The aggressive role played by the United Arab Emirates is becoming increasingly visible, as it turns conflict zones across the Middle East and Africa into open laboratories for testing and circulating cheap Chinese weapons. At the centre of this ecosystem stands the Chinese Type 81 rifle, which has become a signature weapon in the hands of militias aligned with Abu Dhabi.
The same weapon that appeared in southern Gaza with Israel backed militias is the very same rifle that has spread among Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, as well as armed formations aligned with the UAE in Yemen and Libya.
This reflects a supply network stretching from the factories of the Chinese company Norinco to militias receiving financial and logistical support from Abu Dhabi, positioning the UAE as one of the most prominent gateways for smuggling Chinese weapons into the heart of Arab warzones.
The appearance of the Type 81 rifle in Gaza among militia elements supported by Israel carries significant implications. This hybrid rifle, blending Kalashnikov design with SKS characteristics, has never been widely present in the Strip. Its sudden emergence reflects a militia based armament track unrelated to traditional resistance factions.
Local sources in southern Gaza confirmed that large quantities of this weapon reached the militias of Yasser Abu Shabab, accused of collaboration with the occupation and carrying out security tasks under its supervision.
Military experts note that the entry of such a weapon into a besieged territory like Gaza cannot happen through random smuggling, but rather through a regional actor with a sophisticated access network and invisible transport channels — pointing directly at the UAE, which has used the same pattern in other conflict arenas.
In Sudan, it is no longer a secret that the Rapid Support Forces have received a massive flow of Chinese weaponry over recent years — from tactical vehicles, automatic weapons, and drones, to anti armour missiles, jamming systems, and shoulder launched defences.
UN reports and repeated testimonies from Sudanese officials have consistently indicated that the UAE served as the primary transit hub for these weapons.
Notably, the Type 81 rifle was among the weapons documented in battles across Khartoum and Darfur, confirming that the same logistical pipeline supplying Abu Shabab’s militias in Gaza is the one fuelling the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s conflict.
In Yemen, the UAE adopted the same approach, arming the Security Belt Forces, Shabwa Elite Forces, and West Coast Brigades with various Chinese and Russian weapons, in addition to attack drones that shifted the course of the war.
The same occurred in Libya, where large shipments of Chinese equipment were sent to Khalifa Haftar’s forces, prompting the United Nations to open extensive investigations into arms networks flowing from Abu Dhabi toward the Libyan coast.
Across all these arenas, Chinese weapons have emerged as a central component in the arsenal of militias that the UAE relies on to reshape power dynamics in line with its regional ambitions.
The key question remains: why does the UAE resort to Chinese weapons despite possessing vast American and Israeli arsenals? The answer lies in a delicate formula combining economics, politics, and security.
Chinese weapons are inexpensive compared with global markets, and they come without legal or political restrictions. China does not care who uses the weapons after purchase, nor does it require human rights guarantees or end use monitoring — unlike the United States and Israel, which cannot sell weapons that might later appear in the hands of militias implicated in war crimes.
Washington and Tel Aviv also fear that sensitive equipment — such as drones and guidance systems — could fall into the hands of China, Iran, or Russia, so they fully block transfers of this type to the UAE’s proxy forces.
This makes Chinese weapons the perfect choice, allowing the UAE to wage proxy wars without leaving clear fingerprints while influencing conflict trajectories from behind the scenes, whether in Gaza, Khartoum, Aden, or Benghazi.
Even when the UAE has the capacity to arm militias with Western weapons, it avoids doing so, because the appearance of American or Israeli weapons in the hands of Abu Dhabi backed groups in Gaza or Sudan would expose direct US and Israeli involvement in fuelling these wars — something all three parties want to avoid.
As for how the UAE obtains such vast quantities of Chinese weapons, the military relationship between Abu Dhabi and Beijing has become one of the largest defence partnerships in the region over the past decade.
The UAE has purchased Wing Loong drones, surveillance systems, radars, ammunition, and various armoured equipment, in addition to large stocks of light weapons. This continuous flow has produced a surplus easily redistributed to militias operating on Abu Dhabi’s behalf across multiple fronts.
The appearance of the Type 81 rifle in Gaza with Israel linked militia elements is yet another link in a long chain illustrating how the UAE has become one of the region’s largest suppliers of illicit weapons, using China as a convenient front and a source that asks no questions.
The same weapon circulating in Gaza resurfaces in Darfur, in Shabwa, in Jufra, and in every theatre where Abu Dhabi seeks to project influence through money and weapons instead of politics.
Observers confirm that this system connecting Beijing, Abu Dhabi, and militias across three continents is not merely an arms trade, but a long term influence project that fuels chaos, deepens wars, and redraws conflict maps in the interests of a state that has chosen to operate beyond its borders without ethical or political constraints, under a Chinese umbrella that gives it space to manoeuvre while shielding it from the consequences of the bloodshed its weapons cause.
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