The ceasefire agreement in Gaza, consisting of twenty clauses, is on the verge of entering its second phase after the first phase produced a fragile cessation of hostilities, a prisoner exchange, and the partial withdrawal of the Israeli occupation army to what is now known as the “yellow line” inside the Strip.
With the upcoming visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington to meet US President Donald Trump between 28 December 2025 and 1 January 2026, public debate today focuses on the contours of phase two and the feasibility of implementing it on the ground.
Phase Two Clauses
Phase two includes five core components:
Clause One: Withdrawal of the occupation army from the Strip
During the first phase, occupation forces withdrew to an internal line termed the yellow line, which constitutes 53 percent of Gaza’s landmass. Within this zone, Israeli forces remain positioned east of Gaza City and Khan Younis, and in the far north and south of the Strip.
On 20 October 2025, images showed the placement of yellow concrete blocks outside the line to demarcate its borders on the ground, amid assessments that the move aims to facilitate a long-term occupation.
Under the agreement, phase two requires Israel to withdraw beyond the yellow line and exit the Strip entirely. Yet Netanyahu’s government continues to reject this.
Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir stated that “the yellow line is an advanced defensive line and will remain even after the launch of phase two”.
Clause Two: Disarmament of Hamas and other factions
“Israel” places the disarmament of Hamas and all other military factions at the top of its conditions for executing phase two. The agreement stipulates that Hamas must surrender its heavy weapons and retain only light arms for local police.
Netanyahu affirmed that phase two is “far more difficult than the first because of the weapons issue”, stressing that he is “determined to disarm them by any means, even if international forces fail”.
Hamas leader Basem Naim stated that the movement is ready to “freeze or store” its weapons as part of a political process leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state, but rejects handing them over to a foreign force.
Naim and several Hamas officials underlined that their commitment to arms is tied to the continuation of the occupation, while the movement is willing to accept a long-term truce of five to ten years.
Clause Three: Deployment of an international stabilisation force
Details surrounding the international force remain unclear. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 24 October that it is still under formation and that various countries have shown interest in participating, without offering further specifics.
Axios reported on 30 October that Trump administration officials are holding talks with several countries about creating an international force incorporating units from the Palestinian police to be deployed in Gaza.
Hamas welcomed the participation of Arab and Islamic states in the UN-mandated force “to safeguard the borders and monitor the ceasefire without operating inside Gaza”. But both Israel and the United States insisted the force must take on the mission of disarming Hamas.
Israeli government spokesperson Shosh Pedrosian said Tel Aviv is working toward “comprehensive security control” over Gaza, raising concerns that the force could become a new façade for cementing occupation, especially with Israel rejecting participation from certain states, including Türkiye and Qatar.
Clause Four: Formation of a technocratic committee to administer Gaza
The United States is preparing to form a temporary committee to administer Gaza, alongside a “Peace Council” that will supervise its work by 15 December 2025. This framework is designed as an administrative, service-driven structure — not a political one — aimed at extending Israeli control after two years of genocide.
The Palestinian Authority rejected the idea, deeming it a blow to national legitimacy. Palestinian factions described it as an attempt to entrench American-Israeli trusteeship over Gaza, affirming that the solution lies in comprehensive Palestinian dialogue leading to a unified national leadership.
Netanyahu told the New York Times that he is willing to work only with Palestinian figures unaffiliated with either the PA or Hamas, raising questions about the viability of a committee operating without the participation of these primary local actors.
Clause Five: Launch of reconstruction
The plan calls for the start of Gaza’s reconstruction, where destruction is estimated at 84 percent of infrastructure and costs exceeding 70 billion dollars, according to the United Nations.
Before reconstruction begins, Gulf states — especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia — demand a clear pathway toward establishing a Palestinian state. Western countries link funding to disarmament and reforms within the Palestinian Authority.
Under Trump’s plan, the technocratic committee is expected to coordinate reconstruction efforts with donor states and UN agencies to secure funding and oversee the rebuilding of homes and destroyed infrastructure. Yet this remains theoretical given Israel’s refusal to allow full reconstruction, limiting work to building cities under its direct control, such as “Green Rafah”.
Why is Netanyahu obstructing phase two?
Netanyahu has set conditions not included in the agreement that prevent phase two from beginning. The most notable include:
The hostage pretext: “Israel” insists that recovering the remains of the last missing Israeli under the rubble in Gaza is a prerequisite for moving to phase two.
Security pretexts: “Israel” treats the yellow line as a new defensive border enabling its forces to remain in half of Gaza to prevent Hamas from rebuilding capabilities.
International force concerns: Israel fears losing security control if the international force replaces its troops, particularly if participating countries diverge from its policies.
Domestic political considerations: Netanyahu’s coalition stability depends on far-right parties opposed to withdrawing from Gaza. He prefers maintaining the status quo to avoid collapsing the government.
Undermining political solutions: Netanyahu seeks to delay phase two to avoid renewed discussions on a Palestinian state and the future of Gaza and the West Bank.
Additional demands: “Israel” ties phase two to further conditions such as full destruction of tunnels and guarantees preventing Hamas from rearming.
What to expect?
The Trump administration believes continued gridlock threatens diplomatic and economic gains, according to Israeli reports. In early December 2025, Trump phoned Netanyahu urging a shift from military escalation in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria to diplomatic confidence-building measures. This, he argued, is essential for expanding normalisation agreements with Arab states and presenting a major achievement for his administration, according to Yedioth Ahronoth.
Washington’s expected steps for implementing phase two include:
The White House intends to announce the move into phase two before the end of 2025, even without recovering the last Israeli soldier’s remains.
Trump is expected to unveil the members of the Peace Council and the technocratic committee that will administer Gaza, along with the states participating in the stabilisation force.
The US will attempt to convince Israel to allow Türkiye’s participation in the international force, as its presence reinforces the legitimacy of operations in Gaza and helps secure Hamas’ adherence to the agreement.
The United States, along with Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye, is working to persuade Hamas to begin phased disarmament, starting with heavy weapons while temporarily retaining light arms.
The Peace Council will begin reconstruction projects in the Israeli-controlled portions of Gaza even before disarmament is completed.
Netanyahu’s visit will provide Trump with an opportunity to present his vision for expanding normalisation agreements and convincing Saudi Arabia and other states to support Gaza’s reconstruction in exchange for Israeli concessions.
Trump’s ability to impose his vision depends on the responses of multiple parties: Hamas, which remains reluctant to surrender its weapons; “Israel”, which uses security pretexts to maintain control over Gaza; and Arab states that require guarantees before contributing to reconstruction.
Nevertheless, Israeli and American sources indicate that the closing days of 2025 may prove decisive. Netanyahu’s visit could determine whether phase two takes shape soon or remains ink on paper.
