Israel has little popularity inside Iran — except among a small diaspora-leaning segment. Instead of turning the public against the government, the war revived the Islamic Republic’s nationalist narrative.
One Tehran artist told Professor Narges Bajoghli of Johns Hopkins University:
“I once protested sending money to Lebanon or Palestine, but now I realise the bombs we face are the same. If we don’t have strong defences across the region, war will come to us.”
In the short term, Israeli strikes appear to have tightened internal cohesion in Iran and narrowed the gap between state and society — the opposite of Tel Aviv’s intentions.
No “Second Syria” — and No Free Sky
Israel also failed to transform Iran into a Syria-like scenario or achieve sustained air dominance independent of U.S. support. While Israel temporarily controlled Iranian airspace, it paid a price: Iran’s missile response inflicted significant damage. Without heavy U.S. assistance — including using 25% of America’s THAAD missile interceptors in just 12 days — Israel might have been unable to continue the war.
“Mowing the Grass” — and the Next Attack
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir have signalled that the June war was only “phase one” of a longer campaign. Central to this is Israel’s “mowing the grass” doctrine — conducting repeated pre-emptive strikes to prevent adversaries from rebuilding capabilities that could challenge Israeli military superiority.
As Iran rebuilds its missile platforms, air defences, and arsenal, Israel has a strong incentive to strike sooner rather than later — especially before the U.S. midterm elections complicate American political calculations. This makes another Israeli strike in the coming months highly probable.
Iran’s Likely Response
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has vowed that any repeat aggression will be met with a “more decisive response” that cannot be concealed. Tehran believes the cost to Israel must be severe enough to deter further erosion of Iran’s missile deterrent.
Parsi notes that the outcome of the next war will hinge on who adapts faster:
- Can Israel replenish its missile defences faster than Iran rebuilds its launch platforms and stockpiles?
- Does Mossad still have deep penetration inside Iran, or were its assets exhausted in the first war?
- Has Iran learned more about exploiting Israeli air defence gaps than Israel has about closing them?
For now, neither side can answer with certainty.
The Trump Factor
Trump’s stance could prove decisive. He appears unwilling to commit to a long war, yet his initial green light for the first strike played directly into Israel’s hands. Politically, his actions sparked internal division within his “Make America Great Again” movement. Militarily, the 12-day war exposed critical weaknesses in U.S. missile stockpiles, already heavily depleted by both Trump and former President Joe Biden in regions not seen as vital to U.S. core interests.
Parsi concludes that limited U.S. intervention is no longer viable. In the event of another Israeli war on Iran, Trump will have to choose between full participation or staying out entirely, and the latter requires sustained resistance to Israeli pressure, something he has yet to demonstrate.
