In recent weeks, the issue of disarming the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip has resurfaced repeatedly. At times, it has appeared as an Israeli condition for implementing the second phase of the agreement. At other times, it has been presented as a binding obligation by US President Donald Trump. In certain Palestinian, Arab and regional circles, it has also been framed as an attempt to remove what are described as pretexts for the resumption of war.
Trump’s Plan and the Question of Arms
Hamas agreed to President Trump’s plan in what could be described as a conditional manner. It fully accepted the first phase, which included a ceasefire, the release of prisoners and the entry of humanitarian aid. However, it left the heavy political files linked to the resistance and the Palestinian cause to a negotiation track and to what it termed “Palestinian national consensus”.
Despite this, Trump portrayed the position as full approval of his proposed “peace plan”. On his social media accounts, he praised what he described as an end to the war with no return, and declared the beginning of a new era of peace in the region through his efforts.
Hamas and other Palestinian factions fully complied with the requirements of the first phase. The movement exerted exceptional efforts to locate and return the bodies of occupation soldiers after handing over living prisoners. It halted fire entirely from its side and, with limited exceptions, refrained from responding to Israeli violations, which included the killing of hundreds of civilians and the assassination of senior resistance leaders.
In contrast, the occupation authorities did not commit to reopening crossings. Delays continued for an extended period, followed by the partial and conditional reopening of the Rafah crossing under strict control, accompanied by harsh treatment of returning residents. Israeli violations persisted, alongside an expansion of occupied zones within Gaza rather than a withdrawal in line with the plan’s provisions.
Nevertheless, official US statements consistently praised the implementation of the agreement and the “peace that prevailed”, while repeatedly emphasising Palestinian obligations, foremost among them the handover of weapons, without even mentioning Israeli violations.
This reflects that the plan was built from the outset on criminalising the Palestinian resistance and partnering with the occupation in shaping a settlement track. Indicators of this include repeated Trump Netanyahu meetings before the plan’s announcement and prior to the second phase, provisions that position the occupying state as a partner in decisive decisions concerning Gaza, and Netanyahu’s membership in the Peace Council, despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide, where he may be represented by another individual.
Thus, the first phase concluded without full implementation, at least with regard to the occupation’s commitments. As the second phase begins, Netanyahu conditions its execution on the disarmament of the resistance, while Trump threatens to grant him renewed freedom of action to resume the war on Gaza if Hamas refuses to surrender its weapons.
The High Representative of the Peace Council, Nikolay Mladenov, known for his close ties to Netanyahu, also stated that what is required is the “disarmament of all armed groups in Gaza” and that “there is no other option”.
Scenarios
The US administration seeks to frame Israeli conditions for disarmament as an international demand and a central pillar of Trump’s plan, which it claims Hamas has approved and must therefore implement. Media coverage increasingly portrays the issue as a pressing obligation, leaving little room for alternative debate.
As expected, Hamas and all Palestinian resistance factions consider disarmament a red line for principled, moral, national and religious reasons, as well as for practical considerations. The movement has attempted to present alternative approaches acceptable to the American side, submitting proposals to guarantor states, which reportedly expressed understanding.
In general, discussions revolve around matters of form, such as burial or freezing of weapons, timing, such as after the deployment of a stabilisation force, method, such as transfer to a local or regional party, and gradual steps, beginning with heavy weapons. Hamas is urged to “commit” to disarmament based on “international guarantees” that aggression will not recur, that aid will enter, and that the occupation will withdraw, despite widespread awareness that the international community has proven incapable of enforcing such guarantees.
For two years, the international community failed to halt what has been described as genocide, failed to ensure adequate humanitarian aid, failed to open crossings, and failed to prevent the deliberate targeting of starving civilians seeking scarce assistance allowed in limited quantities and turned into deadly traps by occupation forces.
After the ceasefire announcement, the same international community did not succeed in halting Israeli violations, particularly mass killings and assassinations, nor in compelling Israel to open crossings, allow aid, or cease expanding its presence inside Gaza.
Today, the actor effectively determining Gaza’s fate is the US administration. Its role during the war on Gaza and across the region, its continued coordination with Netanyahu’s government, its acceptance of what Israel terms “freedom of action”, and repeated threats of renewed mass violence all remain clear.
History offers numerous examples of parties that placed their fate in international guarantees, only to see their causes weakened or extinguished. In contrast, liberation movements have traditionally relied on their own sources of strength, including arms, popular support and alliances.
What Is Required
Hamas and the broader Palestinian arena understand that the demand is not merely technical disarmament, but rather the criminalisation of resistance in thought and action, followed by stripping it of all sources of power, portraying it as having surrendered, and leaving Palestinians exposed to the occupation as an “easy victim”, as described by Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal at the Doha Forum.
While rejecting the principle of disarmament, Meshaal presented what he termed a “guarantees approach”, reportedly discussed with the three guarantor states. It rests on the premise that the threat originates from the occupation, not from Gaza, and that Gaza’s priorities are humanitarian aid, recovery and reconstruction, not launching attacks in the foreseeable future. It also includes ideas such as a long term truce and the guarantor states, Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, acting as sponsors to ensure Palestinian compliance.
Even so, the issue should be rejected on principled grounds. The priority in Gaza today is halting Israeli violations and compelling the occupation to fulfil its obligations under the agreement, foremost among them reopening crossings, allowing aid and initiating reconstruction.
Only after that should political tracks be addressed. As long as the occupation persists in violations, prevents the administrative committee from entering Gaza, and Netanyahu states that “a ceasefire does not mean refraining from doing what must be done” in the Strip, raising the issue of weapons becomes pressure on Palestinians and an implicit repetition of the American Israeli narrative that danger comes from Gaza rather than being directed against it.
The correct and safer course is to refuse allowing the occupation to impose its agenda, and to consistently redirect political and media discourse to the root of the problem: the occupation, not the resistance; violations, not weapons; Israel, not the Palestinians. Any agreement built solely on force without logic is destined to fail like its predecessors.
Historical experience suggests that movements which relinquish their means of strength before the end of occupation risk losing both leverage and cause. The prevailing logic and the lessons of history maintain that weapons remain in hand until occupation ends and a sovereign state is established under an internal national equation.
The argument of removing the occupation’s “pretexts” is addressed by Netanyahu himself, who stated on the fifteenth of this month that “no heavy weapons remain in Gaza”, claiming that the heavy weapon today is the Kalashnikov, of which there are 60,000 in Gaza and all must be handed over.
This statement alone illustrates not only the occupation’s lack of seriousness but also the gradual escalation of demands in coordination with Washington regarding disarmament.
The New York Times reported that a forthcoming US proposal would focus on scheduling disarmament, beginning with weapons “capable of striking Israel”, without specifying their characteristics, in exchange for permitting “some light weapons”. This implies that later stages would condition progress on surrendering all weapons incrementally.
It is expected that classifications by Netanyahu’s government will shift from the Kalashnikov to even lower thresholds, deepening manoeuvres around ceasefire implementation and continuing pressure on the Palestinian resistance.
As is clear, the occupation’s core objective is not military or security based, but primarily political. It seeks to cement the narrative that the events of 7 October were a mistake to be regretted, and ultimately erased from Palestinian memory and from those who support their cause.
