The United States sought to impose diplomatic pressure on Lebanon to accept its demands. Initially, these demands were limited to maintaining the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah and implementing the conditions stipulated within it. Hezbollah was asked to halt its attacks against Israel and to end its military presence south of the Litani River.
Over time, the United States expanded its demands toward Lebanon, adding new files to the table. After previously confining itself to calls for preserving the ceasefire, it began to demand the complete disarmament of Hezbollah, linking the provision of political and financial assistance to this condition.
This approach became particularly evident during the tenure of Morgan Ortagus, the first US diplomat formally tasked by President Donald Trump with managing the Lebanese file.
Ortagus, known for her pro-Israel positions and her overt interference in Lebanese affairs, publicly raised the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament. In May 2025, she declared that the party’s withdrawal from south of the Litani River was not sufficient, stressing the necessity of stripping it of all its weapons.
Her statements, described as lacking diplomatic tact, generated significant tension and caused a rupture in Beirut’s trust in Washington. As a result, President Trump decided to dismiss her and appoint Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria, in her place.
After assuming the Lebanese file, Tom Barrack quickly presented an official document to the Lebanese government containing a core demand: the disarmament of Hezbollah. On 7 August, the government announced its approval of the objectives outlined in the document’s preamble, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam tasked the Lebanese army with preparing a plan to restrict weapons to the state, requesting its submission by 31 August.
In a series of statements during August and September, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Naim Qassem expressed firm rejection of the disarmament plan, clearly affirming that the party would not hand over its weapons under the current circumstances.
In parallel, Iran was concerned with rebuilding Hezbollah’s military capabilities after the severe damage inflicted by Israeli attacks, while closely monitoring the political track related to attempts to disarm it.
Tension Between Iran and Lebanon
The debate between Iran and Lebanon over interference in internal affairs began after the Lebanese government announced its approval of the objectives contained in the preamble of the American plan. Tehran, which is closely following the course of Hezbollah’s disarmament, expressed strong rejection of the plan and considered it a direct threat to its interests in Lebanon.
This tension was reflected in statements by Ali Larijani, Secretary General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, who accused Tom Barrack of pressuring and threatening the Lebanese government.
Iranian rhetoric escalated further with the intervention of Ali Akbar Velayati, adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who described Hezbollah’s disarmament as a dream that would never be realised.
On the other side, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, along with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, regarded these statements as unacceptable interference in the country’s affairs and issued a stern warning to Tehran.
Tensions flared again in November following statements by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi regarding Lebanon. His Lebanese counterpart, Youssef Rajji responded by describing the remarks as blatant interference and rejected Araghchi’s invitation to visit Tehran, stating that he did not plan to do so.
Iran will not be able to effectively defend Hezbollah in the event of a potential Israeli attack.
A Tense Meeting
Amid rising tensions between the two countries, Ali Larijani visited Beirut in August, where he met President Joseph Aoun. The meeting was marked by strain, as Aoun clearly expressed Lebanon’s discomfort with Iran’s policy toward it.
During the meeting, the Lebanese president stressed that no party inside the country has the right to bear arms or to draw strength from external support, warning against any interference in Lebanese affairs. He stated that cooperation with Iran is possible, but must take place within a framework of national sovereignty and mutual respect. He added, “The friendship we wish to establish with Iran must include all Lebanese and should not proceed through a single group or faction alone.”
Aoun also voiced reservations about the approach adopted by some Iranian officials in recent times, considering it unhelpful, and reminded that the Lebanese state and its armed forces alone are responsible for citizens’ security.
In a press conference following the meeting, Larijani responded to Aoun’s remarks by saying, “Every state has the right to decide its own future. We do not interfere in your decisions. The United States brings you a plan. We do not bring one.” He continued, “Resistance is a national asset for you and for all Islamic countries. Your enemy is Israel, which attacks you, and your friends are those who resist Israel. Know your friend and do not err in identifying your enemy. Do not allow Israel to impose through other means what it failed to achieve through war.”
This meeting between Joseph Aoun and Ali Larijani was recorded as one of the most tense moments in the history of Lebanese-Iranian relations.
Disarming Hezbollah Through the Lens of Iranian Domestic Politics
Iran’s support for movements such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansar Allah varies according to the orientations of political currents within the country. Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, these currents have shown clear divergence regarding Iran’s regional policies.
The conservative current views a vast geography, stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Mediterranean and Africa, as potential spheres of influence and believes in the necessity of supporting movements linked to or aligned with Iran in these arenas by all available means.
In contrast, the reformist current calls for focusing efforts on domestic development and utilising the country’s economic potential. This is reflected in a slogan long repeated in reformist circles: “Neither Lebanon nor Gaza, my life for Iran.”
This divergence emerged sharply during the 2009 presidential elections, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad represented the conservative current against Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who represented the reformist current and placed the issue of supporting armed groups in the region on the political agenda in an unprecedented manner.
More recently, former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, one of the most prominent reformist figures with significant influence in Iranian foreign policy, delivered a speech at the Doha Forum on 7 December 2025, stating:
“We supported Arab causes more than the Arabs themselves, and we were even accused of that. We supported Palestine more than any Arab state and paid a heavy price.
I say this clearly: over forty-five years of following Iranian foreign policy, the groups they call our proxies have not fired a single bullet to serve our interests. They fight for their own causes, we support them, and Iran pays the price.
We suffered, were pushed into sanctions and isolation, yet not a single bullet was fired to defend us, not against Israel nor against any other party. We have the right to feel resentment.”
Despite the clarity of the reformist current’s position, no reformist president who came to power in Iran succeeded in changing realities on the ground. The decisive determinant of Tehran’s policy in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, and Yemen remains the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Within this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs functions as an executive body tasked with providing diplomatic cover and justifying these policies internationally.
