An article published by the Palestine Chronicle, written by Robert Inlakesh, examined the possibility of the occupation resuming war in Gaza and the potential scenarios facing the enclave.
The author stated that “Israel continues to pursue a systematic policy of destroying the Gaza Strip, and that the current truce is nothing more than a temporary phase that may lead either to comprehensive escalation or to the imposition of gradual control, amid a decisive role played by the Palestinian resistance and regional fronts. Despite its military superiority, Israel stands in a position of weakness due to its failure to achieve what it calls absolute victory.”
In the article, translated by Arabi21, Inlakesh said that Tel Aviv’s public refusal to withdraw from Gaza and its insistence on disarming the resistance make the “truce” vulnerable to sliding toward a new wave of mass killing, or toward a slow path of imposed control and displacement. The article pointed to intensified debate over the shape of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, at a time when US President Donald Trump is demanding the disarmament of the Palestinian resistance, met with outright rejection from Gaza, while noting that most analyses have failed to understand Tel Aviv’s real calculations.
Inlakesh added that what is referred to as a ceasefire has proven to be nothing more than a temporary and extended pause in massacres against civilians. He explained that the “first phase” witnessed three fundamental changes despite the continuation of the war: a reduction in the daily rate of killing, a limited increase in aid entry without reaching the required level, and the implementation of a prisoner exchange.
The author stressed that assessing the results of the first phase is essential to understanding the outcomes of the second phase, noting that Israel reaped multiple gains from the partial implementation of the truce. The most notable of these were easing internal pressure on the government of Benjamin Netanyahu by closing the prisoner file, and the decline of Gaza’s presence in international media headlines, which allowed the occupation army to continue the core of its field operations, namely the destruction of buildings and infrastructure.
He pointed out that demolition operations, carried out with the participation of Israeli contractors alongside military engineering units, constituted the bulk of the military effort, while the Israeli army refrained from engaging in confrontations with resistance factions. At the same time, he noted that these operations were fraught with risk due to ambushes prepared by resistance fighters, especially in areas into which the occupation re-entered without permanent presence.
According to the article, the first phase of the truce provided security cover for Israeli soldiers by halting resistance operations. It explains that what is taking place in Gaza amounts to genocide targeting civilians to prepare for mass displacement. Israel exploited the truce period to rehabilitate its military equipment and reduce troop deployment through the civil military coordination centre, making participating states complicit in crimes. It also granted Israel the opportunity to test new scenarios for imposing ethnic cleansing, according to statements by Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declaring no intention for the army to withdraw.
The Second Phase and What It May Reveal
The author considered that Israel’s declared insistence on continuing policies of ethnic cleansing confirms that its military operations have not departed from this framework, forming the basis for understanding the outcomes of the “second phase”.
During the first phase, Israel laid the groundwork for new schemes against Gaza’s population through pressures overseen by the civil-military coordination centre. These included depriving residents of necessities of life, at a time when Hamas security efforts failed to contain crises resulting from the displacement of more than one million people into fragile tents, severe shortages of supplies, unemployment, and psychological trauma, exceeding the capacity of any security apparatus to manage.
Inlakesh pointed out that, in parallel, the Israeli army continued to expand what is known as the “yellow line”, which shifted from a separating line into a killing zone used to prevent residents from returning to their homes or agricultural lands. Meanwhile, infrastructure destruction continues behind this line by the army and private contractors, under American and Israeli leadership of the civil-military coordination centre.
The author explained that the Israeli American plan appears clear in its general objectives, even if its implementation details remain ambiguous. Officials from both sides have announced their intention to confine any reconstruction process to areas under Israeli control, alongside support for local armed groups in those areas.
He clarified that UN Security Council Resolution 2803 grants the United States a direct role in managing Gaza through a “Peace Council” and an international stabilisation force. Hamas has affirmed its categorical rejection of disarmament, while the Palestinian Authority supports the American plan despite lacking any genuine popular base.
Inlakesh added that the absence of any consensus on the “second phase”, combined with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, opens the door to three potential scenarios: the forcible implementation of the plan, the collapse of the truce and a return to the path of genocide, or the continuation of a fragile truce punctuated by intermittent waves of violence and increasing pressure on the civilian population.
He stated that imposing an “international stabilisation force” by force to implement the next phase of the ceasefire appears likely to fail under mounting pressure, as it would inevitably lead to confrontation with resistance factions. This would risk casualties among foreign forces and civilian victims. Moreover, Israel’s refusal to include countries with Muslim majorities and the complexities of forming a multinational force without agreed mechanisms would place it in the midst of complex urban warfare with limited and poorly prepared forces.
He pointed to statements by US President Donald Trump, who recently promoted the idea that countries participating in what he calls the “peace plan” would undertake the task of “destroying Hamas” if it refuses to disarm, claiming that Israel would not need to intervene and that foreign forces would complete the mission entirely.
However, any regime change operation would require a force of no fewer than 250,000 soldiers, rendering the proposal of an “international stabilisation force” impractical due to its enormous requirements, the likelihood of heavy losses, and domestic repercussions for participating states. This makes the scenario likely to fail rapidly.
Inlakesh continued that the other option lies in Israel abandoning the ceasefire, a possibility if Tel Aviv becomes convinced of the failure of its plans during the truce or fears a resistance attack while simultaneously engaging in confrontations with Hezbollah and Iran, considering that American support would not pose an obstacle to this choice.
He stressed that the collapse of the ceasefire would, in practice, mean Israel’s return to a path of genocide, amid the absence of a clear vision to end the war. He also suggested another scenario involving keeping the truce in a state of stagnation while making gradual attempts to impose the “second phase”, aiming to keep the Gaza front closed and concentrate military and political effort on Iran and Lebanon. This path, despite its expected failure, would double the suffering of civilians and make thwarting American and Israeli plans dependent on Iran and Hezbollah’s ability to inflict painful losses on Israel and drag it into a strategic quagmire.
Inlakesh considered that continued military pressure from Lebanon and Iran, drawing Israel into a prolonged war, could place it in an unprecedented crisis and weaken its strategic position, opening the way for impactful escalation from Gaza. Conversely, he warned that temporarily neutralising Iran and Hezbollah through a nominal ceasefire after limited rounds would serve Netanyahu’s interests, as it could pave the way for gradual ethnic cleansing in the Strip unless other fronts are opened.
In conclusion, Inlakesh affirmed that Israel today appears in a position of clear weakness after failing to defeat any of its adversaries, except for the fall of the former Syrian regime, which was not in confrontation with it despite its role as a strategic corridor for the axis of resistance. Israel, after more than two years of war, has not achieved the “complete victory” sought by Netanyahu, yet he continues along this path, driven by the steadfastness of the people of Gaza and Lebanon in rejecting surrender.
Sunna Files has no billionaire owner or shareholders demanding profit.
We are fiercely independent, and every dollar we receive is reinvested directly into our journalism
Helping us pursue the stories that matter and ensuring our reporting remains open and accessible to everyone.
Click here to donate & fund your Islamic Independent Platform
