No one expected that protests which began peacefully in Iran in late December of last year would be exploited and escalated in a way that placed the Middle East on the brink of a regional war with potentially devastating consequences. As preparations, warnings, and rhetorical escalation continue between the United States, which has entered the line of the internal crisis, and Iran, this article examines Tehran’s potential preparations and plans for what may be the most decisive confrontation in its history and in the history of the region.
No one anticipated that protests which began peacefully in Iran in late December would be instrumentalised and intensified to the point of pushing the Middle East to the edge of a regional conflict with severe and destructive outcomes.
As preparations, warnings, and verbal confrontations persist between the United States and Iran, we attempt to shed light on Tehran’s possible readiness and strategic planning for an encounter that could prove the most decisive in both Iranian and regional history.
The protests and their escalation
The protests began peacefully on 28 December, initiated by a number of traders from the Grand Bazaar in the capital, Tehran, following the steady deterioration of the country’s economy and the serious loss in value of the Iranian national currency against the US dollar. These protests quickly spread to rural areas and escalated into acts of violence, particularly in Iran’s western provinces. The violence then reached the capital on 8 and 9 January.
In response, the Iranian authorities cut internet access and telephone communications across the country in an effort to contain the protest movement that had affected Tehran and other cities on 8 and 9 January.
The American president intervened early, declaring during the initial days of the protests that the United States would strike Iran forcefully if protesters were killed.
Following the intervention of the Iranian authorities, the demonstrations subsided and the streets calmed. Nevertheless, Western media outlets and Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, claimed that between 12,000 and 20,000 people were killed following the intervention of Iranian security forces.
The insistence of Western and Israeli media on publishing what were described as exaggerated casualty figures was viewed as an attempt to encourage the American president to attack Iran and to pressure him to fulfil his stated threat. President Trump stated that he had been presented with vastly differing figures regarding the number of deaths and that he was assessing the matter.
By contrast, Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that a total of 3,117 people lost their lives during the recent events, including 2,427 members of the security forces and ordinary civilians.
Although protests and violence in Iran have currently ended, the country has not returned to normal, as the possibility of an American attack has not completely disappeared.
The United States prepares
American officials announced that President Donald Trump had sent an aircraft carrier to the region in preparation for a possible decision to attack Iran.
The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States had deployed combat aircraft to the region and that an aircraft carrier was en route. According to the report, US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets landed in Jordan on 18 January, and the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln was advancing towards the Arabian Gulf with a strike group that included destroyers, F-35 aircraft, and electronic warfare planes.
The newspaper quoted officials stating that President Trump was evaluating military options against Iran.
On the other hand, according to information reflected in American media, there was more than one reason behind President Trump’s last-minute decision to refrain from launching a military strike against Iran the previous week.
According to Axios, the Washington administration conducted an assessment concluding that current military capabilities were insufficient for a large-scale attack on Iran and for managing the potential responses that could follow.
As reflected in reports from US-based media and statements by American officials, President Trump has not entirely abandoned the military option against Iran. The US military is working to address its operational gaps in preparation for a comprehensive attack and to prevent potential counter-attacks from Iran.
President Trump answered “no” when asked by a reporter whether the military option was off the table.
Speaking in Davos, Trump said: “Iran wants to talk, and we will talk too.”
He later told journalists aboard his aircraft on the return journey from Davos: “We are watching Iran. We have many ships heading in that direction in case of any scenario. We have a massive fleet heading there, but perhaps we will not need to use it. We will see.”
The senior military adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, General Rahim Safavi, commented on the recent tensions and the increased likelihood of military intervention by stating: “We are preparing for the final war with Israel. The next war will determine the fate of the conflict.”
The Iranian side is also convinced that the United States will attack Iran and is preparing to repel such an assault. Two informed sources close to the Iranian administration stated that Iran believes an American attack could take place in early February and is structuring its preparations accordingly.
While President Trump continues to make statements oscillating between negotiation and attack, the Pentagon is carrying out a significant military build-up in the Middle East. It can therefore be said that the military option remains firmly on the table.
