The second American-Israeli war on Iran began in the early hours of Saturday, 28 February.
The first wave of air strikes, launched from Israel, targeted senior political and military leadership of the Islamic Republic, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme Defence Council Ali Shamkhani, commander of the Revolutionary Guard Mohammad Pakpour, and Defence Minister Aziz Naserzadeh.
The strike reportedly resulted in the assassination of Khamenei and other top-tier leaders. Shortly thereafter, American forces deployed around Iran joined the attacks, which expanded to encompass a wide range of targets.
Iran’s response to the American-Israeli attacks came as expected, employing medium-range missiles and drones.
The Iranian retaliation targeted sites in Israel and Jordan, as well as American military positions in Iraq and across the Gulf states, except for Oman. Oman’s Duqm port was struck the following day.
By the evening of the first day of war, reports emerged that commercial shipping vessels had received messages from Iran warning against navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
This marks the second American Israeli war on Iran in less than nine months. It is expected to last several days, possibly several weeks, and to be wide in scope both in terms of the type of sites targeted inside Iran and the geographic spread of operations.
Notably, the outbreak of war came just two days after a round of American Iranian negotiations in Geneva, which the Omani mediator described as having made significant progress and brought the parties closer to peace.
How, then, did President Trump pave the way for war? What are the real objectives of this conflict, and what could it ultimately lead to?
The Road to War
Although negotiations between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear programme had been progressing, a series of statements by US President Donald Trump during the final week of February pointed towards a military option.
Observers noted that in his State of the Union address to Congress on 24 February, the prospect of war against Iran appeared increasingly likely.
While the President addressed Iran briefly, his remarks suggested a lower ceiling for negotiations than Iranian officials had indicated. Trump stated that he was convinced Iran had resumed its nuclear programme after the strikes on its facilities in June 2025. For the first time, he specifically described Iran’s missile system as a threat to Europe and potentially even to the United States.
In effect, the President appeared to reject Iran’s assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, demanding a complete halt to uranium enrichment and the inclusion of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal in negotiations. Tehran has consistently rejected these demands.
Despite this, Iranian officials showed no hesitation in continuing negotiations. On the same day, prior to Trump’s speech, Ali Larijani travelled to Muscat to deliver Iran’s initial proposal for an agreement to the Omani mediator.
This proposal had been promised during the second round of talks and was expected to be the basis for the third session.
On 25 February, Trump’s envoy to the negotiations, Steve Witkoff, issued a positive statement, suggesting that Trump might accept a symbolic level of enrichment and that missile discussions could follow a nuclear agreement, rather than being a precondition for it.
However, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio soon issued sharply contrasting remarks, insisting that Iran must dismantle its nuclear capabilities entirely and that its missile arsenal posed a direct threat to American security, declaring that no agreement could be reached without addressing the missile file.
On 26 February, the American and Iranian delegations held their third round of talks, described by Trump as a last chance negotiation. The discussions were largely indirect and concluded with Omani statements indicating positive atmospheres and tangible progress.
Iran’s Foreign Minister commented that both sides had engaged more seriously than before and that expert level talks would resume in Vienna on 2 March, with the participation of officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency. A fourth round was anticipated within a week.
Yet on 27 February, Trump expressed dissatisfaction with the talks, stating that Iran was not being sufficiently clear or credible. While reiterating that he preferred not to use force, he indicated that it might be necessary and said he would await the outcome of the next round.
On the same day, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran was believed to hold more than nine thousand kilograms of uranium enriched at varying levels, the location of which inspectors could not fully verify.
Taken together, these developments suggested that war was increasingly likely, especially alongside visible US military deployments around Iran. Nevertheless, mediation sources indicated that Iran had made substantial concessions during the third round, including relinquishing capabilities associated with potential nuclear weapon production and expressing willingness to discuss missiles and regional influence at later stages. Tehran also reportedly offered economic cooperation opportunities to American companies.
Why, then, did President Trump proceed towards war in coordination with Israel?
In his address announcing the strikes, the nuclear file appeared secondary. Much of his speech focused on decades of strained relations between the Islamic Republic and the United States. His message suggested that coexistence with the current Iranian system was no longer acceptable.
In closing, Trump addressed the Iranian people directly, urging them to seize what he described as a rare opportunity to free themselves from the existing leadership.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu similarly directed remarks at Iranian minorities, including Baloch and Kurdish communities, in a tone supportive of regime change.
The initial targeting of Iran’s top political and military leadership signalled that the objectives extended beyond nuclear or missile issues. The war appeared to centre on the fate of the Islamic Republic itself.
Options and Trajectories
For the Trump administration, sustaining a prolonged war may prove difficult, given limited domestic support and visible opposition in Congress. Israel’s calculations, however, may differ.
From an American perspective, the conflict could be short, lasting days to a week, or longer, extending for weeks. In either case, operations are expected to be intense and geographically broad.
A shorter war would likely focus on eliminating senior leadership, degrading air defence systems, and targeting missile platforms and drone infrastructure, as well as ports, military bases, command centres and what remains of nuclear facilities. The aim would be to weaken and destabilise the system while pressuring it towards concessions in future negotiations.
A longer war would expand to economic assets, administrative institutions and potentially cultural or religious centres. Such an approach would seek to fracture the system entirely, aligning more closely with Israeli objectives.
Iran is acutely aware of the imbalance in military power. Its response strategy appears designed to raise the cost of war and shorten its duration. Gulf states have reacted sharply to Iranian strikes on sites believed to host American forces, having previously opposed escalation.
Iranian calculations may recognise that even an effective missile and drone campaign cannot mirror the scale of damage inflicted on its own territory. Tehran may instead rely on the inability of Israel and certain Gulf states, particularly Bahrain and the UAE, to sustain prolonged disruption. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have global economic consequences.
If the war extends and the regime’s survival is threatened, Iran could activate regional allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen to expand the theatre of conflict, although complex regional conditions may limit such involvement.
Consequences of War
Regardless of its duration, Iran will emerge from this war significantly strained. The degree of exhaustion will depend on the scope and effectiveness of American and Israeli strikes.
Yet even extensive bombardment does not guarantee regime collapse. Modern state systems are not easily dismantled from the air alone. The Islamic Republic’s political and military structure is decentralised across multiple institutions, including the Supreme Leader’s office, the presidency, parliament, security councils, the regular army, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij network.
Although distance between the system and segments of the population has grown since 2008, the regime retains a substantial social base across diverse ethnic regions. Severe blows may lead more readily to internal fragmentation than immediate collapse.
True regime change without foreign invasion would require deep divisions within political and military institutions and significant public alignment with one faction. Targeted killings alone are insufficient.
Nor is it certain that war would eliminate Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. The country is believed to possess thousands of kilograms of enriched uranium, including more than 400 kilograms enriched above 60 percent. The precise storage locations remain uncertain. Missile infrastructure is dispersed across Iran’s vast geography. Moreover, enrichment technology and missile production are the product of decades of domestic scientific development.
Even so, the war’s aftermath could diminish Iran’s regional influence and compel greater inward focus. Should the system retain cohesion, it will face a strategic choice: accommodation with Washington or persistence through reconstruction and resistance, potentially including renewed pursuit of nuclear deterrence.
In either scenario, the Islamic Republic is likely to remain a central target of President Trump’s policy unless shifts occur within the US political landscape following upcoming congressional elections.
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