As the American Israeli war against Iran continues, Tehran’s threat to target the Dimona nuclear complex has revived long-standing questions about this highly sensitive site, its role in the region’s deterrence equation, and how well it is fortified against a potential missile attack.
Five days after the war began, the semi-official Iranian news agency ISNA quoted an unnamed senior military official as saying that Iran would target the nuclear site in Dimona if Israel and the United States attempted to “change the regime” in Tehran.
What Is the Dimona Reactor?
The site’s official name is the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Centre. It is located in the Negev desert, south of the occupied Palestinian territories, about 90 kilometres south of Jerusalem and approximately 13 kilometres from the city of Dimona.
The reactor was built with French assistance in the late 1950s and began operating in 1963 with a thermal capacity estimated at about 26 megawatts, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, independent experts believe it was later upgraded to between 70 and 150 megawatts.
This facility is considered the central pillar of Israel’s nuclear program. In 2018, Israel renamed the complex after former prime minister Shimon Peres, who is widely credited within the occupying state for his role in developing the nuclear program.
The design of the site reflects its heavily fortified nature. The complex contains ten buildings spread over an area of 36 square kilometres and is protected by electrified fences, patrol roads, and anti aircraft missile batteries.
It also includes eight underground laboratories dating back decades, and it is believed that around 2,700 scientists and technicians work there.
Officially, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission states that the facility is dedicated to scientific research. However, Israel follows a policy known as “nuclear ambiguity,” neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons and refusing to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The U.S. based Arms Control Association indicates that the facility is not a power-generating reactor but rather a research centre containing a heavy water reactor and a reprocessing unit for spent fuel. This configuration enables the production of plutonium and tritium used in nuclear weapons.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, Israel has produced enough plutonium and tritium to manufacture approximately 200 nuclear weapons, with around 90 warheads believed to be operational and deliverable via Jericho missiles and aircraft.
As the reactor ages, satellite images in 2021 revealed a large construction site near the reactor and the reprocessing facility.
Some experts believe the construction indicates the building of a new reactor or an extension of the old reactor’s life to continue producing tritium. Others believe it could be a facility for assembling nuclear warheads, although secrecy surrounding the project obscures the reality.
In 2025, additional satellite images revealed a pit measuring about 150 metres long and 60 metres wide near the site. Three out of seven experts interpreted it as a platform for a new heavy water reactor, while others suggested it might be a warhead assembly facility. This coincided with assessments that the aging reactor may require refurbishment or replacement in the coming years.
Why Dimona?
The site carries symbolic, political, and military value. It is the cornerstone of Israel’s nuclear program and the source of plutonium for Jericho missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, making it a symbol of Israel’s deterrent superiority. For this reason, any threat to strike it touches one of Israel’s most sensitive strategic points.
The site is also located deep in the desert, far from major population centres. As a result, a direct strike would have a greater psychological impact than human casualties. Such an attack would therefore be largely symbolic, aimed at undermining deterrence rather than causing mass casualties.
Iran’s threat to strike Dimona uses this symbolism to link any attack on Iranian territory with retaliation that extends beyond the immediate battlefield. For Israel, however, any attack on Dimona represents a strategic red line, meaning that references to it could trigger a major escalation.
Can Iran Target It?
1. Range and Overall Capabilities
Iran possesses the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, with ranges reaching up to about 2,000 kilometres. Its missile inventory includes:
- Shahab 3 with a range of about 1,300 kilometres
- Emad has a range of about 1,700 kilometres
- Sejjil has a range of about 2,000 kilometres
- Kheibar Shekan has a range of about 1,450 kilometres
- Fattah 1 with a range of about 1,400 kilometres
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies notes that some of these missiles rely on relatively basic guidance systems, resulting in a circular error probable of roughly 2,500 metres for early Shahab 3 variants. However, newer versions incorporate Chinese technologies designed to improve accuracy.
The two-stage solid fuel Sejjil missile has a range of about 2,000 kilometres and carries a payload of around 700 kilograms, although guidance challenges reduce its precision.
