The late American broadcaster Tim Russert once asked former US President George W Bush a simple question on his well known programme Meet the Press about the Iraq War, but Bush did not grasp its weight at the time: was the war on Iraq a war of necessity, or a war of choice?
Bush initially stumbled and seemed not to understand what the question meant, sparking widespread media debate over the war’s justifications and motivations.
Today, more than two decades after the invasion of Iraq, most Americans, including Donald Trump, recognise that war as a choice rather than a necessity directly tied to protecting US national security.
The Iraqi and Iranian cases may now resemble each other in this respect. The current war on Iran appears elective rather than inevitable. Escalation was not driven by objective circumstances, and it could have been avoided had serious negotiations continued to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. This war with Iran was not necessary, Mr President.
Why Regret Waits by the Roadside
An old saying describes war as appearing, in its first moments, like a stunningly beautiful woman who steals the hearts of those drawn to her. Yet as the war continues and drags on, she grows into an ugly old figure from whom people recoil, bringing nothing but tears, pain and regret.
That saying seems likely to apply to the current war on Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump appear intoxicated by early strikes, particularly given the high level of coordination between them. This suggests that the decision for war was made during Netanyahu’s most recent visit to Washington DC and his private meeting with the President.
The Trump administration used its latest negotiations with Iran over the nuclear programme to buy more time, under the pretext of applying political pressure, while completing military deployments in the region without alarming Tehran about the certainty of an attack. The objective was to avoid provoking pre emptive Iranian strikes against American forces, which would have disrupted preparations for the surprise assault.
Trump’s Core Assumption
Trump’s central assumption in his latest war against Iran rests on a clear strategy: targeting Iran’s senior military and political leadership in the early hours of the attack, foremost among them the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to produce widespread paralysis in Iranian political and military decision making.
From there, the assumption continues, Iranian protesters would be encouraged to rapidly seize the levers of the state, exploiting political and military disruption to establish control on the ground and change the system through Iranian hands, in a moment unlikely to return.
That is the assumption. The reality, the argument continues, is that Trump may begin this war but cannot resolve it, because resolution requires ground intervention.
Wars typically end militarily when ground forces control territory and impose effective authority. That is highly unlikely here, particularly after America’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq.
For that reason, Trump is unlikely to want to send US forces to invade Iran, instead limiting the campaign, for now, to continued air strikes on strategic Iranian targets and leaving the question of political change to the Iranian people, whether they choose it or not.
This is why Trump and Netanyahu are calling on Iranian protesters to revolt and seize government institutions in order to produce an alternative system backed by the United States.
Yet the past weeks, including the security forces’ suppression of large scale protests against the system, have shown this option to be distant and unrealistic. If it did occur, it could lead to an Iranian civil war with consequences that are difficult to predict for the region and broader security.
This war remains an existential battle for Iran’s system, meaning the new leaders will be compelled to fight desperately for survival despite the scale of losses and what the article describes as deep intelligence and technological penetration into senior Iranian leadership structures.
The Ramadan Timing Error
The piece adds another factor: a cultural miscalculation over the timing of the war during Ramadan.
Ramadan carries deep spiritual meanings in Islamic history, which Iran’s system will likely seek to mobilise for public mobilisation and recruitment, intensifying the symbolic dimension of the conflict.
This symbolism places Iran’s new leaders, replacing those assassinated, under greater pressure to appear resolute. It may reduce their willingness to accept regional or international mediation aimed at halting the war, fearing they could be portrayed as weak or surrendering.
The disappearance of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from the political scene, the article argues, could extend the war beyond what Trump expects. The absence of a strong central leadership may be used to suggest a lack of control, and that some Iranian military arms are acting independently.
From a propaganda perspective, the assassination of senior Iranian leaders, including the Supreme Leader, in the first wave of air strikes represents a major political win that Trump will try to use to persuade the American public that this war is not like previous long, bloody American interventions. He will frame it as a swift strike and a surgical operation aimed at the head of the system, as he did in Venezuela and now in Iran, and perhaps next in Cuba.
Yet Trump also faces a hard task: convincing an American public sceptical of foreign interventions that this war is necessary for US national security.
For that reason, the article anticipates the President will open the door to regional or international mediation, including by Turkey and Gulf states, to stop the war and pressure Iran into accepting a ceasefire.
Iran’s Existential War
The piece argues that the coming weeks will largely depend on Iranian decisions about the scope of conflict, and whether Tehran will accept a ceasefire in the way Iran’s founding leader Ayatollah Khomeini once accepted it at the end of the Iran Iraq War in the late 1980s.
Iran’s system has faced dangerous turning points since the Islamic Revolution at the end of the 1970s, including a long war against Iraq that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. It has also endured a suffocating economic blockade that intensified in recent years after Trump’s rise.
Still, this war is presented as an existential confrontation. The new leadership will need to confront threats on two fronts: internal and external.
Internally, the new leadership will seek to quickly assert control over state institutions to prevent domestic collapse. The article argues it will also seek to politically invest the assassination of the Supreme Leader, drawing on the concept of martyrdom within Shiite cultural heritage to boost morale among supporters.
The speed with which Khamenei’s assassination was announced, without attempts to deny it or conceal it, is presented as evidence of a desire to mobilise public sentiment during an official forty day mourning period.
Externally, the new leadership must define its strategy towards the United States and Israel. The article warns that widening the war by targeting Arab neighbours, who it says had worked sincerely to keep war away from Iran and the region, would be a strategic mistake that could erode Arab public sympathy and hasten the system’s end.
The article concludes that Iran’s upcoming decisions will be crucial in determining whether it believes it can sustain a long confrontation with the United States and Israel and impose meaningful losses, or whether it should acknowledge defeat early and seek an exit that preserves what remains of the system.
It also praises Gulf states for political restraint and refusal to be drawn into widening the war, arguing that their stance reflects a sincere desire to spare the region the devastation of wars and reckless politics that have long imposed displacement, death and destruction on its peoples.
The article urges Iran’s new leadership to recognise the strategic importance of maintaining good relations with Arab neighbours for its broader security interests.
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