Reports have recently intensified regarding the possibility of Turkey joining a joint defence agreement that brings together the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a move observers believe could reshape regional security balances in the Middle East and beyond.
According to a report by Bloomberg, talks between Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad have reached advanced stages, with a final agreement described as highly likely amid growing alignment in strategic interests among the three states.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the defence agreement in September 2025. It stipulates that any aggression against one of the two countries is to be considered an attack on the other, establishing a collective defence commitment similar to major alliances such as NATO. The agreement paves the way for a new security alignment that could alter long-standing regional calculations.
This mutual defence pledge emerged within a turbulent regional context. Days earlier, Israel carried out sudden air strikes on Doha, targeting leaders of Hamas. The year 2025 also witnessed a brief military confrontation between Pakistan and India that lasted four days in May, intensifying fears of a broader escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Within this climate, concerns have grown among Gulf states regarding the reliability of the United States as a security ally, particularly following Washington’s hesitation to respond to attacks on Gulf interests in recent years.
Turkey’s Motivations
Ankara’s pursuit of joining this defence alliance stems from several strategic considerations. Turkey, which possesses the second-largest army in NATO after the United States, feels compelled to reinforce its national security at a time when doubts are increasing over the commitment of traditional allies.
Analysts believe Ankara views the agreement as a platform to strengthen its deterrence capabilities amid questions surrounding the reliability of American support, especially under a US administration showing reluctance toward its Atlantic obligations, according to Bloomberg.
Defence rapprochement with Riyadh and Islamabad would also grant Ankara strategic depth within the Islamic world and provide an additional layer of security alongside the NATO umbrella. This aligns with Turkey’s ambition to play a leading role in the Muslim world.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has, in recent years, sought to repair Turkey’s relations with major regional powers, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, to diversify partnerships and enhance Ankara’s regional influence.
Accordingly, Turkey views joining the Saudi-Pakistani alliance as delivering a dual gain: strengthening ties with two major Islamic powers and sending an implicit message to the West that it possesses alternatives to bolster its security should traditional guarantees weaken.
From another angle, Turkey’s interests intersect with those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan across several regional files.
All three are keen on maintaining stability in Afghanistan and preventing a renewed collapse in security there.
They share caution regarding the expansion of Iranian influence in the region.
They hold relatively aligned political positions on issues such as supporting the rights of the Palestinian people.
What Does Turkey Add?
For Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Turkey’s potential accession represents a significant strategic gain that would enhance the weight of their emerging alliance. Ankara possesses substantial military capabilities and extensive operational experience within NATO, alongside a sophisticated defence industrial base producing everything from drones to warships. This assessment was highlighted by strategic researcher Nihat Ali Ozcan of the Ankara based TEPAV research centre.
Experts argue that integrating the Turkish military, trained to Western standards and technologically advanced, would raise the alliance’s readiness and increase its capacity for deterrence and manoeuvre.
Ozcan summarised this equation by stating that Saudi Arabia would provide financial power, Pakistan would supply nuclear capabilities, missiles, and ground forces, while Turkey would contribute its military expertise and advanced domestic defence industry.
Through this integration, the tripartite alliance would possess a rare combination that brings together funding, nuclear deterrence, and conventional military superiority within a single framework.
On the political level, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would also reap notable benefits from involving Turkey. For Riyadh, the potential agreement would reflect a new chapter in relations between two states that competed for decades over leadership of the Sunni world. It would support greater Saudi investment in Turkey and continued high level military cooperation. Turkey’s accession would also give Riyadh a heavyweight regional partner outside the traditional American umbrella. Additionally, the alliance could accelerate plans to localise military industries under Vision 2030 through technology transfer and domestic weapons manufacturing.
For Islamabad, the benefits would include enhanced international legitimacy through alliance with a NATO member, potentially curbing Western pressure. It would demonstrate that Pakistan is not isolated in its security arrangements. Turkey’s presence could deter India from any military adventurism, as New Delhi would be aware that Islamabad would not be confronting challenges alone. The alliance would also strengthen arms supply channels, as Ankara has become Pakistan’s second largest weapons supplier, accounting for 11 percent of Pakistan’s military imports in recent years.
Replacing Allies or Diversifying Partnerships?
This emerging alliance raises questions over whether it represents diversification of security support or a prelude to replacing old alliances.
In practice, it appears closer to a strategy of diversification and partner mobilisation rather than disengagement from historical allies. Saudi Arabia, for example, remains a key partner of Washington, with arms deals between the two countries reaching a record value of 142 billion dollars in May 2025.
At the same time, Riyadh is keen to build parallel security arrangements that reduce its absolute reliance on the American umbrella.
The erosion of confidence in the United States’ response during certain regional crises, such as the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, has convinced Gulf leaders that new partners may be necessary to ensure national security.
From this perspective, the alliance with Pakistan and Turkey can be understood as a move toward self insurance and risk distribution rather than total dependence on a single external ally.
Turkey, for its part, views the Riyadh Islamabad alliance as a qualitative shift in its foreign policy, but does not present it as an alternative to NATO. Ankara’s membership in the alliance has been a cornerstone of its strategy for decades. However, recent American policies, particularly under President Donald Trump’s administration, have demonstrated a cooling of commitment toward the alliance. As a result, Ankara has adopted a pragmatic approach by strengthening security relations within its regional sphere without abandoning the West.
It can therefore be said that Turkey is seeking the best of both worlds: a Western alliance linking it to Europe and the United States through NATO, and a new Islamic regional alliance connecting it with two of the most influential Muslim states.
This approach grants decision makers in Ankara broader options and greater room for manoeuvre in dealing with crises, while sending an implicit message to traditional allies that Turkey possesses strategic alternatives should it feel marginalised within the Western system.
