Since the outbreak of war on 28 February, statements from Tehran and Washington reveal neither a side eager to extinguish the flames nor another determined solely to fuel them. Instead, they reflect a mutual struggle over time itself.
Iran speaks in the language of resilience, open retaliation, and refusal to accept a ceasefire that does not alter the balance of deterrence. The United States, meanwhile, speaks in the language of military pressure and the continuation of operations until what it considers its objectives are achieved.
Between Iranian rhetoric declaring readiness for a “long war” and American rhetoric insisting it is “winning” and can continue “as long as necessary”, a truce appears postponed. Both sides believe that time has not yet exhausted what it may still grant them on the battlefield and in politics.
When Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, stated that Iran, “unlike America”, had prepared itself for a long war, he was outlining the political and psychological framework of the Iranian position. The statement does not refer solely to military preparedness. It also signals that Tehran does not want to appear as a state surprised by the attack and searching for a quick exit.
In a post on X, Larijani wrote: “Starting wars is easy, but ending them cannot be done with a few tweets.” He added: “We will not leave you until you admit your mistake and pay its price.” The remarks came in response to a statement by U.S. President Donald Trump who said, “We must win this war quickly.”
Deterrence in the Iranian Concept
This position is reinforced by Tehran’s broader official narrative, which emphasises that Iran did not begin the war and will not negotiate under fire, but will continue its “defence” regardless of the cost.
Within this framework, the length of the war becomes part of deterrence in Iranian discourse rather than merely a forced consequence of the American Israeli air superiority.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was equally clear when he said that Tehran “does not seek a ceasefire” and that “the aggressors must be punished”.
This statement reveals that the problem for Tehran is not the principle of a ceasefire itself, but its timing and conditions. A ceasefire now, as implied by Iranian rhetoric, could mean cementing the loss at its present moment.
For this reason, Tehran insists that any de escalation must follow the cessation of American and Israeli strikes, not precede it.
American Disregard for Mediation Efforts
On the other side, Washington is also not speaking in the language of urgency to close the front. According to Reuters, the administration of Donald Trump rejected mediation efforts led by Oman and Egypt to open a ceasefire path. A senior White House official said the president is “not interested in that right now” and that operations will continue “without interruption”.
Here it becomes clear that the war is being read differently in the two capitals, even though both arrive at the same conclusion: there will be “no quick truce”. Iran says time works in its favour because it can transform it into a war of attrition. The United States says time still serves its interests because it can maintain pressure.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated openly that the United States is “winning” the war and that its defences and those of its allies have “ample capacity”, allowing it to continue fighting “as long as necessary”.
However, he also said this would not become an “endless war”, explaining that the goal is to destroy Iran’s missiles, naval capabilities, and security infrastructure “surgically, overwhelmingly, and without apology”. In this sense, Washington seeks a war sufficient to achieve its objectives, not an open conflict without limits.
Notably, Trump himself has sent mixed signals. On 11 March he declared, “We have won,” but immediately added that America does not want to “leave early” and must “finish the job”.
On 14 March, as the fighting expanded to facilities and ports across the Gulf, he wrote that “many countries” would send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and that the United States would continue to “bomb the coast heavily” and target Iranian boats and ships.
Such language does not come from an administration preparing for an imminent ceasefire. Rather, it reflects a leadership seeking to convert military superiority into later political conditions.
Division Behind the Appearance of Enthusiasm
Despite the American push forward, the vision inside Washington is not entirely unified. Marco Rubio justified the American entry into the war as a pre emptive move, saying Washington expected a planned Israeli attack would provoke an Iranian response against American forces, and that failing to act first would have meant “higher losses”.
Reuters also reported internal divisions within the administration itself. Some officials fear the political cost of rising oil prices, while others push for continuing the attack. In other words, the United States, like Iran, is not acting solely according to battlefield logic but also according to domestic cost calculations.
This helps explain Iran’s adherence to the logic of a war of attrition. Tehran understands that the conventional balance of power does not favour it. Therefore it does not bet on a direct military victory, but rather on making the American Israeli objective of toppling the Iranian system more costly and complicated.
Successive waves of missiles and drones, along with threats to shipping and energy routes, are not merely instruments of attack. They are also instruments of exhaustion, draining defensive systems, increasing insurance and shipping costs, and unsettling neighbouring states and markets.
Conversely, Washington believes it must continue bombardment until this Iranian capacity for disruption is reduced to a minimum. Thus time itself becomes the true battlefield: Iran wants it to become a period of attrition, while the United States wants it to become a period of stripping Iran of its capabilities.
Between the Fires of War and the Consequences of Deterrence Imbalance
Yet a prolonged war, even if seen by Iran as a means of exhausting its adversary, is not without cost. According to U.S. intelligence assessments cited by Reuters, American and Israeli strikes have not brought down the Iranian system so far. However, they have placed the leadership under severe pressure. Tehran nevertheless regards the failure of Washington and Tel Aviv to achieve their declared and undeclared objectives as a victory in itself and therefore pays little attention to its own losses.
At the same time, the continuation of war raises economic and social costs inside Iran, just as it increases energy and political costs for its adversaries.
This means Tehran does not choose a prolonged war because it is comfortable, but because it may see it as less damaging than a ceasefire that entrenches a deterrence imbalance against it.
Similarly, the United States does not reject ending the war because it seeks attrition for its own sake. Rather, it believes that ending it now could allow Iran to recover quickly.
Ultimately, it is not enough to ask whether Iran wants a long war. The more precise question is: which side believes time is still serving its interests? So far, Tehran and Washington appear to give the same answer, each from its own position: not yet.
Iran says it does not want a ceasefire without a price. The United States says it does not want one before it “finishes the mission”. Between the “long war” spoken of by Tehran and the promise to continue “as long as necessary” from Washington, a truce appears postponed, not because one side alone blocks it, but because both believe the coming hours may grant them a stronger position at the political table.
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