On 28 February, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes targeting Iranian sites, including the compound of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose death was officially announced following the attack. The operation escalated further when US B-2 Spirit strategic bombers were deployed in a second wave, targeting deeply buried missile storage facilities using bunker-penetrating bombs capable of reaching depths of up to 60 metres.
The use of B-2 bombers, considered a last-resort strategic asset, underscored both the difficulty and the military priority of destroying Iran’s underground missile infrastructure. Iran’s missile programme remains central to the conflict, serving as both a deterrent and a primary tool of response.
Missile Stockpiles and Controlled Use
Iran’s ability to sustain missile launches has become a defining factor in the war. Despite fluctuations in launch rates, these variations do not indicate depletion. Instead, Tehran appears to be deliberately managing its missile usage, prioritising high-value targets and pacing launches to sustain long-term operational capability.
This approach reflects preparation for a prolonged conflict, where endurance outweighs immediate intensity. Missile stockpiles are only one component of this system, which also includes production facilities, solid fuel manufacturing, and launch platforms, all of which are heavily fortified and dispersed.
Underground Infrastructure and “Missile Cities”
Iran has developed extensive underground facilities, often referred to as “missile cities”, used for storage, production, and launch operations. These sites, some located hundreds of metres below ground, are designed to withstand heavy bombardment and maintain operational continuity.
They house advanced missile systems capable of reaching Israeli territory, including medium and long-range ballistic missiles. Estimates suggest these facilities may contain thousands of missiles, with multiple access points ensuring resilience even if individual entrances are destroyed.
This layered infrastructure significantly complicates efforts to neutralise Iran’s missile capabilities.
Rapid Reconstruction and Production Capacity
Iran has demonstrated a strong capacity to rebuild damaged infrastructure. Following earlier strikes in 2025, which targeted launch platforms and fuel production sites, Iran moved quickly to restore its capabilities.
Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments indicate ongoing reconstruction at key facilities, alongside efforts to expand production. Estimates suggest Iran produces between 163 and 217 missiles per month, enabling it to replenish its arsenal despite sustained attacks.
Recent intelligence assessments indicate that Iran still retains a substantial portion of its missile capacity, along with thousands of drones, even after weeks of conflict.
Mobility and Launch Flexibility
A critical factor in Iran’s resilience is its reliance on mobile launch platforms. Unlike fixed installations, these platforms can be relocated frequently, reducing their vulnerability to surveillance and pre-emptive strikes.
Many of these systems are adapted from civilian vehicles, making them cost-effective and easier to replace. While the loss of launch platforms is operationally significant, they remain more replaceable than missile stockpiles themselves.
Iran has also reportedly deployed decoy launch platforms to divert enemy targeting efforts, further complicating strike effectiveness.
External Support and Supply Chains
Iran’s rebuilding efforts have been supported by external assistance, particularly in securing materials for solid fuel production. Intelligence reports indicate shipments of key components, including sodium perchlorate, arriving from China.
Despite interception attempts and sanctions, these supply lines have contributed to sustaining Iran’s missile production capabilities. However, shortages in specialised equipment such as advanced mixing systems remain a constraint, affecting production efficiency.
Strategic Doctrine: Endurance Over Decisive Victory
Iran’s approach to the war is rooted in a doctrine of asymmetric endurance. Rather than seeking immediate victory, Tehran aims to outlast its adversaries, increasing the cost of the conflict over time.
This includes targeting air defence systems to deplete interceptor missile stockpiles. The imbalance in cost is significant, with interceptor missiles such as THAAD and Patriot systems costing millions per unit, compared to the relatively low cost of Iranian drones and missiles.
As interceptor supplies diminish, the effectiveness of defensive systems declines, increasing the likelihood of successful strikes.
The Core of the “Storage War”
At its core, the conflict has become a war of stockpiles, particularly focused on interceptor missiles. The United States and Israel have attempted to prevent launches at their source, but Iran’s layered and resilient infrastructure has limited the effectiveness of this strategy.
Six weeks into the war, Iranian missile launches continue despite sustained bombardment of storage sites. This suggests that Iran retains a substantial reserve capable of supporting a prolonged conflict.
The apparent reduction in launch frequency is likely a calculated decision to conserve resources, aligning with a broader strategy to transform what was intended as a rapid campaign into a prolonged and costly war.
Conclusion
Iran’s missile endurance is not accidental but the result of deliberate strategic planning, combining underground infrastructure, production resilience, mobility, and controlled usage.
The outcome of this “storage war” will depend less on total stockpiles and more on the ability to sustain operations over time, a domain where Iran appears to be positioning itself for the long term.
