An extensive investigation by the American newspaper The New York Times revealed a plan being developed by former Syrian generals operating from Russia and Lebanon to lead an armed insurgency inside Syria.
The newspaper reported that the fall of the Assad regime did not eliminate the influence of an elite group of its military and security leaders. Instead, it pushed some of them to reorganise from exile in an effort to undermine the new Syrian government and potentially carve out zones of control within the country.
The investigation relied on intercepted phone calls and text messages, in addition to interviews and in depth analysis, showing how military ambition intersects with money and external political pressure.
The report added that at the heart of this network are two former generals under international sanctions: Suheil al Hassan, a commander of an elite force under the ousted Assad regime, and Kamal al Hassan, the former head of military intelligence.
Despite differing approaches, both men seek to rebuild influence inside a Syria exhausted after 13 years of war.
The newspaper noted that Suheil al Hassan is known by the nickname “the Tiger” due to his reputation for ferocity and brutality in combat. He received Russian support during the war and was among the first officials Moscow sought to evacuate as the regime began to collapse, according to four former officers.
According to the investigation, Suheil al Hassan refuses retirement in exile in Moscow and is the most driven toward the option of armed rebellion. Since the spring of 2025, leaked messages from his phone reveal a military structure quietly taking shape.
The newspaper reported that “the Tiger” conducted a census and documentation of more than 168,000 fighters from the Alawite sect in the Syrian coastal region. Among them, 20,000 have access to machine guns, 331 possess anti aircraft weapons, 150 hold anti armour launchers, and 35 snipers still retain their weapons.
The communications also show that Suheil al Hassan was not acting alone. He received funding from Rami Makhlouf, the powerful businessman and cousin of Bashar al Assad, who is himself seeking a leadership role within the Alawite community from exile in Moscow.
Makhlouf plays the role of both financier and preacher. He does not limit himself to injecting hundreds of thousands of dollars in monthly salaries for fighters, ranging from 200 to 1,000 dollars, but also promotes himself as the “saviour redeemer” capable of protecting the Alawite sect, according to the newspaper.
The New York Times stated that this alliance between money, represented by Makhlouf, and the brutal military expertise embodied by Suheil al Hassan forms, in the newspaper’s assessment, the hard core of what can be described as a “shadow army” waiting for a moment of weakness in the new government to strike.
The newspaper continued, “Perhaps most surprising is that Suheil al Hassan has begun signing his correspondence with the phrase ‘your servant with the rank of mujahid,’ addressing a person he describes as ‘the commander in chief of our army and armed forces,’ with strong indications that this refers to Rami Makhlouf.”
The investigation discussed attempts to purchase weapons, distribute salaries to potential fighters, and even seek coordination with regional militias to smuggle arms, although the network later began to unravel due to internal disputes and difficulties in execution.
It added that Kamal al Hassan, the former head of military intelligence, appears less focused on direct military action and more interested in building external political influence.
The investigation showed that he stands behind what is known as the “West Syria Development Foundation,” operating from Beirut under a humanitarian cover, but which in practice sought to contract American lobbying firms with a deal valued at one million dollars in order to promote the idea of international protection for Alawite areas.
According to official data in the United States dating back to last August, the foundation contracted the American lobbying firm Tiger Hill Partners, as well as Joseph Schmitz, a former adviser to President Donald Trump and a former executive at Blackwater.
According to the newspaper, this path worries diplomats in Syria more than the insurgency plans themselves, as they believe that organised political pressure in Washington could gradually pave the way for calls to establish a semi autonomous region within Syria.
The newspaper explained that the ambitions of the generals do not stop at theoretical planning. Leaks confirmed the involvement of Ghiyath Dalla, a former commander in the Fourth Division of the Syrian army, an elite force, in managing logistical operations from inside Lebanon.
Dalla, 54 years old, lives in modest conditions in exile and was the main driver of attempts to smuggle weapons, including drones and anti tank missiles, in coordination with Iraqi militias linked to Iran.
The newspaper revealed that in one leaked message, Dalla told Kamal al Hassan that he had distributed 300,000 dollars in the form of monthly salaries to potential fighters and field commanders, with amounts ranging between 200 and 1,000 dollars per month.
He also requested approval to purchase satellite communications equipment at a cost exceeding 136,000 dollars.
According to documents cited by the newspaper, Tehran provided safe havens for former Syrian pilots accused of war crimes, such as Mohammad al Hasouri, in Lebanese hotels so they would be ready for any potential military escalation.
Al Hasouri, 60 years old, is considered one of the senior commanders of the air force and is accused of carrying out a chemical weapons attack on the town of Khan Shaykhun in the north of the country in 2017.
Kamal al Hassan wrote that Iranian officials transferred al Hasouri and 20 other pilots from the former regime to a hotel in Lebanon and that they expressed readiness to remain and join the insurgency if the costs of their stay were covered.
The investigation discussed the limits of these efforts. The Alawite community itself does not appear united behind these projects, and many harbour deep bitterness toward a regime that dragged them into a devastating war. The networks the generals attempted to build also suffer from internal divisions, lack of resources, and regional and international surveillance.
The New York Times concluded its investigative report by quoting Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat who defected from the regime, warning the current Syrian government that “if it fails after two or three years, American leaders may look for others to deal with.”