It can be concluded that the Iranian system is making all of its preparations based on worst-case scenarios.
A multi-front war
Two internal scenarios are considered likely in Iran in the event of a US attack.
Scenario one
If the United States launches a comprehensive and powerful attack on Iran, simultaneous uprisings within the country may begin. In this case, separatist terrorist organisations in western and southern Iran, individuals close to the Mujahedin-e Khalq organisation, and supporters of the Pahlavi family in many cities, including Tehran, are expected to take to the streets. It is also suggested that Mossad elements operating inside Iran would play an active role in this process.
Scenario two
Alternatively, in the face of American attacks, and as occurred during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, forces supportive of the system, secular segments of society, the reformist wing, tribes, and various other social structures may oppose the foreign attack and support the Iranian administration.
In this scenario, terrorist organisations and separatist movements may refrain from street mobilisation. If strong public backing forms behind the administration against the foreign attack, these groups and Pahlavi supporters may choose not to mobilise, given the likelihood that street actions would fail to achieve their objectives.
How would the system defend itself internally?
It can be said that the Iranian system is preparing for the worst-case scenario, including a joint American and Israeli attack coinciding with violent internal uprisings.
Iran’s strongest response to external attacks lies in its ballistic and hypersonic missile technology and its unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities. It is understood that Iran would respond to multi-front attacks by the United States and Israel by targeting American bases and striking strategic sites in Israel.
However, an armed rebellion erupting inside the country alongside a US and Israeli attack would draw Iran into a critical, complex, and multi-layered war process with serious risks.
In such a scenario, the most effective force Iran would employ to suppress internal rebellion would be the Basij forces affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
What is the structure of the Basij?
The Basij was established in 1979 as a voluntary militia organisation by order of Ayatollah Khomeini. It played a highly active role during the Iran-Iraq war, with Basij members accounting for 39.2 per cent of Iranian fatalities in that conflict.
The Basij is regarded as a defensive organisation against both internal and external threats. Its mission is to train the population within the framework of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution and to keep society aligned with the axis of resistance. In this context, the organisation reportedly has around 20 million members nationwide.
Every new Basij member receives military and ideological training. More importantly, the Basij prepares the population for resistance and neighbourhood defence.
The organisation is structured across the entire country. Cities are divided into resistance zones according to size and population density, with multiple resistance neighbourhoods established within each zone.
Each resistance neighbourhood is further divided into resistance stations, each containing organised groups whose size varies according to the station. Basij centres exist in universities, schools, factories, villages, mosques, and residential areas. The strongest Basij bases are located throughout the country, particularly in Tehran.
In neighbourhoods and villages, these centres are often located inside or near mosques and are commonly named after those mosques.
According to IRGC recruitment regulations, the Basij is divided into three groups: basic Basij members, active Basij members, and special Basij members.
Basic Basij members participate in various activities after receiving short-term military, ideological, and political training. Active members continue working with the IRGC and undergo advanced training after completing the basic programme. Special members are those deemed by their superiors to possess the ideological and military capability required for specific responsibilities within the IRGC.
Special members receive permanent salaries, while others do not receive regular pay but benefit from various privileges.
The military structure of the Basij
The Basij maintains numerous military headquarters, where activities are not limited to military functions but also include planning and implementing social and cultural programmes.
Imam al-Hadi Headquarters
Established in 2012 by order of Ayatollah Khamenei and named after the tenth Imam, this headquarters is responsible for providing military training to Basij members and planning military exercises, with branches across the country.
Ashura Battalion
Operating under the Imam al-Hadi Headquarters, the Ashura Battalion is active in the provinces and serves as the structure that brings men over the age of 15 under the Basij umbrella. Its duties include securing and monitoring gatherings and providing assistance in emergencies. In recent years, it has expanded into social, political, and cultural projects and has also become active in countering cyber attacks.
The battalion is known for its extensive involvement in soft power activities, with its primary objective being the suppression of uprisings and street protests. It gained prominence for its role in suppressing opposition demonstrations in the early 1990s. Past unrest in cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Qazvin played a significant role in its formation. In 2015, the number of its headquarters nationwide was estimated at around 4,200. It includes high-ranking Basij members assigned to special duties and trained for deployment to Imam Ali and Imam Hussein battalions.
