Iran is entering a new phase with the absence of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Constitutionally, the country is unlikely to struggle to fill the vacancy, as the Iranian Constitution sets out clear provisions. The critical issue, however, is that this transition is unfolding amid a confrontation in which the Islamic Republic is already engaged.
Article 111 of the Constitution states: “In the event of the Leader’s death, resignation, or dismissal, the Assembly of Experts must act as quickly as possible to appoint a new Leader (without specifying a timeframe). Until the appointment of the Leader, a council composed of the President, the Head of the Judiciary, and one jurist from the Guardian Council selected by the Expediency Discernment Council shall temporarily assume all the duties of the Leader.”
Naturally, Article 111 describes the council that assumes the Leader’s duties until a successor is chosen as “temporary”.
Under this article, members of the Assembly of Experts are required to appoint a new Leader “as quickly as possible”. Yet no time limit is specified for making that choice, nor does the text clarify what happens if no decision is reached on any individual, or how long such a process could continue.
War is war
“War is war, and we understand the power of the United States Army and its capacity for violence, but we are able to harm it and threaten its interests.”
This is how an Iranian official I met in Tehran described the situation, as the United States and Israel carried out attacks on several targets on the morning of 28 February 2026.
The attacks targeted the office of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as the ministries of intelligence and defence, offices of security leadership, the Atomic Energy Organisation, and the judiciary building.
The strikes were spread across Tehran, Lorestan, Alborz, Tabriz, Qom, Chabahar, Kermanshah, Ardabil, Khorramabad, Urmia, Isfahan, Mahabad, and Bandar Abbas. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on US military bases in the Gulf region, as well as the occupied Palestinian territories.
After the confrontation in June 2025, which lasted 12 days, when Israel and the United States attacked Iran and Iran responded with missiles and drones, talk of a renewed war between Iran and the United States and Israel is no longer a future military scenario, but a reality that threatens everyone.
After decades of extended conflict, in which coercion, deterrence, and influence overlapped without an openly declared direct confrontation, the struggle has entered a new stage, crossing thresholds that had stood since the victory of the Islamic Revolution until recently. The concept of the “grey zone” no longer provides a useful explanatory framework. The equation has changed entirely after “Al Aqsa Flood”, the aggression on Gaza, and Israel’s escalating strategic assessment that views Iran as an existential threat that must be confronted.
The clash between Iran and the United States is not new, but it has certainly moved to unprecedented levels. After accumulating strategic experience, the confrontation has moved beyond exchanges of fire into a conflict of systems. It took on a military character after intensified American activation of networks of influence and cross border capabilities through an unprecedented use of siege tools, financial pressure, and covert operations. This created a prolonged operational environment aimed at a short and decisive battle, yet the Iranian equation on the other side does not make the American objective achievable.
Iran sought to avoid comprehensive war. This was not merely a situational calculation by Iranian decision makers, but a deeply rooted feature of its strategic culture. It became especially clear after the legacy of the Iran Iraq war and its heavy human and developmental costs over eight years. This helps explain how Tehran can combine readiness for confrontation with, at the same time, a tendency to control tempo. This is less about fear of war than about a preference to keep it under a ceiling that can be managed, with losses that can be borne.
Iran engaged in negotiations over its nuclear programme, and presented its case to the United States regarding nuclear weapons. It put forward proposals including turning Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s fatwa prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons into a law issued by the Islamic Consultative Assembly banning it, in addition to diluting enriched uranium at 60 percent and converting it into nuclear fuel. But Iran was not prepared to relinquish the core principle of enrichment.
According to Abolfazl Amoei, the special assistant to the Speaker of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly, whom I met in Tehran, the Iranian negotiator was tasked with preserving the core of the nuclear programme. This includes its knowledge and scientific components. The most sensitive part is enrichment, as Iran insists on preserving the chain of metal, knowledge, and industry, including the production of nuclear reactors, enrichment, and conversion into fuel.
An Iranian security expert I met in Tehran said that excluding confrontation has left the Iranian strategic mind forever. This was present even as Iran sent its delegation to negotiations. “This time we understood the American side was not serious. The Iranian negotiating delegation noticed that the American negotiator was not taking notes during talks. It seemed as though a decision had already been made, and returning to negotiations was only a pretext to justify the attack.”
The expert spoke about elements of Iranian strength, stressing that there are things Iran’s enemies do not know, including capabilities that could change the equation. These are “non missile, non drone capabilities, and not nuclear weapons”.
He added: “We know that the American army, in material terms and military calculations, is the strongest army in the world, and there is no balance in military power. But Iran is not weak. It can endure despite major losses, and it can inflict severe damage on American interests. If it reaches an existential threat, it will be an existential threat to everyone, not only the Islamic Republic.”
In this confrontation, missile capabilities occupy the crown jewel of Iran’s power system. Iran’s missile programme has passed through three generations. The first was inaccurate and short range. The second was accurate but not long range. The third combines accuracy with long range.
Unlike the nuclear programme, which was exposed through oversight exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and by Iran’s lack of desire to conceal the programme, information remains limited regarding Iran’s missile programme.
