On 5 February this year, retired Israeli brigadier general Amir Avivi, founder and director of the “HaBitkhonistim” movement that includes former Israeli security leaders and head of the Israeli Defence and Security Forum, appeared in a video expressing his anxiety over Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. In the clip posted on X, Avivi said: “While we are busy toppling the Shiite axis and waiting for the American attack on the Iranian regime, Egypt and Turkey signed a strategic military cooperation agreement.”
Avivi described the new agreement as the latest attempt by both countries to deepen military and security cooperation and strengthen ties after years of tension. More notably, he argued that Cairo and Ankara should become the “compass” for shaping Israel’s army in the coming years, saying Israel must build a force capable of fighting on two fronts against two regular armies at the same time. “Even if the Turks and Egyptians are not enemies of Israel right now, they are rivals and could become enemies in the future.”
Avivi’s concerns were not isolated. Several Israeli media outlets echoed similar messaging, including Yedioth Ahronoth, which covered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Egypt in the same cautious tone. The Hebrew newspaper said Erdogan is improving relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt as part of unifying interests in the face of Israel. It added that Erdogan arrived in Egypt on an official visit after concluding a trip to Saudi Arabia, announcing in both stops understandings and cooperation agreements, which the paper claimed are primarily directed at Israel.
At the official level, the tone was not far off. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly warned about the growing strength of the Egyptian army during a closed Knesset session that coincided with the latest moves by Cairo and Ankara. He said Egypt’s military power is increasing and must be monitored, and that despite current diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt, “we must prevent any excessive accumulation of Egyptian military power.”
These signals suggest that early steps in Egyptian Turkish cooperation and the agreements concluded by President Abdel Fattah el Sisi and President Erdogan in Cairo have triggered a wave of Israeli concern, visible both in media coverage and in official corridors. The convergence of two regional powers of Egypt and Turkey’s weight constitutes a serious strategic headache for many in Israel focused on the country’s regional posture. It came as an unwelcome shift in Tel Aviv at a moment when Israel had begun to believe that the “Iranian threat” in its vicinity had significantly diminished.
The “Islamic Alliance” Versus the “Abraham Alliance”
On 27 January, the American magazine Foreign Policy published an article that helps frame the emerging political scene in the region. It argued that two blocs are competing to shape the Middle East. The first is led by Israel and its regional allies, a bloc that sees the existing regional order as having failed to curb what it describes as “extremist Islam”, whether in a Shiite form backed by Iran or a Sunni form backed by Turkey.
This bloc seeks to reshape the region through military force and technological cooperation. It openly advocates intervention across regional conflicts in favour of forces opposed to political Islam. It also pushes to expand normalisation with Israel without any meaningful concern for granting Palestinians their rights or for Israel’s acceptance of a two state solution, which still enjoys, at least formally, the support of many international actors.
Foreign Policy labelled this bloc the “Abraham Alliance”, in reference to the Abraham Accords that normalised diplomatic, political, security, and economic relations between Israel and several Arab states under the sponsorship of then-President Donald Trump’s administration during his first term. As the article argued, this bloc believes in remaking the region through blunt military power, as reflected in Israel’s devastating war on the Gaza Strip.
Facing this emerging bloc is what Foreign Policy termed the “Islamic Alliance”, referring to the Islamic world rather than political Islam. It is described as an alignment led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar. Its interests and reading of regional power balances conflict with the first bloc’s vision, producing competition between the two.
According to the same analysis, states within this alignment see Israel as significantly destabilising the region. They argue that the “Abraham Alliance” supports separatist forces that deepen fragmentation in conflict zones, and they view its narrative about political Islam as a pretext for narrow interests and expanding influence.
Foreign Policy also drew a key distinction between the two camps: the Saudi Egyptian Turkish axis prefers preserving existing state structures and institutions, despite their flaws. In Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and elsewhere, it favours supporting the framework of existing authorities, even when weak or exhausted, so they can reassert sovereignty and protect territorial integrity against militias challenging them.
This context suggests the recent momentum in Egyptian Turkish relations is not a sudden development. It has formed within a shifting regional landscape since 7 October 2023. From this perspective, Israel’s heightened unease about strengthening Egyptian Turkish ties now becomes more intelligible, especially as the same concern did not appear as sharply when relations resumed in 2022, when the Egyptian and Turkish presidents shook hands on the sidelines of the FIFA World Cup opening in Qatar.
Today’s Israeli concern stems from a broader regional picture in which competitors have split into two directions. One side has begun showing significant reservations about expanding Israeli power following blows to Iran and its allies, which opened space for what the article described as unchecked Israeli aggression. The other still bets on deepening cooperation with Tel Aviv and benefiting from alliance with it.
Accordingly, Egyptian Turkish rapprochement over the past two years, the formation of a strong relationship between Cairo and Ankara, and understandings that also include Saudi Arabia, all come in the context of strengthening a bloc opposing Israel’s expansionist ambitions in the region. Those ambitions include seeking decisive influence in reshaping its Arab neighbourhood in Lebanon and Syria, and direct impact on the Yemen and Somalia files.
A Rapprochement Accelerated in 2024
The latest wave of rapprochement began with President Erdogan’s arrival in Cairo in February 2024, his first visit of that kind since 2012. It was followed by President el Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September of the same year, alongside multiple meetings between the two leaders in international and regional settings. Repeated bilateral meetings in 2024 led to the signing of 17 memoranda of understanding. The two states also agreed to coordinate on regional issues and launched a high level strategic cooperation council that was reactivated during Erdogan’s most recent visit to Cairo.
