Five files are expected to be on the agenda of the anticipated meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Trump on 29 December 2025.
First: Implementing the Second Phase of the Security Council Decision
Implementing the second phase of the Trump plan and the United Nations Security Council resolution related to the Gaza Strip will be a central and significant محور of the meeting. Under this file fall several contentious items that could cause the plan to collapse and fail if the Israeli occupation does not show sufficient flexibility toward them.
The most prominent of these issues is the nature of the “Peace Council” in terms of its composition and mandate. Palestinians reject guardianship and external colonial control, and the council is destined to fail unless it is stripped of substance or its powers are amended so that its role is limited to ensuring a ceasefire, facilitating the entry of aid, and overseeing reconstruction. The same applies to the demand to disarm Hamas and the resistance, as there is no state in the world willing to undertake this task on behalf of the Israeli side, which itself failed to achieve it over two years of genocide, starvation, destruction, and displacement. This would mean changing the mission of the international “Stability Force” to tasks related to monitoring ceasefire lines and preventing a return to war.
A third item concerns Israeli withdrawal from the Yellow Line to new lines. This is a highly contentious issue in which the Israelis show significant intransigence, linking it to the disarmament of the resistance, the receipt of the last body of an Israeli captive, and the presence of on-the-ground security guarantees to prevent Hamas and the resistance from reorganising. They also seek to maintain a security situation in the Strip that allows them to carry out assassinations, incursions, and bombardment at will. In addition, some Israeli officials want to turn the Yellow Line from a temporary line into a permanent “border line.” A fourth item concerns the West Bank, its future, and how to address Israeli measures aimed at annexation.
While Trump seeks to appease the Israeli occupation, he finds that the Israeli ceiling prevents him from marketing his plan. He may not find effective Palestinian cooperation from the Ramallah Authority, nor Arab or international backing. Maintaining the status quo would prolong Palestinian suffering, increase global anger and resentment, and lead to further pressure and isolation imposed on the Israeli occupation, at a time when the occupation itself is unable to disarm the resistance and does not wish to administer the lives of more than 2.2 million Palestinians in the Strip. Accordingly, Trump will seek to persuade Netanyahu to show flexibility regarding withdrawal from the Yellow Line, possibly to new lines while retaining control over strategic points, facilitating the movement of people and goods through crossings, allowing the entry of aid and reconstruction materials, and finding marketable formulas related to the “Peace Council,” the “International Stability Force,” and the collection of Hamas and resistance weapons. This also includes facilitating the work of the governmental committee in administering the Strip and granting a greater role to the Ramallah Authority in its management.
Second: The Iranian File
Reports indicate that Iran is restoring and reorganising its nuclear programme and rehabilitating its missile system, while continuing to support resistance forces in Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine. Accordingly, discussion of tightening sanctions and pressure on Iran, and providing American cover for a violent Israeli attack, are expected topics in the talks between Netanyahu and Trump. There are complex American calculations regarding the desire to restrain Iran without entering a war or triggering regional instability.
Third: Between Normalisation and Security Requirements
This file concerns the “engineering” of regional relations and creating more favourable environments for settlement and normalisation pathways. It includes the Israeli occupation’s pursuit of security guarantees from Lebanon and Syria, pressure toward disarming Hizbullah, and providing cover for the security zone controlled by “Israel” in south western Syria, with the possibility of American cover for an Israeli attack targeting Hizbullah and the resistance in Lebanon.
It appears that the American side wants to manage priorities differently. The Israeli method of using an iron fist and harsh tools, and employing top down approaches to subjugate and humiliate regimes and their peoples, is in itself not guaranteed to succeed. It would undermine settlement efforts, disrupt the “Abraham Accords,” and create environments of popular anger and resentment that add fuel to the fire in an unstable region prone to explosion at any moment. Accordingly, Americans may press to de-escalate tensions and obtain security guarantees from regimes without using harsh Israeli tools.
This file also includes American efforts to give momentum to settlement pathways, particularly with Saudi Arabia, and attempts to reorganise and develop Israeli-Turkish relations.
Fourth: Rehabilitating “Israel” in the International Environment
This file aims to repair the horrific image Israel has created for itself through its war on Gaza, as well as on Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. This includes pressure on the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to withdraw charges and close cases filed against the Israeli occupation and its figures.
Fifth: Israeli-American Relations
This file seeks to ensure the continued flow of US military aid, develop trade relations, and address tariff issues on Israeli goods. It also includes a set of measures to “whitewash” Israel’s image within American society and counter the ongoing shift in the United States away from the Israeli narrative and toward greater sympathy for the Palestinian people. This shift is deeply concerning for the Israeli occupation, particularly as the majority of the Democratic Party’s electoral base has become more sympathetic to Palestinians. The Republican Party is also witnessing, for the first time, internal division over support for Israel, with an emerging bloc, still a minority but growing in weight, arguing that the “America First” idea requires placing conditions and constraints on US support for Israel. In addition, a large proportion of university students and young people are inclined toward the Palestinian narrative and strongly criticise Israeli conduct.
Netanyahu, who is preparing for Knesset elections in the coming months, faces a difficult and unsettling situation. Most opinion polls favour opposition forces, and Naftali Bennett represents a strong rival to Netanyahu for the premiership. Around 52% of the Israeli public opposes Netanyahu’s candidacy, according to a poll conducted in December 2025. As a result, Netanyahu is in urgent need of achieving gains or escaping impasses through the American lever, which gives this visit particular importance.
On the other hand, Trump himself will face the US midterm congressional elections in November 2026, with Democrats currently leading in House of Representatives polls. As much as he seeks the support of the Zionist lobby, he also seeks political and economic breakthroughs and achievements. He must exert various pressures, some of which affect the Israeli side, to prevent his plan from failing in Gaza and to realise his ambition of bringing Saudi Arabia into the world of normalisation with “Israel.” He will not be able to do so unless Netanyahu lowers the ceiling of his demands and cooperates to help Trump succeed on a number of the issues outlined above.
