Southern Yemen has witnessed striking geopolitical shifts over recent days that have reshaped the political and military landscape. These developments followed the Southern Transitional Council extending its control, with clear Emirati backing and funding, over Hadramawt governorate and vast areas in the east of the country, reaching the coastal city of Aden. For a full decade, Aden had served as the official seat of the internationally recognised Yemeni government backed by Saudi Arabia.
As a result of these changes, Aden has effectively fallen outside government control, after the departure of most political and military leaders, including the prime minister and the head of the Presidential Leadership Council. This eight member body was created to share presidential powers. A new political reality has thus been consolidated, one dominated almost entirely by the Southern Transitional Council amid an unprecedented institutional vacuum.
The situation has grown more complex with the escalation of separatist rhetoric from the Council, which no longer conceals its inclination to revive the project of a “southern state”. This signals the opening of a new chapter of tensions, not only within Yemen but across regional balances as a whole.
While the visible picture reflects an intense struggle for influence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over southern geography, another actor is quietly and cautiously observing developments. This actor is the Israeli entity, which views the ascendancy of separation as a strategic opportunity that serves its security calculations. This undeclared presence places Tel Aviv, indirectly, at the heart of the conflict equation as one of the influential players shaping the future of southern Yemen.
“Israel” derives its growing interest in Yemen from the exceptional strategic importance of the Bab al Mandab Strait, one of the world’s most vital maritime passages, linking the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. Tel Aviv considers any potential threat to navigation through this strait as a direct danger to its maritime trade and the security of the port of Eilat. It also sees such threats as a strategic pressure card that could fall into the hands of its adversaries, foremost among them Iran.
From this perspective, “Israel” does not treat Yemeni developments as an isolated internal crisis, but as an integral part of the Red Sea security equation and the broader regional conflict. This explains the growth of its influence and its transformation from a mere observer into a key player on the scene.
The Israeli strategy in Yemen: confronting the Houthis first
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, the Yemeni front has emerged as one of the most complex arenas of confrontation for “Israel”. The Houthi group has carried out dozens of missile and drone attacks targeting Israeli territory, alongside repeated attacks on Israeli or Israel linked vessels in the Red Sea. While Tel Aviv has succeeded in containing other fronts, the Yemeni arena has remained open to escalation, posing a security challenge that has yet to be resolved.
In this context, Israeli involvement in the Yemeni file has come as part of the broader confrontation with Iran. Tel Aviv views the Houthis as an extension of Iranian influence. On this basis, “Israel” has dealt with the Yemeni front through two parallel tracks. The first has involved direct military targeting of the Houthis through air strikes that began in May 2025 in response to their missile attacks.
The second track has focused on strategically neutralising the Houthis by supporting the advance of the Southern Transitional Council in southern Yemen. This approach aims to reduce Houthi influence while strengthening Israel’s position against Iran within the regional conflict equation.
Separation versus normalisation: a fundamental strategic shift
Since its formal inclusion in the internationally recognised Yemeni government under the Riyadh Agreement in 2019, the Southern Transitional Council has operated with a wide margin of political and military influence. The agreement granted the Council representation within the Presidential Leadership Council and sovereign portfolios, enabling it to wage successive battles to extend control over most southern and eastern regions. These areas are rich in natural resources and hold immense strategic value in terms of ports, shipping lanes, and supply routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 and the growing Emirati Israeli alignment, Tel Aviv entered the Yemeni crisis through the Emirati gateway. “Israel” came to be regarded as one of the undeclared supporters of the Southern Transitional Council, under the banner of logistically containing the Houthis and curbing their influence, with particular focus on the security of the Red Sea, Bab al Mandab, and Yemeni ports of high strategic value in global trade, energy, and navigation equations.
After consolidating its control over most of the south, the contours of this political and security convergence began to surface publicly. The head of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidarus al Zubaidi, stated during a visit to the United States that normalisation and the establishment of official relations with “Israel” were possible. In remarks reported by the newspaper Maariv, he argued that the establishment of an independent southern state would open the door to joining the Abraham Accords and pursuing an independent foreign policy.
In this context, The Times revealed direct contacts between the Council and Israeli officials to discuss “shared issues”, foremost among them confronting the Houthis. This occurred alongside briefings to Western diplomats and members of the Security Council that Yemeni unity had become a thing of the past and that preparations were under way to announce an independent southern state.