Zahra Battalion
The Zahra Battalion is one of the most significant Basij units focused on women. It was established to integrate women over the age of 15 into the Basij structure and was estimated to have 1,800 centres nationwide in 2015.
It operates in social, cultural, political, and soft power domains and also participates in Basij military manoeuvres across various fields.
Bayt al-Maqdis Battalion
Among its tasks is the suppression of civil demonstrations across the country, responding according to the trajectory of protest movements. It is also responsible for securing cities and villages, with counter-insurgency manoeuvres forming part of its major exercises.
Members of the Bayt al-Maqdis Battalion are considered more loyal to the Islamic Republic than those of the Ashura Battalion. The unit reportedly operates around 1,500 military centres nationwide.
Imam Ali Battalion
Established in 2011, this battalion was tasked with countering security threats. It is regarded as the most important Basij unit in suppressing uprisings and addressing security threats, possessing full decision-making authority in emergencies. Its duties include securing strategic buildings and offices, and since 2017 it has operated around 180 units within IRGC headquarters across the country.
Imam Hussein Battalion
This battalion is tasked with countering foreign invasion and security threats. It operates in 500 locations nationwide and maintains a more independent structure than other units, conducting frequent military exercises against external threats. Its members are professional soldiers, and it has organised and deployed many volunteer militias that fought in Syria.
Kowsar Battalion
The Kowsar Battalion consists exclusively of women and is tasked with providing support in maintaining urban security. It plays an active role in suppressing uprisings during periods of unrest and has a structure similar to the Bayt al-Maqdis rapid intervention unit.
Basij communications network
The Basij uses a communications programme known as SHABAB, launched in 2011 to ensure fast and secure internal communication. It also operates a video messaging application called SAMT Center.
These systems are used for daily operations and routine communication, as well as to ensure rapid transmission of orders from top to bottom and swift organisation during exceptional circumstances.
During the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, the Basij played the most active role in maintaining state control of the streets and preventing attacks launched from within Iran. The SHABAB system played a critical role in enabling the Basij to assert control across all streets.
Salehin Circles Unit
Established in 2008 and rapidly organised following the Green Movement protests in 2009, this unit structures its members into circles divided by age groups: 7 to 11, 12 to 17, 18 to 29, 30 to 50, and over 50.
These groups meet periodically, typically after the evening prayer, to follow and analyse speeches and directives issued by Khamenei on current political issues. Assigned members disseminate messages to sectors such as markets, bazaars, and schools within their designated areas.
The expansion of these circles follows a hierarchical model. Members continuously monitor Khamenei’s speeches and guidance, take active roles in elections and pro-revolution gatherings, and participate in all IRGC programmes.
Members must complete a three-stage training process, with additional opportunities granted in the event of failure. Training includes reading works by prominent figures such as Motahhari, Qaraati, Shirazi, and Tabatabai.
Conclusion
The Basij emerges as a military and civil structure organised across the entire country. In addition to its military headquarters, it operates units engaged in economic, political, and cultural activities, as well as social initiatives such as reducing divorce rates.
Designed to operate from major cities to the most remote villages, the Basij is structured to respond rapidly during periods of internal unrest or in the event of external attack.
Should an uprising occur inside the country during a US and Israeli attack on Iran, the most critical responsibility would fall upon the Basij forces affiliated with the IRGC.
Accordingly, the existence of such a comprehensive organisational structure makes it extremely difficult for internal rebellion movements to achieve their objectives quickly.
During the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, this extensive Basij organisation enabled a rapid reduction in internal attacks from the second day of the conflict and facilitated the swift arrest of perpetrators. The conflict clearly demonstrated the Basij’s capacity to suppress internal attacks and uprisings.
Therefore, assessing Iran’s internal security measures solely through the police and military prevents a full understanding of the country’s internal security architecture. Iran’s internal security must be evaluated through the structure of the Basij, alongside the police and the armed forces.