Due to sanctions, Iran was prevented from acquiring weapons. For decades, Iran’s military budget remained low compared to states in the region. Until 2022 it stood at 3 percent of the state’s general budget, rising in later years to 4 percent, and today reaching around 6 percent.
Early on, the military decision turned towards the necessity of acquiring and localising missile production technology in Iran through Iranian scientists. While the cost of a ballistic missile may reach one million dollars, Iran can produce it at a cost of around 2,000 dollars. Work on this became organised into military cells spread across Iran’s geography, each cell producing a particular missile. These cells are able to sustain production in the harshest conditions.
The leadership system
Returning to the question of selecting the Supreme Leader, the issue overlaps at two levels: the formal constitutional mechanism governing the transfer of authority, and the actual political and security balances that practically determine the shape and limits of the choice.
Legally, the Assembly of Experts elects the Leader. The Constitution also sets out transitional arrangements in the event of vacancy or sudden incapacity, ensuring leadership powers do not lapse until a decision is made. Yet Iranian experience shows that the constitutional text operates within an institutional environment where specific institutions play a significant role in the election process or in pushing outcomes in one direction rather than another.
A potential successor must secure at least two thirds of the votes of Assembly of Experts members. If no candidate achieves that threshold, the three person council mentioned in Article 111 could, in theory, assume leadership duties for an indefinite period. However, numerous meetings held by Khamenei before his departure, including with the Assembly of Experts, indicate that succession was discussed under several scenarios. These scenarios, however, are not unfolding in the context of a natural death, but amid an open military confrontation with the United States and Israel.
In the transitional period, the temporary leadership body stands out as a constitutional safety valve enabling the management of leadership affairs until a new Leader is elected. The real weight of this phase is not determined only by its duration, but by the nature of elite consensus on a name, or on a transitional formula that gains wider agreement.
When succession coincides with a security shock, war context, or external escalation, the system’s priority becomes controlling decision making and ensuring security. Political reviews are not carried out within this framework, and may instead become a later matter.
Within this framework, the scenario most consistent with the logic of the Iranian state is choosing a successor who secures the system’s hard core. This makes it more likely that a principled conservative figure, or a consensus figure, will take the helm, within an equation that allows the election decision to pass smoothly within the Assembly of Experts. That would send internal and external signals of system cohesion and strength.
The likelihood of this path increases the higher the cost of a vacuum, or the longer deliberations drag on.
Closely connected to this scenario, and also with a high probability, is a path tied to assessing conditions. This may lead to the security and military establishment holding the centre of gravity in decision making during the next phase, while pushing towards selecting a symbolic Leader who provides a legal and constitutional cover for such control.
This scenario is reinforced by the ongoing confrontation and the need to manage escalation and control the internal front, which pushes towards elevating the role of institutions most capable of rapid action and institutional discipline.
Another possible scenario is leadership by a council. This option is determined by the balance of forces inside Iran. If consensus on a single candidate proves impossible in a way that guarantees system continuity, the direction may shift towards extending transition to manage risks rather than imposing a name that could open the door to internal conflict.
As for a cautious pragmatic settlement scenario, through electing a figure showing greater flexibility on major files, this is possible, but it would likely come later, after security is stabilised and political rupture is avoided. Such flexibility could become a choice to stop attrition without compromising security constants.
Although much has been said about a scenario of “inheriting power by Mojtaba Khamenei”, this is the least likely scenario, and may have been closed entirely if the man died with his father, whom he often accompanied. In addition, Khamenei sent several signals during his life that he rejected this option.
Even if considered a possible option, it would depend on the cohesion of the inner circle, the ability to pass the name through the Assembly of Experts, the level of acceptance within the religious establishment and public opinion, and the effect of security developments on the ability of the circle around the leadership household to manage transition.
The scenario of dispute within the elite leading to disorder is the least likely, but the most consequential. The likelihood is reduced by the existence of strong institutional and security tools that may favour a short and calculated transition, preventing an event that would disrupt consensus mechanisms within the Assembly of Experts.
Whatever the scenario, certain institutions will play the most decisive role in shaping the next phase: the Assembly of Experts, security institutions led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the religious establishment (the Hawza).
The most likely outcome is the rapid selection of a principled conservative Leader who ensures system continuity, or a consensus Leader with a larger role.
Conclusion
Iran’s leadership transition, regardless of surrounding circumstances, remains institutionally manageable through Article 111, which guarantees continuity of the Leader’s powers through a temporary council until the Assembly of Experts reaches a decision, even if without a clear time ceiling. In the context of open war and a shift from “grey zone” dynamics to a conflict of systems, the system’s priority will be securing continuity and controlling tempo before any opening towards political settlement options.
Accordingly, the paper leans towards a path based on electing a conservative consensus Leader, or a less weighty Leader alongside a stronger positioning of the security establishment to secure decision making.
If consensus proves difficult, transition may lengthen, or a leadership council formula may be adopted temporarily. The legitimacy of the next successor will be measured by the ability to combine deterrence with managing negotiations and reducing the cost of internal attrition. The immediate test will be the speed of consensus within the Assembly of Experts, the cohesion of the security circle, and its ability to absorb social shock and prevent a slide into larger crises.
