The magazine The National Interest published a report examining rapid shifts in Saudi Arabia’s position towards the Israeli occupation and the direct implications for American calculations aimed at strengthening ties with Riyadh. The report argues that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stepping away from the path of normalisation compels Washington to reassess its broader Middle East approach.
According to the magazine, whose report was translated by Arabi21, Mohammed bin Salman chose to distance himself from normalisation with the Israeli occupation, as well as from broader regional alignment with Washington, despite a series of political, military, and economic incentives offered by the United States.
The report notes that shared concerns over Iran’s regional ambitions had, in recent years, driven an undeclared rapprochement between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. This took the form of limited regional coordination and generated American and Israeli hopes that it could evolve into full normalisation.
It adds that Saudi normalisation with the occupation was viewed as the culmination of a series of regional shifts following the events of 7 October 2023, which resulted in the killing of 1,200 Israelis. The magazine argues that the occupation’s wide-ranging military response did not target Gaza alone, but also weakened Iran and several of its allies within what is known as the resistance axis, including Hezbollah and Hamas. According to the report, this produced indirect security benefits for both Saudi Arabia and the Israeli occupation by reducing the level of Iranian military threat.
The report points out that the Middle East remains in a state of ongoing strategic fluidity, where alliances form and dissolve in response to emerging threats, while prospects for long-term stability recede amid the ambitions of major regional actors. This, the magazine says, applies to Saudi relations with the occupation, as Riyadh and Tel Aviv are no longer on the normalisation track that appeared possible before 7 October.
It notes that the Saudi crown prince has recently issued sharp public criticism of the occupation’s conduct and has begun shaping a new regional bloc aimed at counterbalancing the growing alignment between the occupation and the United Arab Emirates.
The magazine considers this shift to have strategic implications extending beyond Tel Aviv to Washington itself. US President Donald Trump had been counting on Saudi-Israeli normalisation as a gateway to expanding the Abraham Accords and drawing additional Arab states into them.
It recalls that Trump remained optimistic over the past year about achieving a breakthrough with Riyadh, lavishing praise on Mohammed bin Salman while offering, in return, a broad package of military and economic concessions. In November, the US administration approved a potential deal to sell up to 48 advanced F-35 stealth aircraft and around 300 tanks to Saudi Arabia, alongside agreements to expand trade ties and ease restrictions on mutual investments.
However, the report argues that Saudi Arabia’s recent moves require Washington to pause and reconsider these commitments, including the F 35 deal, which still requires congressional approval and would not be implemented for several years.
The magazine notes that the Israeli occupation has previously expressed concern that the Saudi acquisition of these aircraft could undermine its qualitative military edge. Washington has long sought to reassure Tel Aviv on this point, but rising tensions between Riyadh and Tel Aviv may bring these concerns back to the forefront more forcefully.
The report explains that Mohammed bin Salman has, at least publicly, tied any normalisation with the occupation to tangible steps towards advancing the establishment of a Palestinian state. Yet the broader strategic distancing from Tel Aviv appears, according to the magazine, to be driven by internal considerations and deeper regional developments.
Domestically, the crown prince faces reservations from factions within the ruling family who view the occupation as a competitor rather than a partner. He also confronts opposition from religious currents that continue to adopt a hostile discourse, as well as from a wide segment of Saudi youth who hold the occupation primarily responsible for the massacres that followed the October 2023 events.
The magazine further suggests that bin Salman views the regional landscape differently today, perceiving Iran as weaker than before. This reduces Riyadh’s need for the military umbrella that rapprochement with the occupation once provided.
Conversely, Tel Aviv appears, through its efforts to target Hamas leaders outside Palestine and its attempts to influence post-Assad arrangements in Syria, to be pursuing its own hegemonic ambitions. This has raised concerns within the Saudi leadership.
The report stresses that this shift did not emerge solely from the October events. Riyadh had already been laying the groundwork for a broader regional realignment before that. In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced the resumption of diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture. This track has demonstrated a degree of resilience, culminating in a visit by the Saudi defence minister to Tehran in April, where he met senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
As it distances itself from the Israeli occupation, Saudi Arabia is, according to the magazine, moving towards confronting the occupation’s closest regional partner, the United Arab Emirates, in what it describes as a fundamental shift in the balance of power. It notes that Riyadh, which backs Yemen’s internationally recognised government, has carried out strikes in recent weeks against Yemeni factions supported by Abu Dhabi, signalling an escalation in competition between the two sides.
The report adds that Saudi Arabia is also working to curb growing Emirati influence near the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, while expanding its alliance network by strengthening security cooperation with Egypt and Somalia, and deepening ties with Türkiye.
It notes that Ankara’s efforts to join a defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia with Pakistan in September, which includes a collective defence clause similar to Article Five of the NATO charter, could lead to the emergence of a Saudi-Turkish axis with a collective defence structure. This axis would be implicitly oriented against both the Israeli occupation and the United Arab Emirates.
The magazine concludes that American bets on deepening partnership with Riyadh and securing Saudi normalisation with the Israeli occupation are colliding with the internal challenges facing Mohammed bin Salman, as well as with his regional ambitions, which now extend beyond traditional American calculations.
