On 14 January, US envoy Witkoff announced the launch of the second phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan concerning the Gaza Strip. Two days later, Trump himself announced the formation of a “Peace Council”.
On the sidelines of the Davos Forum on 22 January, Trump inaugurated the Peace Council with the participation of representatives from 21 of the 35 countries that agreed to take part, after invitations had been extended to more than 60 states. Most participants came from Arab and Islamic countries and the Global South, notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan. European countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council were almost entirely absent. This coincided with the announcement of a technocratic committee tasked with administering the Gaza Strip during the current phase.
Despite the existence of real obstacles to the declared path, including Israeli objections to the membership of Turkey and Qatar in the council, difficulties in forming an international stabilisation force, and the occupation’s obstruction of the technocratic committee’s entry into Gaza, participating states, led by the United States, announced without ambiguity the commencement of the second phase of Trump’s plan, backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803.
In terms of context, discourse, and signalling, there are grounds to assess the announced council within a broader international framework, not only in relation to Gaza. This includes Trump’s suggestion that it could potentially “replace the United Nations”, which contributed to European and international reservations about participating in the council. Trump later attempted to clarify this by referring to “coordination with the United Nations”. However, this article focuses specifically on the Palestinian dimension.
Here, a significant and undeniable reality must be acknowledged. The first phase has ended and its page has been turned, yet it was not implemented, or more precisely, the obligations required of the occupation were not fulfilled. The resistance handed over all living captives and the remains of soldiers in its possession, made efforts to locate the final body, and adhered to the ceasefire. In contrast, the occupation implemented almost none of its corresponding obligations, except for an initial withdrawal from the so called yellow line, which it later modified.
Despite this, American statements have suggested that the first phase was implemented with remarkable precision, encouraging optimism about what lies ahead. However, the substance of these statements reveals something more telling. Witkoff focused on the first phase having achieved a ceasefire, the return of detainees and most remains, and added what he described as the entry of “historic humanitarian aid”. Trump echoed this in both substance and tone, speaking of “record levels of humanitarian aid” allegedly entering Gaza during the first phase. This is widely known to be inaccurate, in addition to the fact that crossings were not opened and equipment necessary for clearing rubble and beginning infrastructure rehabilitation was not allowed in.
The key observation here is that American assessments did not address Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement, which exceeded one thousand incidents. These included bombardment, killings, assassinations, obstruction of aid entry, failure to open crossings, and the continued demolition and destruction.
This leads to the conclusion that the American vision of the plan, particularly in its second phase, rests on three main pillars. The first is the imposition of a ceasefire according to the American perspective, which does not differ greatly from the Israeli one. This means preventing a return to the previous pace of genocide while granting cover to all occupation violations, including the targeting of civilians.
The second pillar is the exclusive focus on and monitoring of the Palestinian side. There is little attention, let alone criticism, directed at Israeli violations, contrasted with occasional American voices alleging breaches by Hamas and Palestinian factions. This reflects a deliberate assessment framework rather than a mere oversight.
The third pillar is the emphasis on what is demanded of the Palestinian side in the second phase, without addressing the obligations of the occupying power. Trump’s Davos speech focused on the second phase as a “comprehensive agreement to disarm Hamas” and on what he described as obligations required of it, including “returning the final body to Israel”. He made no reference to any obligations on the occupation, including withdrawal. Witkoff had earlier framed the second phase as a transition from a ceasefire to disarmament, the establishment of a Palestinian technocratic administration, and the launch of reconstruction.
If this indicates that the implementation, or rather the non implementation, of the second phase will not differ from the first, with no expected guarantees of change, it is important to recall the core philosophy underpinning Trump’s plan from the outset. It aimed to help Netanyahu descend from the tree, easing the international pressure he faced by creating the illusion of a path towards calm, settlement, and peace, while fundamentally criminalising the Palestinians. Netanyahu, the perpetrator of genocide and wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, was thus a partner in the plan, not its target nor merely a party to it. Accordingly, while Trump compelled Netanyahu on the timing and scope of the ceasefire, he does not differ from him, either personally or as a state, on the long term war objectives, which primarily concern Palestinian resistance.
Today, the American and Israeli demand is to advance the plan with Hamas and despite Hamas at the same time. This means maintaining temporary engagement with it in order to ultimately remove it entirely from governing Gaza, strip it of all weapons, hand over its tunnels, and potentially even exile its leaders and cadres. All of this is pursued through constant threats of severe punishment and the opening of “hell” upon it, including restoring the green light for the previous pace of genocide if it does not comply. This is already occurring through overwhelming American force and an unprecedented network of official Arab and Islamic support.
The goal of the American plan, as was clear from the outset and later confirmed, is the liquidation of the resistance to secure complete calm for Israel and eliminate any threat to it, the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, and the resumption of Israel’s integration into the region through the Abraham Accords or similar arrangements. This can be described as an updated or developed version of the Deal of the Century, or Deal of the Century 2.
At the heart of this plan is the removal of the Gaza Strip from its Palestinian identity through internationalisation, and the creation of a new model designed to erase the model of resistance and Al Aqsa Flood in favour of a real estate, investment, and commercial model. This is accompanied by a narrative of a “culture of peace”, changes to education curricula, and the so called “combatting of hatred”.
It is important to recall Trump’s description of the technocratic committee governing Gaza, when he referred to it as a “Palestinian technocratic government”, not merely a committee. Its reference point is distant from Hamas, the factions, and even the Palestinian Authority itself. Its declared authority is the “High Representative of the Peace Council”, Nikolay Mladenov, which entrenches separation from the Palestinian political entity and imposes international trusteeship. Further reinforcing this point, the committee’s meeting was held at the US embassy in Cairo, not at the Palestinian embassy nor at any Egyptian institution.
Trump’s plan, particularly in its second phase, represents a path towards liquidating the Palestinian cause, ending the resistance, and consolidating Israeli dominance over the entire region. This is how it must be understood, and on this basis it must be confronted and addressed.
