“This war once again proves that China’s relationship with Iran is less important to Beijing than its internal economic stability and its alignment with the United States.”
By Victoria Herzeg – Geopolitical Futures
The American Israeli war against Iran has entered the middle of its second week, with no clear end to the military escalation in sight. Despite Tehran’s resilience and its ability to absorb the first strike, which appears to have surprised even the Americans themselves, the balance of power in the conflict remains heavily skewed. The vast disparity in military capabilities between Tehran on one side and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other is clearly visible, raising questions about Iran’s allies who might be capable of providing decisive assistance that could alter the course of the war.
Attention often turns to China as the most likely candidate capable of placing Iran in a stronger position politically and, more importantly, militarily. In fact, there were some early indications that Beijing was interested in supporting its Iranian ally and strengthening its position before the war began. Only hours before the American Israeli attacks started, the website Middle East Eye reported, citing unnamed informed officials, that China had delivered both offensive and defensive weapons to the Islamic Republic to enhance its military capabilities.
According to those unnamed officials cited by Middle East Eye, Beijing had already sent suicide drones and air defence systems to Iran, and had also supplied surface to air missile batteries following the Twelve Day War in June 2025, during which the United States bombed three Iranian nuclear sites. However, after the outbreak of fighting and the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, China’s position appeared notably restrained. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned the attack as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty and international norms, and described the assassination of Khamenei as “unacceptable.” He stated that China supports Iran’s efforts to maintain its security, territorial integrity, and national dignity, and called for de escalation. Nevertheless, Beijing has refrained from providing any publicly declared material support to Tehran since then.
This stance is entirely consistent with China’s diplomatic legacy. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that any other position would have represented a clear departure not only from the traditions of Sino Iranian relations but also from Beijing’s long standing approach to foreign policy. China has repeatedly avoided making any direct security commitments to Tehran, in line with its rejection of formal alliances and what it calls the “bloc mentality” in international politics.
China’s response was similarly cautious during the Twelve Day War in June 2025, when its reaction was limited to issuing statements criticising the actions of the United States and Israel. Had Beijing provided weapons or other military assistance to Tehran, it would have exposed itself to financial and political risks, including the possibility of American sanctions, which could endanger China’s primary priorities centred on its economic interests. In short, this war once again demonstrates that China’s relationship with Iran is less important to Beijing than its internal economic stability and its alignment with the United States.
China and Iran: Limits of the Relationship
At first glance, the relationship between China and Iran appears to resemble a strong alliance. The two countries signed a comprehensive 25 year strategic partnership agreement in 2021, and China serves as a lifeline for the Iranian economy, which has suffered under international sanctions for many years. China purchased more than 80 percent of the oil exported by Iran last year alone, accounting for 13.5 percent of China’s total seaborne oil imports.
China has also helped pull Iran out of international political isolation in recent years by supporting its membership in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
According to data from the World Trade Organization for 2024, Iran imports goods from China worth approximately 18 billion dollars and exports goods worth around 14.5 billion dollars to China. As a result, China represents a central pillar of the Iranian economy, with Iranian trade with China accounting for more than a quarter of Iran’s total foreign trade. In addition, Chinese energy companies participate directly in offshore oil extraction from Iranian waters.
These close economic relations have also been reflected in security and military cooperation between the two countries during periods outside crises and wars. Following the Twelve Day War, Beijing and Tehran expanded their security cooperation agreements, including intelligence sharing and coordination in facing potential external threats, in addition to China supplying Iran with important weapons. However, such support tends to diminish during times of war, replaced instead by China’s typical diplomatic positions that emphasise respect for Iran’s sovereignty and reject military adventures against it, while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict.
“These close economic relations have been reflected in security and military cooperation between the two countries outside times of crises and wars.”
According to the website The Diplomat, there is another aspect of Sino Iranian relations that does not usually receive sufficient attention: China’s provision of surveillance technologies and drones to Iran. Chinese companies have played a significant role in developing Iran’s surveillance infrastructure. The Chinese company Tiandy, for example, has provided equipment and training to the Iranian government in this field. This technology has played a role in managing recent protests in Iran and in enabling the Iranian state to maintain internal cohesion and control. In addition, Chinese companies contribute significantly to providing technology and equipment to Iran’s drone industry.
“There is a structural imbalance in Sino Iranian relations, reflected in the lack of balance between the two sides, as Iran needs China far more than China needs Iran.”
This leads to what can be described as the structural imbalance in Sino Iranian relations. Iran clearly depends on China to a far greater extent than China depends on Iran. This can be seen clearly in trade figures. Since 2019, China has been the primary destination for Iranian exports, and since 2014 it has been the largest source of Iran’s imports. In contrast, Iran represents less than 1 percent of China’s total global trade. These figures demonstrate the extent to which China serves as an economic lifeline for Iran, while Iran does not hold the same level of importance for China.
Moreover, Chinese investments in neighbouring Gulf countries far exceed those in Iran. In 2024, total trade between China and the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries reached approximately 257 billion dollars, while bilateral trade between China and Iran did not exceed 14 billion dollars in the same year, according to Chinese government data. This means that Gulf states, some of which maintain unstable relations with Tehran, are far more important trading partners for China.