The year 2024 thus marked a decisive turn in strengthening Egyptian-Turkish ties and setting aside earlier disputes. The article argues that the repercussions of the Al Aqsa Flood operation and Israel’s war on Gaza played a major role in pushing relations this far, as both countries’ positions largely aligned. Israel’s shift towards using hard power across its Arab surroundings, backed by unprecedented American support, also alarmed Cairo and Ankara, both of which share long borders and complex ties connected to Palestine and Syria. That dynamic contributed to a growing sense in both capitals that cooperation was the best path to secure national interests.
Military Cooperation and Israeli Anxiety
The arms and security file has been the most prominent track in the development of Egyptian-Turkish relations over the past two years, and it is also the most unsettling for Israel. Turkey previously agreed to supply Egypt with Bayraktar TB2 drones, described as among the best combat drones globally. In August last year, Egypt joined the development project for Turkey’s fifth-generation stealth fighter “Kaan”. Later, Cairo and Ankara signed an agreement to produce the “Turkha” drone locally in Egypt through a partnership between the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation and Turkey’s HAVELSAN. The drone is designed for surveillance and intelligence gathering. Officials in both countries described the agreement as a step and a foundation for broader military-industrial partnerships between Egypt and Turkey.
At the time, the Hebrew language newspaper Maariv warned that Egyptian-Turkish military cooperation had entered a dangerous and unprecedented phase. It said the cooperation was troubling Israeli security circles because it could affect Israel’s air superiority in the region, noting that Egypt is not only importing ready-made systems but is entering the field of military aviation manufacturing.
In parallel, joint exercises between Turkish and Egyptian special forces were held in Ankara in April 2025. Later that year, joint naval drills resumed under the name “Sea of Friendship” in September 2025 after a 13-year pause. Those drills included naval units, fighter aircraft, and special forces.
These agreements and exercises paved the way for President Erdogan’s most recent visit to Cairo, a pivotal moment in the relationship. During that visit, rapprochement appeared at its peak. The Egyptian president welcomed his Turkish counterpart alongside his wife. The two leaders announced their intention to raise bilateral trade volume to 15 billion dollars by 2028, compared to roughly 9 billion dollars in 2025. More importantly, the visit included agreements with Turkish companies to produce drones and build a facility to manufacture long-range artillery ammunition for the Egyptian army, alongside military deals including the export of the Turkish air defence system “Tulga”.
Former Egyptian assistant foreign minister Ambassador Ali al Ashmawy was quoted in previous remarks to Al Jazeera Mubasher saying that what occurred during the visit, and the clear alignment of views between Egypt and Turkey, alongside Saudi Arabia, could move beyond economic cooperation towards a strategic alliance among the three states. He suggested it could open the path to what he described as an “Arab Islamic NATO”, especially if Pakistan, with its strong relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey and its nuclear arsenal, were to join.
From Washington to Mogadishu
One of Israel’s biggest fears regarding emerging Egyptian-Turkish cooperation is that, if it stabilises, this axis would possess a broader political reach than the “Iranian axis”. While Iran’s relationship with the United States is defined by hostility, both Ankara and Cairo maintain positive relations with Washington under Donald Trump’s administration. Trump had previously told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in front of the media that his relationship with Erdogan is excellent and that Netanyahu should find a way to deal with him.
Trump has also repeatedly expressed admiration for President el-Sisi. In effect, the article argues, if Egyptian-Turkish understandings solidify, it will not be easy for Tel Aviv to mobilise the United States against them in the way it does against Iran. This axis could use its influence in Washington to obstruct Israeli policies in the region, especially amid the rise of a wing within the MAGA movement that is increasingly critical of those policies and of the influence of the “Israeli lobby” inside Trump’s base.
At another level, deepening Egyptian-Turkish relations at this moment lays groundwork for coordinating efforts on Somalia, a file Israel is portrayed as seeking to extend influence into. At the end of last year, Tel Aviv announced official recognition of what is called the “Republic of Somaliland” as an independent sovereign state, becoming the first UN member state to do so. Egypt and Turkey rejected this move and condemned the Israeli position.
The article argues that Israel likely seeks two goals through this recognition. The first is establishing a military base in Somaliland, positioned directly opposite Yemen. The second is competing with Turkey’s influence, as Turkey already has a military base in the Federal Republic of Somalia. With Egyptian-Turkish ties rising, Israel’s efforts in the area would face significant resistance, as it would be confronting two aligned rivals united around respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial unity, a position also supported by Saudi Arabia.
In response to these shifts, Israel is portrayed as attempting to manoeuvre by strengthening its alliance with Greece, Turkey’s traditional rival in the eastern Mediterranean. With Cairo and Ankara drawing closer, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz visited Athens seeking to enhance military relations with Greece, which began with economic cooperation in eastern Mediterranean gas extraction more than 15 years ago.
During the visit, Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias announced cooperation with Israel to develop technologies to counter drone threats. Katz, in a veiled message, said Israel and Greece would ally to “deter those who dream of taking the region backwards and building empires”. Some analysts viewed the visit and statements as an indirect message aimed specifically at Egypt and Turkey: Israel recognises the risks posed by their emerging alignment and intends to confront it through all available means.