The Conditions Facing Iran and Hezbollah
Tehran currently faces serious challenges on multiple levels, including economic, political, security, and strategic dimensions. Long-standing economic sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries have severely weakened the Iranian economy and negatively affected citizens’ purchasing power.
In parallel, regional military and political developments since October 2023 have exacerbated the situation, damaging Iran’s military doctrine and reducing its strategic room for manoeuvre in the Middle East.
Iran has found itself in regional isolation as a result of policies pursued over many years, prompting recent attempts to repair relations with some neighbouring states, particularly after attacks it faced from Israel and the United States in June.
With rising talk of a potential new Israeli attack, security agencies and the Revolutionary Guard entered a state of serious alert, despite efforts by Iranian leadership, headed by Ayatollah Khamenei, to downplay the likelihood of such an attack and describe it as rumours aimed at destabilising internal stability.
Under these multiple pressures, Tehran has been compelled to reconsider the extent of its regional footprint and has begun moving toward reducing its presence beyond its borders, without implying a complete withdrawal from the region.
Ongoing transformations point to a disruption of the strategic balance that had existed between Iran and the United States since the early 2010s, particularly in arenas such as Iraq and Lebanon, a disruption that appears likely to work against Iran’s interests.
Based on these factors, Tehran’s position on the issue of disarming Hezbollah, despite its objection, is subject to precise calculations. At present, it lacks the capacity to provide direct support should Israel launch a wide-scale attack on the party.
In this context, Ali Larijani met with senior Hezbollah figures during his visit to Lebanon to attend the anniversary programme marking the death of Hassan Nasrallah, where extensive discussions took place regarding recent developments.
According to an informed source close to official Iranian circles, Larijani stated during this meeting that Iran would not be able to effectively defend Hezbollah in the event of a potential Israeli attack, noting that the party should not expect direct Iranian intervention or military engagement in such a scenario.
Accordingly, failure by the Lebanese government to pass the disarmament plan, combined with Israel launching a comprehensive military operation, could leave Hezbollah to face its fate alone. Sources indicate that this Iranian stance has caused discontent within Hezbollah circles, which have begun to feel that Iran has abandoned them at a critical moment.
Hezbollah’s Historical Link to Iran
The relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is multifaceted, with deep historical, strategic, and ideological roots. Although current conditions may constrain Tehran’s ability to provide direct military support to the party in the face of Israeli pressure and disarmament demands, this does not mean Iran is ready to abandon it easily. Even without military intervention, Iran is likely to continue providing support through economic, logistical, and advisory channels.
This close relationship is tied to Hezbollah’s founding phase itself, as Iran played a direct role in supporting its political and military structure from its inception. This explains why some circles view the party as an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
The book Hezbollah: The Path, the Experience, the Future by Sheikh Naim Qassem is among the most prominent references shedding light on the nature of this relationship, outlining the stages of establishment and the intellectual and organisational backgrounds of the party.
Qassem notes that religious scholars in Lebanon before the Iranian revolution were largely affiliated with the Najaf school and tended to distance Islamic activity from revolutionary or political action, leaving the emerging Islamic movement at the time unable to keep pace with challenges.
With the success of the revolution in Iran, an intellectual debate emerged between the Najaf and Qom orientations regarding the necessity of establishing religious and political ties with the revolutionary leadership in Tehran. Hezbollah later resolved this debate in favour of the Qom school, which was more engaged in practical political activity.
Qassem recounts that the decisive shift came with the formation of committees of solidarity with the Islamic revolution in Iran, which opened direct channels of communication with Ayatollah Khomeini and his circle, laying the foundation for an integrated strategic relationship.
He further states that Hezbollah’s establishment followed the submission of a detailed document by nine individuals to Ayatollah Khomeini, who approved it, granting the party what he described as legitimacy of birth from the perspective of the wali al faqih.
Qassem affirms that doctrinal and military guidance against Israel was conducted under the direct supervision of the Iranian leadership, and that the Revolutionary Guard dispatched a delegation to Lebanon to provide training and establish resistance infrastructure, following explicit directives from Khomeini to offer all forms of support in confronting occupation.
The book clearly shows that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was not merely a supporter of Hezbollah but an active partner in its founding and development at the military, political, and economic levels.
Based on this deep history of coordination, it is difficult to imagine that Iran, despite its current circumstances, would completely abandon Hezbollah, which it considers the cornerstone of its regional project.
In Conclusion
It is inconceivable that Iran would remain silent regarding the complete disarmament of Hezbollah after more than four decades of support, establishment, and coordination. Naturally, successive Iranian statements would lead to strained relations with Lebanon, a tension likely to persist in the foreseeable future.
With Israel initiating a comprehensive military operation aimed at dismantling the party’s capabilities, Iran is expected, despite its inability to engage directly in military terms, to provide everything it can to ensure Hezbollah’s survival and to minimise its losses.
By contrast, American policy, clearly biased toward Israel, has slowed Lebanese efforts to reach an internal settlement over the party’s weapons. Tom Barrack’s statement, “If Lebanon does not do what is required, it will become part of Syria as it was before,” triggered widespread resentment in Beirut and contributed to diminishing trust in American mediation.
This new reality may create an opportunity for understanding between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah through an agreement that ensures the handover of heavy weapons to the army within a national security plan that guarantees stability and avoids escalation. In this context, Sheikh Naim Qassem, known for his diplomatic experience, may play a role in strengthening the party’s political wing and restructuring its military position.
Nevertheless, concerns remain. It is unlikely that the party will relinquish its entire arsenal, particularly light weapons, amid fears of the country sliding toward civil war, a possibility that remains present in the Lebanese landscape.
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