There is also a strong perception among Chinese officials and academics that cycles of violence and instability in Iran make it a high risk environment for investment. These recurring periods of unrest do not encourage China to place Iran among its most important strategic allies in the region. The most significant disagreement between Beijing and Tehran appears in the nuclear file. China does not welcome Iran possessing nuclear weapons, although it supports a peaceful resolution to the issue, as demonstrated by its participation in the 2015 nuclear agreement concerning Iran’s nuclear program, from which the United States later withdrew.
Beijing’s Priorities
In times of war, China draws its policies independently of assumptions about its “hesitant” alliance with Iran. Beijing’s primary concern regarding the war relates to its impact on its direct interests, particularly energy security. Nearly one third of China’s oil imports and about one quarter of its natural gas imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been at least partially disrupted by the war.
Last year in 2025, China imported 13.5 percent of its crude oil from Iran, while another 36.8 percent came from other Gulf producers that depend on the same strait. Beijing’s central interest therefore lies in ending the war and stabilising maritime navigation regardless of how that outcome is achieved. However, China is not prepared to intervene militarily beyond what it considers necessary to achieve this objective. Instead, it relies on contingency plans developed to manage such disruptions, most notably its large strategic oil reserves.
“Beijing has successfully stored at least 1.1 billion barrels of oil, enough to cover three months of imports.”
Over recent years, Beijing has accumulated at least 1.1 billion barrels of oil in reserves, enough to cover approximately three months of imports. According to Victoria Herzeg, an analyst at Geopolitical Futures, China has also diversified its oil portfolio, increasingly relying on Russia, which now accounts for around 20 percent of China’s crude oil imports. With renewed instability in the Middle East, Beijing may have greater incentives to invest in long term energy projects such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. This 2,600 kilometre pipeline would transport 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually from Russia’s Yamal fields to China through Mongolia.
Another factor is China’s desire to avoid any disruption to its upcoming negotiations with the United States and the anticipated summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping expected to take place in early April. The United States appears to share this priority. In order to avoid provoking Beijing ahead of the summit, the Trump administration reportedly postponed announcing a 13 billion dollar weapons package for Taiwan, which would have included Patriot interceptor missiles and other advanced surface to air missile systems. President Donald Trump also eased some restrictions on semiconductor exports to China, according to a report by The New York Times.
Could China Intervene in the War?
Beyond calculations of direct interests, China does not present itself globally as an ally that will decisively intervene if distant partners face an existential threat. Beijing may provide diplomatic and economic support to its partners, and perhaps some military exports, but it avoids offering direct security guarantees, which consistently places it in a secondary role in global conflicts.
China took no serious action when the United States targeted its ally and former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, nor when Washington seized control of the Venezuelan oil sector where China had invested billions of dollars. During the war in June 2025, when Iran was attacked by Washington and Tel Aviv, Beijing similarly limited its response to criticism of Israeli actions in Gaza and warnings directed at Washington regarding its threats toward Iran, according to assessments by the British think tank Chatham House.
The institute goes further, suggesting that China might even tolerate certain American and Israeli strikes against Iran for two main reasons. First, Beijing strongly opposes Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, meaning that tactical strikes by the United States and Israel could ultimately contribute to a diplomatic breakthrough and a stable regional settlement lasting years. Second, a weakened Iranian government that survives without collapsing or being replaced by a Western aligned administration would serve China’s interests by increasing Tehran’s dependence on Beijing. The more pressure placed on Iran, the more it becomes technologically, politically, and economically reliant on China.
Another factor shaping China’s security interventions is geographic proximity. Hamidreza Azizi, an analyst of Middle East security affairs at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Berlin, noted that China clearly failed to seriously defend Iran during the June 2025 war and is likely to show the same reluctance during the current conflict. Azizi points out that this Chinese hesitation contrasts with Beijing’s behaviour toward countries within its immediate neighbourhood. During clashes between India and Pakistan last year over Kashmir, China provided tangible military assistance to its most important ally, Pakistan. Such assistance is not something China appears prepared to provide to Iran with the same seriousness. Azizi concludes that pressure and strikes against Iran do not harm China in the way some observers imagine.
It is therefore unlikely that Beijing will send troops or become directly involved in the conflict under its current military doctrine and cautious strategy. However, China remains capable of supporting its partners in its own way. Reports from military oriented websites indicate that Iran seeks advanced fifth generation aircraft from China as well as HQ 9 air defence systems. China’s economic and military role therefore remains important to Iran, even if it does not have a direct strategic impact on the battlefield.
“China’s global strategy does not include direct military intervention to assist its allies during wartime except in rare cases, and Iran does not appear to be one of them.”
In conclusion, China is not prepared to intervene militarily to rescue Iran. First, Iran does not represent a red line for China that would compel Beijing to act. Second, Chinese calculations suggest that American strikes may be painful but are unlikely to result in regime change in Tehran. At the same time, China’s global strategy rarely includes direct intervention to assist allies during wartime, especially when the conflict occurs far from its territory or maritime sphere, and when the adversary involved is the United States, with whom Beijing seeks to avoid direct confrontation on any issue, including the long standing Taiwan question.
Even decisive Chinese arms transfers tend to remain limited to countries within its immediate geographic neighbourhood, as demonstrated by the recent India Pakistan war and by China’s close relations with North Korea. By contrast, the Middle East is treated with greater caution by Beijing, where economic considerations dominate its calculations. The flow of oil and investment is ultimately more valuable to China than a risky military venture undertaken to protect its Iranian partner.
