A wave of protests erupted in Iran, starting in the bazaar, before spreading across the country within days, driven by a 21 per cent rise in the US dollar exchange rate in December and an inflation rate estimated at around 43 per cent over the past year, according to figures from the central bank.
These demonstrations quickly moved beyond economic demands to political demands touching the very existence of Iran’s political system. They were accompanied by acts of violence against public institutions and clashes with security forces and police, resulting in the deaths of around 109 personnel, according to the Iranian Tasnim News Agency as of 11 January, with more than 270 injured according to official sources.
At the same time, the Human Rights Activists News Agency, based in the United States, reported the killing of 116 Iranians and the arrest of more than 2,600 others.
A Trojan Horse and Claims of Solidarity With the Iranian People
This is not the first wave of protests Iran has witnessed in recent years. In September 2022, the country saw widespread social protests following the death of Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the morality police over issues related to the hijab. Earlier protests also erupted over fuel price increases in 2019 and over shortages of fresh water in 2018 and again in 2025.
This time, however, the protests appear different. They have been more organised and faster to spread since their launch on 28 December, with their ceiling quickly shifting from livelihood demands caused by the economic crisis and the US imposed blockade to calls directly targeting the political system.
Here lies a point of contention among observers and within Iran itself. Some view the demonstrations as a natural matter and a legitimate right of the Iranian people, who have endured decades of economic decline, the devaluation of the local currency against foreign currencies, and the government’s failure to resolve accumulated economic problems and deficiencies in public services.
Others argue that while livelihood protests are legitimate, they deviated from their peaceful course and demands for improving living conditions and an economy weakened by the US blockade. This deviation, they say, occurred due to the involvement of local groups backed by external actors, inciting the Iranian public against the system and calling for its overthrow. Supporters of this view cite several arguments.
First, violence by some protesters against security forces, police, and public institutions aimed to provoke the authorities into using force, thereby stripping the scene of its peaceful nature and inciting the wider public against the system. Casualty figures are cited as evidence.
Second, Israel has been among the most prominent inciters against the Iranian system and supporters of its overthrow, a goal it pursued unsuccessfully during its most recent war against Iran in June 2025. It found an opportunity in riding the current protest wave to advance its unchanged political objectives. During his recent visit to Washington at the end of December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed scenarios for a new military strike on Tehran to complete the destruction of Iran’s nuclear project and its hypersonic ballistic missile systems, which had played a decisive role in halting the Israeli attack on Iran.
Third, the direct role of the United States in inciting protesters to continue their demonstrations, despite the violence directed at the system. This includes statements by US President Donald Trump, who said that Iran is seeking freedom and that the United States is ready to help in that regard. He also threatened the Iranian system by saying that if protesters were fired upon, the United States would respond forcefully, stating that if they began killing people, the response would be severe. These statements are viewed as providing US cover for protesters to escalate violence against the system, state institutions, and security services.
This incitement or interference in Iranian affairs comes in the context of what Washington has already done by violating Venezuela’s sovereignty and abducting its president Nicolás Maduro, seizing control over oil resources and political decision making. This has made Trump’s threats appear more serious than ever.
These positions pushed Iranian officials, the Iranian military, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council to accuse Israel and the United States of responsibility for inciting protesters for political reasons. This marked a shift from the initial position of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who in the early days attributed the protests to economic and livelihood causes, away from Washington.
It thus became justified, from this perspective, to question the conduct and objectives of segments of protesters who adopted violence against the system and state institutions, and to attribute this to external interventions described as hostile to Iran and the interests of the Iranian people.
The United States is seen as selective in its positions and as having exceeded the standards of international law, particularly when compared with its unlimited support for Israel’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza, its violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty and detention of President Maduro, its political and economic interference in internal affairs, and its threats to seize Denmark’s Greenland island by military force.
The US administration, through its aggressive posture, and the Israeli occupation through its arrogance, indicate that their positions on the protests in Iran are purely political. They are not driven by concern for the Iranian people, but by hostility towards the system and its policies that fall outside the American and Zionist framework, regardless of claims about human rights and public freedoms. They use the legitimate reformist and livelihood demands of the Iranian people as a Trojan horse to penetrate the Iranian situation and steer it solely according to their own interests.
Preemptive War and the Question of Who Strikes First
Since the Israeli aggression against Iran halted after the twelve day war in June 2025, the scenario of renewed war against Iran has remained present, initiated by Israel with US partnership to complete the destruction of Iran’s nuclear project and ballistic missile systems.
Israel believes it has not settled its confrontation with Iran, nor secured deterrence. The survival of the Iranian system and its efforts to rebuild what was destroyed by the war are viewed as a renewed threat that disrupts Israel’s overwhelming regional superiority and obstructs its ambition to redraw the Middle East. This is compounded by Israel’s disputes with Turkey and other regional states that reject Israeli hegemony.
Iran has also not abandoned its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Israel accuses of rebuilding its military capabilities and fears its resurgence. This would represent a grave failure for Israel, the far right, and Netanyahu, who seeks to eliminate the occupation’s adversaries permanently.
In this context, Israel has treated the protests in Iran as an opportunity to be exploited to overthrow the system from within, sparing it the costs of a war against Iran. Accordingly, Israel is invested in fuelling the situation until it yields results.
Here, Iran’s perception of the danger of this trajectory becomes evident. If Tehran, prior to the protests, feared a surprise Israeli strike and prepared seriously for it, prompting Israel to send a message of reassurance via Moscow to avoid an Iranian preemptive strike, then how should Tehran respond amid protests and US Israeli efforts to topple its system.
In this context, Iran is expected to address the situation through several tracks.
First, economic and security handling of the protests by suppressing violent groups that attack police and public institutions and isolating them from peaceful demonstrations. The Iranian government has promised serious reforms to address inflation, the economy, and public services. This is the approach emphasised by President Pezeshkian in an effort to calm tensions and halt the protests.
Second, readiness for any external military intervention by Washington, Tel Aviv, or both. This includes fears that Washington may intervene under the pretext of supporting and protecting protesters, as threatened by Trump, or that Israel, with US backing, may strike sensitive sites in Iran to destroy what remains of the nuclear project and missile systems. Such a scenario would aim to pave the way for the collapse of the Iranian system and its reconfiguration according to US standards, distancing Iran from its alliances with Russia and China, and neutralising its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Ansar Allah in Yemen.
If Tehran succeeds in extinguishing the protests in the near term and restoring the situation with a package of economic and social reforms, this would deny Washington and Tel Aviv the opportunity.
However, if the protests persist, expand, and begin to threaten the system or pave the way for external military intervention according to Iranian assessments, it would not be unlikely for Iran to resort to a preemptive strike against Israel. Such a move would be intended to shift the situation forward, extinguish internal unrest through external confrontation, reshuffle the cards, and redefine equations of power and mutual deterrence.
In this context, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani stated that Israel is responsible for the current situation and that the country is in the midst of a war, with neither peace nor a ceasefire.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps affirmed that protecting the achievements of the revolution and the security of the country is a red line. This places Israel effectively within Iran’s sights, amid reports in US media and statements by White House officials that President Trump is seriously considering issuing authorisation for an attack on Iran.