The Khorramshahr missile is derived from the North Korean Musudan missile and may carry a warhead weighing about 1,800 kilograms. Some of its versions are believed to reach ranges of up to 3,000 kilometres, although Iran reportedly understates the official range to avoid provoking European concerns.
These range figures clearly indicate that most of these missiles could reach Dimona from deep inside Iranian territory.
2. Accuracy and Warheads
Reaching a target does not necessarily mean striking it precisely. Older Iranian missiles rely primarily on navigation guidance, meaning their margin of error can be large. As a result, they are more suitable for targeting cities or large installations rather than specific buildings.
More advanced versions, such as Ghadr and Emad, incorporate improved reentry vehicles and control systems designed to reduce error margins and allow airburst detonations that enhance the effect against large facilities.
Khorramshahr carries a heavy warhead and may potentially carry multiple warheads, though its accuracy remains debated. Therefore, Iran’s ability to reach the Dimona area is almost certain, but striking a specific facility with precise accuracy remains uncertain, particularly given Israel’s capacity to disrupt missile guidance systems.
3. Alternative Routes
In addition to ballistic missiles, Iran possesses cruise missiles such as the Hoveyzeh with a range of about 1,350 kilometres, as well as drones capable of long range flight.
Tehran also provides missile capabilities to its allies in Lebanon and Yemen, meaning attacks could theoretically be launched through third parties or through combined operations.
However, missiles possessed by allied groups are usually short-range and cannot reach Dimona from southern Lebanon or even Gaza. Missiles launched from Yemen could potentially travel over 2,000 kilometres if long-range variants were used.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the Houthis possess missiles with the accuracy or range necessary to strike a precise target in the Negev.
4. Israeli Air Defences
Israel maintains a multilayered air defence system that includes Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 for intercepting long-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, David’s Sling for intercepting medium-range missiles and cruise missiles, and the Iron Dome system for short-range rocket barrages.
In 2025, the United States supplied Israel with the THAAD system to reinforce air defence during the Twelve Day War with Iran. Military officials say these systems intercept about 80 to 90% of incoming missiles, although they are not impenetrable.
Israel has also previously announced strengthening defences around Dimona during periods of heightened tensions. As a result, Iranian missiles striking a well-protected site is not guaranteed, particularly if launched in small numbers. However, large missile barrages could place pressure on the defence systems.
Record of Previous Incidents
The site has been the subject of several threats in the past, though none resulted in a direct strike.
Gulf War 1991: Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein launched several Scud B missiles toward Dimona, but none hit the facility.
Gaza 2014: The Al Qassam Brigades announced firing three M-75 rockets toward Dimona. The Iron Dome intercepted one while the other two landed in open areas without causing casualties. Other sources said the rockets were intended to strike the surrounding Dimona area rather than the reactor itself.
Syria 2021: A Syrian S-200 surface-to-air missile launched toward an Israeli aircraft deviated from its trajectory and landed about 30 kilometres from Dimona. Israeli air defences attempted to intercept it without success, prompting Israel to reinforce defences in the southern occupied territories.
IRGC exercises 2021: During military drills, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard launched 16 ballistic missiles and five drones at a target model bearing a sign reading “Weapons of Mass Destruction Production Centre,” simulating Dimona as a warning message. A Guard commander stated that the difference between the drill and a real attack was only the launch angle.
Ultimately, the significance of Dimona lies not only in its status as a nuclear facility but also in its role as a meeting point between nuclear ambiguity, military deterrence, and political symbolism in Israel.
For that reason, the explicit inclusion of Dimona in Iranian threat rhetoric does not merely represent an expansion of potential targets. It reflects a shift in the confrontation toward a more sensitive level in which strategic red lines are directly tested.
Between Iran’s ability to reach the site in terms of range, the uncertainty surrounding precise targeting, and the dense protection surrounding the facility, Dimona remains as much a contest of wills as it is a potential military target.