Despite the Council’s efforts, since its establishment in 2017, to revive the pre 1990 southern state and secure international recognition, this path remains fraught with fundamental obstacles. Chief among them are Saudi rejection and Western doubts about the separation project and its repercussions for Yemen’s stability and the wider region.
A strategic gain for “Israel”
There is little doubt that a scenario of southern Yemeni separation, beyond its internal repercussions, would lead to isolating the Houthis in the north and curtailing their logistical access to the Red Sea. This would constitute a clear strategic gain for “Israel”. Such a shift would place Tel Aviv, indirectly, at the heart of the security equation for navigation in Bab al Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, one of the most sensitive maritime passages in the global trade system.
Moreover, potential separation would open the door to the emergence of a new strategic ally for “Israel” in the form of the Southern Transitional Council, backed by the UAE, Tel Aviv’s most prominent regional partner. This alliance would limit Iranian influence in the Red Sea and reduce the Houthis’ room for manoeuvre, thereby strengthening Israel’s deterrence balance in one of the region’s most volatile arenas.
In this context, Hebrew media suggest that “Israel” would be able to enhance its geopolitical position in the Gulf of Aden not only by confronting the Houthis and reducing Iran’s influence, but also by expanding its network of economic relations with new Arab partners.
What about the Houthis and Tehran behind them?
Observers argue that the growing state of division within the internationally recognised Yemeni government, and the possibility of influence struggles erupting among the actors involved, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and “Israel”, may ultimately serve the interests of the Houthi group. According to a divide and rule logic, disputes within the opposing camp grant the Houthis greater space for political and military manoeuvre and ease the pressure of direct confrontation.
At the very least, the group can be assured that these divisions will not negatively affect its military position in the short term, allowing it to maintain control over northern areas that constitute its primary base of support. Even if the Houthis were to lose influence, resources, or logistical positioning in the south, this would not threaten the core of their control so much as reorder lines of engagement according to new priorities.
However, if this debate were to culminate in actual southern separation, it could carry long term repercussions contrary to Iranian calculations. The emergence of an independent southern entity would limit Tehran’s influence over the Red Sea and undermine its presence in one of the world’s most important maritime hubs. This would render short term Houthi gains contingent on a reduction of Iran’s role in this highly sensitive geopolitical zone.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular: what about Yemen’s surrounding states?
The escalating movement in southern Yemen and the serious talk of separation represent a potential geopolitical earthquake that could redraw maps of influence across the entire region. Whoever imposes control over the south would hold the keys to one of the world’s most critical waterways. More than one fifth of global trade passes through Bab al Mandab and the Red Sea, making this geography a decisive pivot in regional and international security equations.
Should Israeli influence extend into these vital passages, Arab national security as a whole would face an unprecedented threat, particularly in light of Tel Aviv’s revealed ambitions that go beyond traditional conflict boundaries toward ideological visions seeking to impose dominance “from the river to the sea”. Such a scenario would place the pillars of Arab security in Israel’s grasp and transform the Red Sea from an Arab international space into a zone of direct Israeli influence.
From this standpoint, Saudi Arabia has for years sought to obstruct the southern separation project by containing the Southern Transitional Council and integrating it within the internationally recognised government as part of an anti Houthi front. Yet this path now appears threatened with collapse, as the Council’s leadership ambitions have moved beyond power sharing toward monopolising the south as an independent entity, even if through the gateway of normalisation with “Israel”.
In this context, Egyptian concern has grown in particular. The extension of Israeli influence into the Red Sea via the Yemeni flank constitutes a nightmare for Cairo’s national security. This raises the prospect that continuation of the separation scenario could overturn the table and force all parties to recast their alliances and strategic calculations.
In conclusion, southern Yemen is no longer merely an arena of internal conflict. It has become a geopolitical knot where the calculations of regional and international powers intersect, from the Gulf to the Red Sea. Between the Southern Transitional Council’s push for separation, the growing undeclared Israeli presence, and the erosion of cohesion within the internationally recognised government, Yemen is heading toward a pivotal phase that may redraw maps of influence and alliances across the region.
Within this complex scene, the repercussions of what is unfolding in the south appear likely to transcend Yemen’s geographic boundaries and affect Arab national security and the security of international navigation. Any forthcoming political or military eruption would thus represent a decisive test for regional stability as a whole.
