The American Israeli war on Iran casts a shadow over Gaza, despite the relative calm prevailing in the Strip, particularly after the Israeli government announced the closure of crossings into the besieged enclave, including the Rafah crossing.
Fears are growing that the occupation forces may exploit the regional escalation as a pretext to intensify restrictions on more than two million Palestinians, and to evade the obligations of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement.
Observers agree that Gaza is not isolated from developments in the war on Iran. It remains exposed to political, security, and economic repercussions, especially as it has not recovered from the devastating consequences of a war that exhausted it over the past two years.
Israeli Evasion
On the political level, Palestinian writer and political analyst Wissam Afifa believes that Gaza is not an isolated arena, but part of a broader network of regional balances. The escalation between Iran and Israel, with direct American participation, reshuffles regional priorities, which in turn affects the political trajectory of the ceasefire in Gaza.
Afifa told Al Jazeera Net that if Washington becomes preoccupied with managing a broader and longer confrontation with Iran, pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to complete the second phase of the agreement will likely recede. The result, he argues, would be a slowdown in implementation or renewed negotiations under the pretext of “the regional security situation”.
Afifa further believes that if the conflict transforms into a regional confrontation, Netanyahu could use this to delay commitments related to Gaza, particularly those concerning withdrawal or reconstruction.
Conversely, Afifa notes that if Hamas perceives that the regional confrontation has not broken the position of the “Axis of Resistance”, it may seek to leverage that in certain files. However, if Iran appears to be under significant pressure, the movement may be compelled to adjust to a new reality, prioritising the consolidation of the ceasefire to protect Gaza’s internal front.
The political analyst stresses that the most dangerous development would be linking the Iranian track with the Gaza track, in other words, using Gaza as a bargaining chip in indirect negotiations with Washington or through mediators.
Rounds of Escalation
The outbreak of the Israeli war on Iran comes after two rounds of military escalation between the two sides since the beginning of the war on the Gaza Strip.
On 1 October 2024, Tehran launched a missile attack against Israel in response to the occupation’s assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on 31 July 2024, along with several leaders of the Axis of Resistance. Approximately 200 ballistic missiles were fired towards the occupied Palestinian territories.
At that time, the war on Gaza was at its peak, and Iranian missiles struck locations where occupation forces were stationed along the Netzarim axis in central Gaza.
On 13 June 2025, a new wave of escalation erupted between Tehran and Israel, lasting 12 days. Israel launched a wide ranging surprise attack on sites inside Iran, including military facilities, in what was described as a preemptive operation to destroy Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities.
Iran responded by launching ballistic missiles and drones at targets inside Israel.
During that round, Gaza remained under intense Israeli war, with residents suffering deliberate starvation as the occupation closed crossings and prevented the entry of aid.
Security Repercussions
The war on Iran is reshaping the priorities of conflict in the region and will reflect directly on the future of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, according to security and military affairs researcher Rami Abu Zubaida.
He explained that direct US entry into the war effectively shifts Washington’s centre of attention from Gaza to the confrontation with Iran. This will lead to a clear slowdown in political efforts related to the Gaza truce, and perhaps even near total paralysis.
Abu Zubaida told Al Jazeera Net that the second phase of the ceasefire appears to be in a state of stagnation, especially as it requires sensitive and decisive steps. These include gradual Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international stabilisation force, the formation of a technocratic government committee, and complex security arrangements.
He believes Gaza will automatically become affected by any regional escalation through three possible tracks:
The first track involves gradual escalation. The occupation may expand limited operations inside the Strip, drawing on an intelligence target bank to carry out precise strikes. These would carry indirect deterrent messages to resistance forces, Iran, and the Axis of Resistance, while also easing internal pressure resulting from the broader war.
The second track is a tactical freeze of military movements in Gaza. The occupation may prefer to keep the front temporarily quiet, recognising the risks of opening simultaneous fronts, particularly if regional confrontation expands to arenas such as Iraq, Yemen, or the Red Sea, creating unpredictable military challenges.
The third and most dangerous track would be simultaneous ignition across multiple arenas, turning Gaza into part of a multi front regional battle, especially if regional actors engage directly in the confrontation.
Abu Zubaida affirmed that the war on Iran may grant Israel wider room for procrastination, and possibly for hardening its conditions, particularly regarding the disarmament of the resistance and the restructuring of the security reality in the Gaza Strip.
Economic Exhaustion
On the economic front, researcher Ahmad Abu Qamar said the Palestinian economy is almost entirely tied to the Israeli economy. Any disruption in supply chains within Israel directly affects both the West Bank and Gaza.
Abu Qamar told Al Jazeera Net that the continued closure of the Rafah land crossing deprives Gaza of diversifying its sources of goods. Rafah had previously eased reliance on the Kerem Abu Salem crossing and reduced the impact of closures or imposed restrictions.
He explained that Gaza’s crossings are the most fragile link during crises. Even a single day of closure is immediately reflected in markets, especially given the transformations the Strip has undergone after the war.
Before the war, Gaza had food reserves sufficient for at least six months, providing a degree of resilience against food security shocks. Today, after the destruction of warehouses and the targeting of key food basket components, that capacity has eroded significantly. Dependence is now almost entirely on external imports, making markets highly sensitive to any security development or crossing closure.
The economic researcher stressed that this reality produces market distortions manifested in price volatility and sudden increases, as recently witnessed.
Abu Qamar warned that the continuation of regional tensions, combined with the fragility of Gaza’s economic structure, increases the likelihood of a worsening living crisis. Any military escalation in the region thus becomes an additional pressure factor on an already exhausted economic reality.
