A Saudi-Iranian War as a Possible US Project to Reassert Control Over the Heart of the Region
A heavy sense is seeping into the regional landscape that the Gulf is standing on the threshold of a year that could be the most dangerous in two decades. Predictions speaking of a possible confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2026 are no longer mere whispers on the margins of analysis. They have become recurring themes in reports by Western research centres and in intelligence assessments that view the region as a powder keg requiring only a single spark. Behind closed doors, one question circulates. Are the two sides heading toward open confrontation, or will escalation remain confined to levels that can still be contained?
The warning signs are numerous. Saudi Arabia faces a complex network of threats emanating from Iran’s allies in Yemen and Iraq. Houthi attacks on maritime navigation in the Red Sea have upended global trade balances, as documented by American and British naval reports recording the increased use of precision missiles and drones targeting commercial vessels. Shipping lanes once considered among the safest corridors have turned into a testing ground for Iran’s indirect capabilities, while economies dependent on the Suez Canal, such as Egypt, come under mounting pressure with every new attack.
In contrast, Iran builds its strategy on expanding its sphere of influence without being drawn into an open confrontation. It invests in tools that strike deep without raising its own flag. These instruments have granted Tehran the ability to apply pressure without bearing the full cost of war, prompting some research centres, including the Atlantic Council, to note that Iranian deterrence has become complex and multi-layered. The United States, which for decades served as the Gulf’s primary guardian, is observing the scene through calculations different from those of the past. It does not want a new war, yet it also does not want Saudi Arabia to trade its stability for the illusion of reassurance. As a result, the American position has appeared more ambiguous, as if pushing the parties toward the edge of tension without allowing a fall into the abyss.
An idea circulating in some Western analyses suggests that Washington may allow a certain level of confrontation to unfold before intervening once core interests are threatened. This is not an entirely new policy, but neither is it a fixed rule. The region has changed, and with it the calculations of major powers. China has entered the scene as a mediator between Riyadh and Tehran, yet Beijing’s ability to contain tensions remains under examination. Developments following the March 2023 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran confirm that restoring relations on paper is insufficient to dismantle the deeply rooted conflict.
All of this renders 2026 a year open to risks that cannot be dismissed. If confrontation occurs, it will not remain confined to two states. The entire Gulf will pay the price, with energy markets absorbing the first shock, its reverberations spreading across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea would be enough to reshape oil and gas prices, a point repeatedly highlighted by the International Energy Agency, which consistently links market stability directly to Gulf stability. Egypt, which relies heavily on shipping traffic through the Suez Canal, would be among the first to suffer, as every crisis in the Red Sea translates into immediate revenue losses.
Yet the road to war is not destiny but consequence. Saudi decision makers understand that engaging in a confrontation could threaten the economic transformation project being carefully built in recent years. Iran, despite its elevated rhetoric, is not in a position that allows for a comprehensive war capable of striking the domestic front and opening the door to crushing international pressure. Thus, the region today appears to be walking on a thin layer of glass. Every step is calculated, and any miscalculation may be enough to shatter the fragile balance.
The scene as it currently stands is neither one of inevitable war nor of stable reconciliation. It is the scene of a region slowly approaching a moment of testing, particularly as Saudi Arabia tightens pressure on Iran’s allies in Iraq and Lebanon. It is a moment that may reveal whether years of de-escalation were merely a brief pause or a prelude to a more difficult phase. Until then, the Gulf remains suspended between anxiety and anticipation, with eyes turning toward 2026 as a year that could open a new chapter in the region’s history, a chapter whose colour no one can predict, but whose weight is already being felt as it draws closer.
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